Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BAKU1331
2007-11-06 11:20:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baku
Cable title:  

FM MAMMADYAROV REVIEWS CASPIAN DELIMITATION, IRAN

Tags:  PBTS PREL ENRG MARR IR TX AJ 
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P 061120Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY BAKU
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4178
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHDIR/IRAN RPO DUBAI PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAKU 001331 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/04/2017
TAGS: PBTS PREL ENRG MARR IR TX AJ
SUBJECT: FM MAMMADYAROV REVIEWS CASPIAN DELIMITATION, IRAN
SANCTIONS, 2+2 TALKS AND UNGA

REF: A. STATE 146521


B. STATE 145641

C. STATE 148506

BAKU 00001331 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Ambassador Anne E. Derse for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAKU 001331 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/04/2017 TAGS: PBTS PREL ENRG MARR IR TX AJ SUBJECT: FM MAMMADYAROV REVIEWS CASPIAN DELIMITATION, IRAN SANCTIONS, 2+2 TALKS AND UNGA REF: A. STATE 146521 ¶B. STATE 145641 ¶C. STATE 148506 BAKU 00001331 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Ambassador Anne E. Derse for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: During a November 2 meeting, Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Mammadyarov said that he was optimistic that a delimitation deal with Turkmenistan was possible. Mammadyarov suggested that the U.S. assist Azerbaijan by helping to draft a joint declaration outlining the median line as the concept for delimitation and then delivering it to Turkmen President Berdimuhamedov directly. Mammadyarov also strongly urged that the U.S. do all it could to ensure that Berdimuhamedov received a clear message during his EU meetings in Brussels, something Mammadyarov suggested was essential to any possible deal moving forward. The Ambassador also reviewed with Mammadyarov on new U.S. sanctions on Iran, recent 2 2 talks with Russia, and the U.S. position on key UNGA votes. End Summary. Mammadyarov on Caspian Delimitation -------------- ¶2. (C) Meeting with the Ambassador on November 2, Azerbaijani Foreign Minister (FM) Mammadyarov seemed upbeat about prospects for a delimitation deal with Turkmenistan, saying that Turkmen President Berdimuhamedov's public statements at the Caspian Summit in Tehran suggested that Turkmenistan supported a median line agreement and that Turkmenistan's position concerning any pipeline agreement was that it should be left up to the relevant states to decide such a matter. Saying that the Turkmen are a very suspicious people, Mammadyarov said that if Berdimuhamedov supports a median division, then Azerbaijan should pursue a joint Azerbaijan-Turkmenistan declaration based on the median line. Adding that clarifications should be decided by experts, Mammadyarov said that if both sides were conceptually amenable to a median line agreement as the basis for a maritime border in principle, experts could work out the details of defining the specifics of the median line to resolve the Azerbaijan-Turkmenistan dispute, there should be no problem pursuing a new trans-Caspian interconnector. Mammadyarov went on to say that if Berdimuhamedov is interested in an interconnector, he should recognize that we have a joint border, where exactly is for the experts to &#
x000A;decide. If we have a border, no one else can dispute this, Mammadyarov emphasized. ¶3. (C) Mammadyarov said that he had discussed this proposal with Turkmenistan's Deputy Foreign Minister (DFM) on the fringe of the Caspian Summit in Tehran, who he reportedly told that if both sides can agree on their delimitation, then the whole Caspian is a done deal because four states would have agreed, leaving only Iran out. According to Mammadyarov, the Turkmen DFM said that he would have to deliver Mammadyarov's proposal "to the top." Mammadyarov commented that he is worried about Turkmen Foreign Minister Meredov because "he is from the past." Mammadyarov said that if Azerbaijan were to deliver a draft proposal, U.S. support would help the Turkmen to accept. Mammadyarov suggested that U.S. lawyers draft a simple, two-sentence declaration outlining the median line as the agreed concept for delimitation and saying that experts will explore the details in the meantime, suggesting that such a proposal would "open Turkmen minds." Mammadyarov suggested that the U.S. take the letter to the Turkmen "since they trust you." Returning to Berdimuhamedov's public statement, Mammadyarov said "I don't think he's playing." ¶4. (C) Saying that he thought SCA PDAS Mann was taking a more cautious approach to the Turkmen, Mammadyarov said "I think now is the time to press ahead on the trans-Caspian pipeline because he is stronger at home." According to Mammadyarov, if Berdimuhamedov "gets a clear message from Brussels, this is a good thing." Suggesting that the Europeans were "very shaky and we need a clear message," Mammadyarov said that he had suggested to EUR DAS Bryza that he use the November 5-7 Berdimuhamedov visit to Brussels to push for greater engagement. According to Mammadyarov, Berdimuhamedov wants "to be sure Europe won't give up on him otherwise Russia will come in - this is critical for his survival," adding that Berdimuhamedov "will definitely come to a conceptual agreement with us if he gets a clear message in Brussels." Mammadyarov believes that this would make sense for Turkmenistan from a diversification point of view BAKU 00001331 002.2 OF 003 because the Turkmen could use their offshore fields for the trans-Caspian pipeline, their fields near the Kazakh border for Russian and Chinese exports, and continue to supply the Iranians with approximately 3 million cubic meters, according to "our sources," Mammadyarov said. Mammadyarov noted that the Iranians are trying to convince the Turkmen not to proceed with a trans-Caspian pipeline and instead expand exports through Iran and on to Azerbaijan or Europe via the Nabucco pipeline. ¶5. (C) Mammadyarov said that unresolved debt issues continue to limit rapprochement with Turkmenistan, although Presidents Aliyev and Berdimuhamedov had agreed in St. Petersburg to discuss the issue based on documentation. Mammadyarov said that Azerbaijan would add an additional three percentage points to what is owed Turkmenistan these past ten years, not an inflated figure "based on bribes." Noting that the Turkmen had recently sent a team to Baku to discuss the issue, Mammadyarov said that the Turkmen "held the same position" and that DFM Khalafov would travel November 20 to Ashgabat. Separately, Mammadyarov said that the Turkmen Embassy in Baku would reopen and that the delay in launching the bilateral joint commission was another "annoying" issue for him. Mammadyarov on Iran -------------- ¶6. (C) After outlining the State and Treasury Departments' recent designation of Iranian entities and individuals, and the Financial Action Task Force's strong message that states be aware of the risks of doing business with Iran, the Ambassador notified Mammadyarov that visiting EUR A/S Fried would be discussing the status of anti-money laundering (AML) and counter-terrorist finance (CFT) legislation in Azerbaijan. To this, Mammadyarov said that he had sent the Azerbaijani parliament a letter requesting support on this legislation (Mammadyarov later clarified that his letter was to support Azerbaijan joining a UN AML/CFT Convention). Asked by the Ambassador if the Foreign Ministry was engaged on this issue, Mammadyarov said "I just encouraged them." He also said that "honestly speaking, we have to research the finances of Melli Bank." Asked by the Ambassador to clarify a National Bank statement quoted in the press saying it did not support U.S. sanctions, Mammadyarov responded "don't compare our press to your press!" and "I am not happy with the journalism of Azerbaijan." Mammadyarov on the 2 2 Talks -------------- ¶7. (C) Responding to the Ambassador's readout of the 2 2 Talks (ref a),Mammadyarov confirmed that the Russians were surprised by the USG's constructive proposal, based on their readout with him. He also noted that the Russian First Deputy FM had briefed him on efforts to explore a joint regional missile defense architecture. Asking about the U.S. offer to allow observers at sites, Mammadyarov sought clarification if this would include all four sites, asking if A/S Fried would discuss this with President Aliyev. Telling Mammadyarov that A/S Fried was prepared to discuss the issue with President Aliyev, the Ambassador also suggested that A/S Fried could provide additional details related to observers, adding that the U.S. was taking Russian concerns seriously and in the context of our proposal on a joint regional architecture. ¶8. (C) Mammadyarov said that inclusion of Azerbaijan as part of a regional security arrangement was "good for us." Any Qabala specific role is of interest because we are a target - the "Iranians have warned us." Mammadyarov said that Iran had asked Azerbaijan if the radar was directed against it, adding that Azerbaijan had told the Iranians that if Iran is only pursuing a peaceful nuclear program, then Iran had nothing to fear. According to Mammadyarov, Azerbaijan had to be part of the system and "think one hundred years in advance." Telling the Ambassador that it was his understanding that at the 2 Plus 2 Talks a broader package had been discussed, not just missile defense, Mammadyarov asked if "they had put different eggs in a basket?" To this, the Ambassador said that the U.S. was not linking the issues, but discussing a full range of strategic issues that both nations must work on and that Azerbaijan should be pleased with this. Mammadyarov responded that "we want to use this situation (Qabala) for our benefit." BAKU 00001331 003.2 OF 003 Mammadyarov on UNGA Resolutions -------------- ¶9. (C) The Ambassador also raised two UNGA resolutions with Mammadyarov, one dealing with rape and the other the Cuba Embargo (refs b and c). Informing Mammadyarov that the U.S. had worked with the OIC to oppose rape as a state policy, the Ambassador asked Mammadyarov for Azerbaijan's support during the vote. Mammadyarov replied that he could not believe anyone would not support this resolution. On the Cuba Embargo resolution, Mammadyarov said that Azerbaijan had been "with the 184 countries." Noting that the Azerbaijani trade delegation to Cuba had been postponed, Mammadyarov informed the Ambassador that Cuba would be opening an embassy in Baku, adding the Cuban ambassador to Baku would be a "good ambassador." Saying that it was Azerbaijan's belief that it was better for countries to be "on the inside rather than on the outside" in order to promote democracy, Mammadyarov said that over 1,000 Cubans had been educated in Azerbaijan during the Soviet period, primarily at the oil academy and international law department, and that there is a large Azerbaijan diaspora in Cuba. Mammadyarov also said that Azerbaijan could not have many embassies in South America because it had so few fluent Spanish speakers, so Cuba was an important element along with Mexico and Brazil. Responding to the Ambassador's question about what interest Cuba would have in having an embassy in Baku, Mammadyarov said that this would be the first Cuban embassy in the Caucasus, with Cuba having over 145 embassies, mainly smaller one to two person posts. DERSE

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