AZERBAIJANI DFM AZIMOV DISCUSSES AZERBAIJAN'S

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAKU 001382 SIPDIS SIPDIS FOR EUR/CARC E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/21/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL AJ IR MARR MNUC PARM RS SUBJECT: AZERBAIJANI DFM AZIMOV DISCUSSES AZERBAIJAN'S INTERPRETATION OF FUTURE PROSPECTS ON CFE Classified By: Ambassador Derse for reasons 1.4 (b, d) ¶1. (C) Azerbaijani Deputy Foreign Minister (DFM) Araz Azimov and Ambassador Derse met November 12 to discuss several security-related issues (septels),including Azerbaijan's participation in the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty and the "Tashkent Agreement." Azimov told the Ambassador that Baku's position on the CFE was not conducive to Azerbaijan's national security. Azimov laid down the marker as he has before, that at some point in the future Azerbaijan could abandon observation of the limits set by the "Tashkent Agreement" on the number of tanks/armaments that Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia can possess. ¶2. (C) Azimov was clear to differentiate between the main CFE treaty, which the GOAJ in general supports, and the "Tashkent Agreement" of 1992 which Azerbaijan never ratified although it has "voluntarily" abided by the "Tashkent Agreement" limits. Azimov said that if Azerbaijan ultimately abandons the "Tashkent Agreement" limits, Azerbaijan should not be considered to be violating the agreement since it had never ratified the "Tashkent Agreement." ¶3. (C) Azimov said that there were two primary national interests that Azerbaijan had in breaking the CFE/Tashkent Agreement ceilings. Azerbaijan would not be "following" Russia's example of leaving the CFE, nor was Azerbaijan using it as some kind of political cover by which they could exceed their CFE "limits". Azimov said that Azerbaijan considers there to be a tactical military alliance between Armenia and Russia and, as such, given that Armenia has a military alliance with a country that will be outside the CFE treaty, Russia and Armenia should be considered as one entity. In addition, he was quick to point out that the military equipment in the Azerbaijani occupied territories needed to be counted against Armenia, since the area was under Armenian military control. Azimov said that Azerbaijan's position was in large part shaped by the current situation with Nagorno-Karabakh settlement process, which he described as "not encouraging." He said that Azerbaijan was not able to support the adapted CFE as long as the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict continued. ¶4. (C) Second, Azimov said that Azerbaijan was deeply concerned about developments with Iran, and that given Azerbaijan's geographical position vis-a-vis Iran, it would not be tactically wise to limit the amount of armaments to which they had access. Azimov said that should tensions flare with Iran, Azerbaijan would have "no idea" of what would happen, or what it may need to defend itself. He speculated even a "ground invasion" could take place from Iran. ¶5. (C) COMMENT: Azimov covered a number of security issues at this meeting, but it was interesting that he presented the CFE issue first, and in detail. He reiterated the GOAJ's position, confirming that he was simply restating Azerbaijan's long-held views. Azimov did not give any indication as to when Azerbaijan might abandon either the "Tashkent Agreement" or the CFE agreement itself, but it seems clear he was laying the groundwork for such a step to take place in the coming months. END COMMENT. DERSE