BAKU EAC MEETING - 11/9/07

S E C R E T BAKU 001352 SIPDIS SIPDIS NOFORN DEPT FOR D, P, M, INR, DS/IP/EUR, DS/ICI/PII, DS/DSS/ITA, EUR/CARC, S/CT AND CA; FRANKFURT FOR MCESC REGION I E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/09/2027 TAGS: ASEC CASC PREL PINR PTER AJ SUBJECT: BAKU EAC MEETING - 11/9/07 REF: BAKU 1326 AND PREVIOUS Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Donald Lu per 1.4 (b,c,d). ¶1. (S/NF) DCM convened an EAC meeting on November 9 at 1400 to review the latest information concerning an ongoing threat against the Embassy (reftel) and the Embassy's security posture in response to this threat. DCM, CONS, GRPO, IMC, IMO, MSG, POL/ECON and RSO attended. GRPO reported that Azerbaijani authorities had captured one of the four fugitives in the Baku metropolitan area on November 4. According to the Ministry of National Security (MNS),the fugitive was armed with hand grenades and had written a suicide note. The MNS also reported that the fugitive confirmed that the group led by Kamran Asadov had planned to attack the U.S. Embassy on OCTOBER 27. The MNS believes that the three remaining fugitives are still armed and in the Baku metropolitan area and most likely are together. The MNS believes the group is not trying to flee Baku and may not have given up on its plans to attack the Embassy; however, the MNS does not believe there is an imminent threat against the Embassy nor does the MNS believe that there is any information indicating a specific threat against the Marine Corps Ball. The MNS now believes the group was responsible for the OCTOBER 27 armed robbery of a gas station in Baku (reftel). GRPO reported that the Asadov group has historical links to a separate Islamic Jihad Union-affiliated terrorist group. There are no obvious operational links between this group and the Asadov group. Full reporting in GRPO channels. ¶2. (S/NF) The EAC noted that the latest information from the MNS contradicts previously available information. The EAC agreed that the situation was likely to remain fluid and that we were unlikely to have a more full picture of the group, its intentions, capabilities or possible expanded links. The EAC agreed that the Embassy must maintain a heightened security posture and discussed the need to reduce the subsequent strain on Embassy resources. The EAC recommended that the Ambassador take a careful look at the number of USG visitors requiring extra security protection and the number of large representational events that require extra security staff, in light of the need to maintain extra guard shifts for the foreseeable future. The EAC also agreed that the Embassy should move to a mandatory, staggered work schedule in order to reduce the numbers of Embassy personnel entering and leaving the Embassy at peak hours, and to reinforce among Embassy staff the need to maintain a heightened security posture. ¶3. (S/NF) The RSO reviewed security precautions for the Marine Corps Ball, in light of the continuing threat against the Embassy. Although the RSO, working with local police, has done everything possible to increase our security posture for the event, the EAC agreed that drop-off and pick-up remained a vulnerability. The EAC recommended that the DCM send a message to Embassy personnel to urge them to either use a driver who could drop them off and pick them up within the security cordon or park at the Embassy's unclassified annex and use an Embassy-provided shuttle to reach the event. The EAC unanimously agreed that the Ball should be held on November 10 as planned, with the additional security precautions. ¶4. (U) The EAC adjourned at 1500. DERSE