FORUM ON KARABAKH ADVOCATES SETTING A DEADLINE FOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAKU 001099 SIPDIS SIPDIS FOR EUR/CARC E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/04/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV PBTS AM AJ SUBJECT: FORUM ON KARABAKH ADVOCATES SETTING A DEADLINE FOR MINSK GROUP PEACE PROCESS Classified By: Ambassador Anne E. Derse for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Representatives from the Forum on Karabakh -- a nascent association of opposition-leaning individuals -- on August 29 told the Ambassador that their organization is increasingly impatient with the Minsk Group process due to its lack of progress in resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The Forum advocates setting a three to five year timeline on the Minsk Group's efforts, and also urges enhanced GOAJ efforts to lobby other countries to label Armenia as the aggressor in the conflict. The Forum supports the use of force to retake NK and the seven occupied territories if negotiations fail. The Forum representatives argued that the continued status quo of the unresolved conflict is not in the interests of Azerbaijan or the U.S, adding that Azerbaijanis' generally favorable view of the U.S. is declining because many Azerbaijanis question the U.S. commitment to serve a solution to the NK conflict due to the Minsk Group,s continuing failure to resolve the conflict. We believe the Forum,s views increasingly represent a growing trend in Azerbaijani society that must be countered to ensure that the peace process is not disrupted. End Summary. ¶2. (C) On August 29, the Ambassador met with three representatives from the Forum on Karabakh, at their request, to hear the group,s perspectives gauge popular opinion on resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Each also heads a small opposition party. The Forum on Karabakh is an informal association of several opposition-leaning individuals who have held several meetings to address the NK conflict. The Forum is not a tight-knit, well-organized group, but a nascent umbrella organization. Their most recent meeting was in July, and they have sent a letter, which outlines their recommendations for settling the NK conflict, to President Aliyev. While the movement is nascent, we believe it reflects growing opinion within Azerbaijani society that the Minsk Group is not capable of resolving the conflict and other means to secure a resolution must be explored. (The three representatives and their political affiliation are: Ahmad Oruj (Azadliq Party),Taleh Aliyev (Azerbaijan Way), and Hasan Hasanov (Azad Azerbaijan).) ¶3. (C) The Forum provided the following eight proposals to President Aliyev, suggesting a new approach to resolving the NK conflict. The Forum also is preparing a broader plan for a Government-wide approach to resolving the conflict. Informal Embassy translation of the eight points follows: -Disclose the framework of negotiating principles. -Stop looking for internal enemies and eliminate internal clashes so Azerbaijan is more unified in its approach to resolving the NK conflict. -Raise the issue of the withdrawal of Russian troops from Armenia. -Put a deadline on the work of the OSCE Minsk Group. -Establish a Karabakh or Territorial Problems Institute to deepen Azerbaijan's approach toward the conflict. -Nationalistic groups should start a campaign to call on the U.S., Russia, France, and Iran to stop supporting Armenia. -Azerbaijan should lobby neighboring countries to label Armenia as the aggressor in the NK conflict, paving the way for economic and political sanctions. -Create a Karabakh Commission within the Parliament. Status Quo Not in Azerbaijan's Interest -------------- ¶4. (C) The Forum representatives argued that Azerbaijanis increasingly believe that Azerbaijan should not continue with the Minsk Group process unless there are clear results. Oruj said a number of recent statements by the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs -- including the U.S. Co-Chair's August interview that mentioned American revolutionaries and Karabakhis -- have heightened Azerbaijanis' immediate frustration with the Minsk Group process. However, he noted that there also is a more long-term trend of mounting skepticism toward the Minsk Group. One of the Forum's key recommendations is that the GOAJ should put a clear timeline on the Minsk Group's work. Specifically, the Forum believes that the GOAJ should set a three to five year deadline on Minsk Group negotiations. If negotiations fail after this period, the GOAJ should retake BAKU 00001099 002 OF 003 NK and the seven occupied territories. ¶5. (C) Oruj argued that the GOAJ should be more proactive in pursuing Azerbaijan's interests vis-a-vis NK and not assume that other countries will necessarily act in Azerbaijan's best interests. Despite their opposition affiliation, the Forum representatives advocated a more cohesive national consensus between the government and the Azerbaijani people regarding NK. Oruj said that if the GOAJ broadens the public dialogue on NK, this would create greater trust and solidarity between the Azerbaijani population and President Aliyev. Oruj said some oppositionists would put aside their political agenda if President Aliyev moved forward with concrete actions to settle the NK conflict in a manner more consistent with Azerbaijan's interests. ¶6. (C) The representatives commented that the continuation of the status quo increases the risks of a country or international fora recognizing NK's independence. In particular, Oruj was nervous about Moscow taking this step. . . . or the US' Interest -------------- ¶7. (C) Aliyev observed that the current stalemate is decreasing Azerbaijanis' generally favorable impressions of the U.S. Anti-U.S. forces are playing on this theme. In response to the Ambassador's question, Aliyev said there is no homogenous group of anti-U.S. forces, as it includes a range of politicians, NGO activists, journalists, and intellectuals. Just as the U.S. provides grants to a range of civil society groups, Russia and Iran actively maintain their own outreach tools. Aliyev and Oruj said Russia seeks to exacerbate ethnic tensions between Azerbaijanis and several non-Turkic minorities, including Lezgis, Talysh, and other groups indigenous to Dagestan. On the other hand, Iran has outreach efforts to religious groups in Azerbaijan. Recognize the Aggressor -------------- ¶8. (C) Oruj argued that the Minsk Group's basic stance is not terribly different from the position of the Soviet Union because neither actor distinguishes between the aggressor and the victim. The Forum's appeal to President Aliyev called for increased GOAJ lobbying efforts for other countries to label Armenia as the aggressor in the conflict because it is "unjust" to ignore the distinction between aggressor and victim. The representatives suggested the GOAJ should work with the Azerbaijani diaspora to achieve this goal. Territorial Integrity is Key -------------- ¶9. (C) Taleh Aliyev said the only alternative to maintaining Azerbaijan's territorial integrity is war. Aliyev and Oruj cautioned that while Azerbaijanis generally are quiescent, they can also be emotional and would never accept a compromise when it comes to Azerbaijan's territory. If Azerbaijan did not make such a compromise when it was a weak state in the 1990s, why would Azerbaijan now make a compromise from a position of greater strength, asked Oruj While arguing for the inviolability of Azerbaijan's territorial integrity, the representatives underscored the importance of granting all ethnic Armenian Azerbaijani citizens clear minority rights in their proposal. Treat Azerbaijan as a Partner -------------- ¶10. (C) The representatives' appeal was grounded in a favorable -- albeit receding -- view of the U.S. and Azerbaijan's Euro-Atlantic orientation. (COMMENT: As a variety of polling shows, the majority of Azerbaijanis have a favorable view of the U.S., but this has been gradually declining over the past several years.) Oruj stated that the U.S. is the only country in the Minsk Group that Azerbaijan can trust and that Azerbaijan and the U.S. have created a strong partnership, which is in both states' interests. He complained, however, that the partnership is one-sided. Reflecting a common sentiment, he argued that while BAKU 00001099 003 OF 003 Azerbaijan has been a consistent partner for the U.S. in the areas of counterterrorism and energy, the U.S. has not adequately treated Azerbaijan as a strategic partner. Oruj cited Armenia's acceptance into the Millennium Challenge program and the U.S. Congress' financial assistance to NK as evidence of the U.S.' lack of a fair approach toward Azerbaijan. Push GOAJ on Democracy Agenda -------------- ¶11. (C) The representatives asked that the U.S. take a stronger stand on pressuring the GOAJ to undertake democratic reforms. They argued that the U.S. faces an image problem among average Azerbaijanis, who perceive that the U.S. is toning down its criticism of the GOAJ's democratic failings on the altar of U.S. energy interests. Noting that "we expect a lot from the U.S. as our strategic partner," Oruj asked for the U.S. to not soften its criticism of the GOAJ's undemocratic behavior, particularly in the area of rigging elections and the clampdown on independent media. Comment -------------- ¶12. (C) We believe the representatives' criticism and impatience with the Minsk Group peace process reflects growing opinion within Azerbaijani society. The majority of everyday Azerbaijanis and a number of educated Azerbaijani commentators routinely state that the Minsk Group process is ineffective and has little legitimacy. This sentiment appears to be growing, along with the number of Azerbaijanis who favor the GOAJ taking more robust diplomatic, economic, and military steps to regain NK and the seven occupied territories (septel). This is in keeping with a broader sense -- fueled in large part by Azerbaijan's energy wealth -- that Azerbaijan is an increasingly important regional player, whose views on the conflict should carry greater weight. As we consider how best to advance the peace process, we will need to take into account Azerbaijanis' growing skepticism and its increased ability to act in support of its perceived interests. DERSE