AZERBAIJAN PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR SAYS TEHRAN SUMMIT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAKU 001319 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/30/2017 TAGS: PBTS PREL ENRG MARR IR AJ SUBJECT: AZERBAIJAN PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR SAYS TEHRAN SUMMIT ALL TALK AND LITTLE ACTION REF: BAKU 1263 BAKU 00001319 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Ambassador Anne E. Derse for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: During an October 26 meeting with the Ambassador, Azerbaijani Presidential Foreign Policy Advisor Novruz Mammadov provided a read out of the recent Tehran Caspian Summit (reftel). Mammadov affirmed Azerbaijan's long-standing position that it does not need a five-party agreement on delimitation in order to proceed on Caspian energy projects, including a trans-Caspian pipeline. Mammadov said delimitation talks would continue at the deputy ministerial level and was upbeat about prospects for progress with Turkmenistan because Turkmen President Berdimuhamedov's public statements signified a "more flexible position." Iran also showed a more flexible position at the summit, with Mammadov attributing this to Iran's interest in winning friends. Mammadov said that Iranian President Ahmadinejad's statements regarding new Caspian military and economic cooperation were not reported accurately. According to Mammadov, Russian President Putin's attendance at the summit served both as a show of support for Iranian President Ahmadinejad and a signal to Western powers that Russia did not want to see the nuclear standoff handled militarily. End Summary. Mammadov on the Tehran Caspian Summit -------------- ¶2. (C) Mammadov characterized the Tehran Summit's discussions as having been centered on two types of issues: issues which could potentially be agreed upon or resolved (such as the pledge not to allow their territory to be used for attacks against fellow littoral states) and issues which would most likely not be resolved (such as the legal status of the Caspian). Mammadov said that all sides agreed to meet again in Baku next year to discuss these issues further. Saying that deputy minister level talks would continue two to three times per year, Mammadov said that ministerial level meetings would also take place in order to better prepare for upcoming summits. Mammadov was pleased that Baku had been selected to host the next summit, saying that he hoped this would facilitate agreement on more contentious issues such as the Caspian's legal status. Mammadov said that Azerbaijan would use its position as host country to "oppose any agreement if not agreeable to us." ¶3. (C) Concerning Azerbaijan's approach to determining the legal status of the Caspian, Mammadov characterized it as two track - a "minimum program" calling for a partition at the seabed level and a "maximum program" involving a division by sectors at the surface. Mammadov said that Azerbaijan's aim was to demand the maximum in order to possibly reach agreement on the minimum - something Kazakhstan, Russia, and Azerbaijan had agreed upon and of "great support for us." ¶4. (C) Mammadov outlined the five parties' varying positions on the surface division option. According to Mammadov, the positions of Russia, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan on this issue were quite divergent, with some states such as Kazakhstan insisting that their territorial waters extend 40 miles into the Caspian. Mammadov said that Russia and Iran could also not agree on this point because both wanted larger shares of the proposed commercial or economic zone (the area which extends beyond territorial waters and is supposed to be shared by all). Saying that Russia and Iran were seeking a joint use agreement before trying to resolve the legal status of the sea, Mammadov said that this was not acceptable to Azerbaijan since it was not practical. ¶5. (C) The third major issue which could not be resolved was the pipeline issue. According to Mammadov, Russia and Iran demanded that if a trans-Caspian pipeline for oil or natural gas was desired, then all five states would have to be in agreement. According to Mammadov, Azerbaijani President Aliyev rejected this proposal, pointing to the examples of Black Sea and Baltic pipelines. According to Mammadov, if Azerbaijan has already reached a pipeline agreement with Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, then Azerbaijan does not need an agreement from all five. ¶6. (C) Mammadov said that Azerbaijan was trying to elaborate a new approach toward delimitation, with Mammadov deeming it an "internal new approach." Saying that if a pipeline agreement can be reached with Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, this agreement does not have to be presented as a "new BAKU 00001319 002.2 OF 003 pipeline," simply an interconnnector (since pipes are already in place on the Caspian seabed and simply need to be connected). While saying that President Aliyev did not have an opportunity to discuss this issue further with his Turkmen counterpart at the summit, Mammadov said that the GOAJ was encouraged by the Turkmen President's official statements. Noting that Berdimuhamedov's statement contained "no strong position on any points," Mammadov suggested that this was a positive development because it signified a "more flexible position." Saying that the GOAJ believes advances are now possible with the Turkmen side, Mammadov said that the GOAJ would seek to exploit this opening at the deputy minister level. Mammadov on Iran -------------- ¶7. (C) Noting that Iran had also shown a more flexible position at the summit, Mammadov attributed this to Iran's desire to "win friends." Mammadov said that Iranian internal political developments also played a role, adding that the GOAJ not only sensed this, but had "information on this." According to Mammadov, Iran was experiencing "the beginning of many processes" with Khamenei reportedly ill and Rafsanjani ascendant. Suggesting that the Iranian political scene was dominated by three factions - conservatives, neo-conservatives, and liberals, - Mammadov said that these processes "deserve special attention." ¶8. (C) Providing further insights into Iran, Mammadov said that while the Iranian leadership feels confident that the U.S. cannot attack it militarily due to commitments in Iraq, Iranians' views about the U.S. are changing, even at higher levels. Mammadov said that some high-ranking people were advocating removing slogans such as "America is our enemy" from all discussions related to the U.S., something Mammadov interpreted as a good sign. According to Mammadov, Iran's top leadership places its own interests above those of the nation, interested solely in preserving their power. Mammadov said the Iranian leadership sees democratization in countries such as Azerbaijan, Afghanistan and Iraq as a direct threat to the regime because it signifies a "weakening of Iran's influence in the region." Therefore, Mammadov believes Iran will continue to undermine democratization efforts in the region because the regime considers this an existential threat - a "to be or not to be" issue, according to Mammadov - to the regime. ¶9. (C) Concerning Iranian President Ahmadinejad's announcement that an agreement on greater military cooperation had been reached during the summit, Mammadov said that no agreement had been reached on this issue. While ruling out possible military cooperation in the Caspian, Mammadov said that the GOAJ would be open to greater police-type functions (to counter threats such as narcotics trafficking or terrorism),but again only after the status of the Caspian had been agreed upon. Mammadov reiterated Azerbaijan's position that the legal issue should be resolved before any areas of cooperation can be considered. Mammadov said that maintaining the military status quo in the region was in Azerbaijan's interest since Russia had the greatest amount of military forces in the region while Azerbaijan and Iran had far fewer. Responding to President Ahmadinejad's announcement that a "Caspian Economic Cooperation Organization" had been established, Mammadov said that the GOAJ saw "different tendencies by the different sides" on this. Saying that Russia was very interested in seeing greater economic cooperation among littoral states, Mammadov again said that this was a non-starter for Azerbaijan until the delimitation issue had been resolved, adding that he did not see this proposal "going anywhere." ¶10. (C) According to Mammadov, Russian President Putin's attendance at the summit served both as a show of support for Iranian President Ahmadinejad and a signal to Western powers that Russia did not want to see the nuclear standoff handled militarily. Saying that the Turkmen and Kazakh leaders likely decided to attend because "everyone knew the status of the Caspian would not be resolved," Putin wanted to send a signal to the West and show support for Iran. ¶11. (C) Comment: Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan will have another opportunity to explore trans-Caspian cooperation during the November 14-15 Ashgabat Oil and Gas show. While the legal delimitation issues are unlikely to be addressed in this venue, we are encouraging the two countries' national BAKU 00001319 003.2 OF 003 oil companies to begin discussions on commercial issues. End Comment. DERSE