AZERBAIJAN - BAKU EAC MEETING

S E C R E T BAKU 001294 SIPDIS NOFORN DEPARTMENT FOR D, P, M, INR, DS/IP/EUR, DS/ICI/PII, DS/DSS/ITA, EUR/CARC, S/CT, CA FRANKFURT FOR MCESC REGION 1 E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/18/2027 TAGS: ASEC CASC PTER AJ SUBJECT: AZERBAIJAN - BAKU EAC MEETING REF: EMAIL: DLU/STATE DEPARTMENT OPERATIONS CENTER 10/28/2007 Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission - Don Lu for reasons 1.4 (B,C,D) ¶1. (S/NF) Ambassador convened an emergency meeting of the Emergency Action Committee (AMB, DCM, CON, DAO, DTRO EXBS, GRPO, MGMT, MSG, PD, Peace Corps, POL/ECON, RSO, USAID, Peace Corps) on October 28, 2007 at 1800 hours (local) to discuss Post's security posture in response to information received from the GOAJ Ministries of National Security (MNS) and Internal Affairs (MIA) regarding a threat specific to the U.S. Embassy. The threat is from members of an Azerbaijani Wahabist terror group that lead by an Azeribajiani military officer who disappeared from a military base in western Azerbaijan recently with one heavy machine gun, five AK-47 rifles, several thousand rounds of ammunition and approximately 50 hand grenades. Over the last 48 hours, Azerbaijani MNS and MIA Special Forces troops have conducted several raids in the Baku area which have netted six arrested, one killed and several weapons recovered. At present, three of the group are still at large and presumed to be well armed and equipped. Per the MNS, the group has specific plans to attack the U.S. Embassy with automatic weapons and hand grenades. See also GRPO reporting: TD 314/71719-07. ¶2. (S/NF) The EAC was briefed by GRPO and RSO on the threat information, the status of the GOAJ operations and possible countermeasures to be undertaken at Embassy Baku. EAC was advised that the group was believed to have recently, possibly in the last several days, undertaken surveillance of the Embassy in preparation for an attack. Information obtained by RSO FSNI from MIA sources indicated that the group was well organized, had prepared for the attack and was in the final stages of readying for the attack. MNS sources provided less detailed information, but corroborated the intentions the group, the fact that three of the members were still at large, and the fact that a significant amount of arms (rifles and grenades) remain unaccounted for. The Ambassador was in direct phone contact with the Minister of National Security who confirmed a direct threat to the U.S. Embassy by the group. The Minister also confirmed that there are no other known targets of the group at this time. Post Management, RSO and GRPO are in regular contact with MNS and MIA. ¶3. (SBU) In response to the threat, the EAC decided that the Embassy would go to limited operations for Monday, October 29th, with only key American and FSN staff on post. The Embassy Annex will suspend operations and all non-essential personnel will work from home as needed. The EAC decided that a warden message describing the limited operations of the Embassy in response to a threat against the Embassy was warranted. ¶4. (SBU) Security around the Chancery compound and the Embassy Unclassified Annex was immediately increased with host nation police and MIA Special Forces troops. MSG Detachement has been placed on ready standby for REACT. Additional security measures include extra guards for each shift, a doubling of the Mobile Patrol response vehicles with host nation police riding along with the Mobile Patrol, increased police presence at the CMR, and expansion of the Surveillance Detection coverage to 24 hours. DERSE