LIMITED AZERBAIJANI REACTION TO NEWS OF THE MINSK

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAKU 001453

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

FOR EUR/CARC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/07/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PBTS KPAO AM AJ
SUBJECT: LIMITED AZERBAIJANI REACTION TO NEWS OF THE MINSK
GROUP'S WRITTEN PROPOSALS


Classified By: Ambassador Anne E. Derse for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Azerbaijani reaction to the announcement
that the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs forwarded written
proposals for resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) conflict to
the governments of Azerbaijan and Armenia has been muted.
The majority of commentators and average Azerbaijanis
routinely express their lack of faith in the Minsk Group
process -- arguing that it has failed to achieve results --
and their general disinterest in following the specifics of
this diplomatic process. While there was limited reaction
and the story was not extensively covered in the press,
several commentators focused on EUR DAS Matthew Bryza's
statement about the potential outcome of the 2008 Azerbaijani
Presidential election (septel). End Summary.

Limited Public Interest
--------------


2. (C) Political commentator Ilgar Mammadov told us the
general public and Azerbaijani intellectuals are not very
interested in the news of the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs'
written proposals for resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh (NK)
conflict. Reflecting a view we often hear, Mammadov said the
Azerbaijani people "do not take the Minsk Group process
seriously anymore." Mammadov personally commented that he
was not very interested in the news as he saw little ground
for optimism regarding a settlement, while observing that the
proposals do not appear to be a new development since the
Co-Chairs publicly revealed the basic principles in June

2006.


3. (C) More broadly speaking, the overwhelming majority of
Azerbaijanis we meet with seem to have little confidence or
interest in the Minsk Group process, septel. There are
varying reasons undergirding this sentiment, but most
Azerbaijanis come back to the argument that the Minsk Group
process has lasted for years without a settlement.
Reflecting a wide-spread view, one Azerbaijani told us the
Minsk Group Co-Chairs continue to the region for a few days,
hold their talks, but nothing happens. He laughed and said
the process is just mere talk with no results.


4. (C) In conversations with oppositionist Eldar Namazov and
Taleh Aliyev -- a member of the "Karabakh Forum"
organization, which calls for the GOAJ to put a deadline on
the Minsk Group negotiations -- about the written proposals,
Namazov and Aliyev focused their criticism on EUR DAS Matthew
Bryza's reported statement regarding the likely outcome of
2008 Azerbaijani presidential election in response to a
question as to how the elections might affect the
negotiations. (Press reaction septel.) Namazov and Aliyev
argued that Bryza's statement suggested the U.S. foresees a
predetermined outcome in the presidential election.

GOAJ's Bellicose Rhetoric: Who Believes It?
--------------


5. (C) The Embassy continues to monitor the GOAJ's rhetoric
on the NK conflict and the domestic reaction. The GOAJ has
gradually adopted a more bellicose tone toward the conflict
in selective public statements over the past several years.
Defense Minister Safar Abiyev's recent statement in Astana
that the possibility of war is close to 100 percent as long
as Armenia occupies Azerbaijani lands fits this broader
pattern. Despite the rhetoric, however, the majority of
Azerbaijani commentators, and other international observers,
do not believe that the GOAJ would initiate a conflict within
the next five years. These commentators argue that the more
strident GOAJ statements have three target audiences. First,
the GOAJ seeks to convince its population that it will not
make unnecessary compromises and there is a correlation
between Azerbaijan's energy wealth and its negotiating
position. Second, the GOAJ seeks to signal to the Armenian
government that it increasingly is negotiating from a
position of strength. Thirdly, the GOAJ hopes such
statements will pressure the international community -- and
the OSCE Minsk Co-Chairs in particular -- to lean on the
Armenian government to make concessions.


6. (C) Comment: While most Azerbaijani commentators

disregard the possibility for war in the short-term, the
GOAJ's bellicose statements are part of a broader GOAJ
foreign policy approach that is more confident, seeking to
project an image of Azerbaijan's growing regional prestige
and strength (septel). As the GOAJ uses its huge inflow of
petrodollars to build up its military capacity and
demonstrate its regional prestige, the possibility for a
military clash along the line of contact exists.
DERSE