PRESIDENT ALIYEV SAYS USG, AZERBAIJAN ALIGNED ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BAKU 001007 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/08/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL ENRG ETRN TX AJ RS SUBJECT: PRESIDENT ALIYEV SAYS USG, AZERBAIJAN ALIGNED ON ENEGY Classified By: CDA Don Lu, Reasons 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In an August 2 meeting with DS Bryza, President Aliyev said that USG and GOAJenergy policies were "perfectly aligned." Azerbajan had just that day signed an Energy MOU with reece. The GOAJ was increasing gas production, nd ready to negotiate with British Petroleum (BP) about production service agreement extension and Azeri Chirag Guneshli (ACG) deep gas, although the government would warn BP that it had to "play fair." Aliyev was quite upset at the recent Turkey-Greece-Italy (TGI) interconnector signing, in that Turkey, Greece and Italy seemed to be deciding the fate of Azerbaijani gas without involving Azerbaijan in the deliberations. Concerning Chevron's recently announced involvement in the Turkmen energy sector, Aliyev said that joint Turkmen-Azerbaijan development of the Serdar/Kyapaz field would greatly facilitate bilateral demarcation issues and trans-Caspian exports of oil and gas. Energy Minister Aliyev and State Oil Company of Azerbaijan (SOCAR) Vice-President Nassirov would take the lead on gas transit talks with Turkey, which will commence imminently. On the Qabala radar station, the President supported the Russian invitation to the U.S. side to visit, but emphasized that Azerbaijan should also participate in the visit. Bryza also shared USG concerns about Iran and media freedom with President Aliyev. END SUMMARY. QABALA AND MISSILE DEFENSE -------------- ¶2. (C) Giving President Aliyev a read-out of the recent USG talks with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Kisylak (reftel), Bryza said that on July 30 there was the first of three planned expert-level bilateral talks on the possibility of joint use of Gabala. Bryza said that the USG realized that Gabala was Azerbaijan's property and would keep Azerbaijan fully aware of the talks as they continued, and would seek Azerbaijan's permission for any agreement reached between the USG and Russia. "There will be nothing about you without you," Bryza assured President Aliyev. ¶3. (C) Bryza asked the President whether Azerbaijan would support the Russian proposal for an American delegation to visit the Qabala radar station. President Aliyev thanked Bryza for the briefing, asking him to keep Foreign Minister Mammadyarov apprised. He agreed to support the visit of an American team to Qabala, but emphasized that Azerbaijan would also need to participate in the visit. Bryza said one good outcome of the Kisylak talks was the USG-Russian agreement that an Iranian missile threat did exist. Bryza asked Aliyev whether he had a preference as to Gabala being used merely to monitor, or whether it should undergo upgrades to allow it to play a fuller role in missile defense. President Aliyev said he had no preference. GREECE-AZERBAIJAN ENERGY MOU -------------- ¶4. (C) Bryza congratulated Aliyev on the just-signed Greek-Azerbaijan Energy MOU. The USG had encouraged Greece to reach out to Azerbaijan, especially after the Greek Prime Minister's snub of President Aliyev at the Black Sea Conference, when Greek PM Karamanlis instead signed a declaration with Russian President Putin on a possible South Stream gas pipeline under the Black Sea. President Aliyev told Bryza that next year SOCAR would be increasing gas production to approximately eight billion cubic meters annually (bcm/a),in addition to freeing up another one bcm for export from decreased domestic gas use due to price hikes. As such, the GOAJ would have non-Shah Deniz gas for export to Greece (which he had told Development Minister Sioufas earlier that day) and also extra for Georgia. GEORGIA -------------- ¶5. (C) Bryza asked if Georgia would need Russian gas for the coming winter. Aliyev said that the GOAJ now provides approximately 75 percent of Georgia's gas needs, and that he had told Georgia that the GOAJ would be able to tell at some point in August how much gas it would have for Georgia in the coming winter. The GOAJ would give Georgia a "good price." TGI MOU -------------- BAKU 00001007 002 OF 004 ¶6. (C) President Aliyev expressed extreme pique at the July 26 MOU signed among Turkey, Greece and Italy, saying these countries should not have come to an agreement about "our gas," including gas from the second phase of Shah Deniz development, without including Azerbaijan. He scoffed at the mention of "Caspian gas" in press accounts of this MOU, saying that this gas would have to be Azerbaijani gas. He thanked Bryza for the explicit mention of Azerbaijan in the State Department press release on this topic, with Bryza responding that the USG realized that Azerbaijan was the cornerstone of the Southern Corridor strategy. GAS TRANSIT TALKS W/TURKEY -------------- ¶7. (C) President Aliyev said Energy Minister Aliyev and SOCAR Vice-President Elshad Nassirov would be the lead negotiators in gas transit talks with Turkey (NOTE: Embassy subsequently learned that Energy Minister Aliyev, SOCAR V-P Nassirov and MFA Ambassador at large for Energy Shamil Aleskerov flew to Ankara on August 7 to begin gas transit negotiations, and that they are expected back in Baku August tenth. We had urged Turkey and Azerbaijan to commence these talks for over a year.) Bryza explained the MOU's stipulation that Turkey get 15 percent of transit gas reserved for itself at the netback price paid by Italy, adding that Guler wanted to establish a precedent. The key to any gas transit arrangement is fair and transparent netback pricing. President Aliyev said that Turkish Energy Minister Guler had offered a twenty percent gas reservation clause to Energy Minister Aliyev during the recent Black Sea Conference. President Aliyev said the GOAJ would insist on direct deals with the consumers downstream of Turkey, and that Turkey not be allowed to re-sell the 15 percent gas that it would get. Bryza said that the Turkish position had "softened" over time to their current position of wanting to do only some "modest" gas marketing, rather than becoming a "mini-Gazprom" as investors feared. ¶8. (C) Bryza relayed part of a conversation he had had earlier in the day with Majlis Deputy Speaker Valeh Alasgarov. Alasgarov had said that European Nabucco consumers should sign "delivery or pay" contracts with SOCAR for gas delivery at the border, with SOCAR being responsible for ensuring adequate gas provision. This would spur progress on the Nabucco pipeline. President Aliyev agreed. TURKMENISTAN -------------- ¶9. (C) Bryza said in general the news about Turkmenistan was good. In his most recent trip to Ashgabat, he had seen more interest from the GOTX in the concept of Block One gas moving west. Competent Body Chairman Myradov told Steve Mann and Bryza that the GOTX would decide where Block One gas (produced by Petronas) would be sold. In Bryza's talks with the local Petronas managing director and the Georgian Ambassador, all agreed that the idea of an MOU among Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey on transparent tariffs and netback pricing would allow the GOTX to see how they could gain additional revenues by shipping gas west, vice north. Aliyev expressed support for this idea. ¶10. (C) Bryza told Aliyev that BP Group Managing Director and Chief Executive of Exploration and Production Andy Inglis was currently in Malaysia for discussions with Petronas. Bryza said he had good discussions with President of Chevron NeftGaz Russia Ian McDonald, who briefed him on Chevron's goal of developing, in conjunction with Azerbaijan, the offshore Serdar/Kyapaz field and exporting the oil to global markets via Azerbiajan. President Aliyev pointed out that joint Serdar/Kyapaz development would perforce do away with the issue of GOTX partial ownership of the ACG field, leaving Iran alone concerning Caspian delimitation and facilitating trans-Caspian shipments of oil and natural gas. KAZAKHSTAN -------------- ¶11. (C) Aliyev mentioned his upcoming trip to Astana, saying that one of the main topics would be oil transportation. Bonds between the two countries' energy sectors were expanding, with contemplated joint SOCAR-Kazakh National Oil Company Kazmunaigas(KMG) ownership of a refinery in Ceyhan. Given the large volumes of Kazakh oil that could be flowing westward, the GOAJ was contemplating a new oil pipeline BAKU 00001007 003 OF 004 through Georgia to the Black Sea. The President said that he did not necessarily trust the Kazakh Government, in that it could well be using negotiations with Azerbaijan as leverage for extracting a commitment of CPC expansion from Russia. Bryza agreed that an agreement on CPC expansion looked possible. During his conversation with Bryza earlier in the week in Moscow, Transneft President Semyon Vaynshtok suggested Transneft and western oil companies were nearing a deal according to which the foreigners would accept a lower rate of return on their investment and agree to the Burgas-Alexandropolis pipeline in exchange for CPC expansion. TURKEY-IRAN MOU -------------- ¶12. (C) President Aliyev expressed surprise at the recently announced Turkey-Iran Energy MOU, saying that he doubted that Iran had 30 bcm for export to Turkey, or that the infrastructure was sufficient to ship the required amounts from Turkmenistan through Iran to Turkey. If Turkish Petroleum (TPAO) engaged in South Pars development, the USG should sanction Turkey. Bryza said that GOT officials had told the USG "not to worry," that the project would take many years to implement, presumably by which time there would have been a new situation in Iran. He suspected that politics played a role in this announcement, given its proximity to the election and the strong anti-U.S. sentiment in Turkey. Bryza reiterated the USG,s opposition to energy investment in Iran. ODESSA-BRODY -------------- ¶13. (C) President Aliyev sought Bryza,s advice on Odessa-Brody. Referring to the May 11 Energy Summit in Krakow, Aliyev said the EU should have sent a representative to participate, adding that an "EU umbrella" was needed for the cooperation among Azerbaijan, Georgia, Ukraine, Poland and Lithuania. He said that the GOAJ was being offered partial ownership of the Sarmatia joint company formed by Ukraine's UkrTrransNafta and Poland's PERN project (for extending Odessa-Brody to Plock),and that this partial ownership if accepted would commit the GOAJ to Odessa-Brody. As it stands now, it was not clear whether Odessa-Brody would be a priority for the GOAJ. Aliyev pointed out that this issue will doubtless re-surface at the follow-on meeting to Krakow, during the October summit in Lithuania. ¶14. (C) Bryza said the USG supports Odessa-Brody, and is working with the Polish government in this regard, though the U.S. also supported other commercially viable Bosporus bypass pipelines, like Samsun-Ceyhan, AMBO, and PEOP. Poland wants Caspian oil for transit, and the U.S. would like to help Poland "stave off" Gazprom's potential hostile takeover bid of Poland,s PKN/Orlen oil company. Hungary also sought help to forestall a hostile takeover bid by OMV, which MOL,s CEO believed was really driven by Gazprom. In this regard, Bryza requested help from President Aliyev to alert SOCAR to the desirability of increasing its investment profile in Hungary and Poland. Aliyev said he would do so, as such cooperation with the U.S. in Central and Eastern Europe was in Azerbaijan,s interest. ¶15. (C) Aliyev said that SOCAR had opened an office in Romania to pursue refining opportunities, which was going to be its regional office for Eastern Europe. The GOAJ was looking to participate in the broader Eastern European market, and in this regard SOCAR needed guidance from its U.S. partner. MOL has been a frequent visitor to Baku, and the GOAJ has good political relations with Hungary. Bryza confirmed this point, saying that the Hungarian FM had been very impressed after her meeting with President Aliyev. BP -- ¶16. (C) President Aliyev said that the GOAJ was waiting for a proposal from BP about PSA extension and ACG Deep Gas (note: BP's Bill Schrader told Bryza earlier that day that after months of back and forth, all eight Azerbaijan International Oil Consortium (AIOC) partners had finally agreed to the proposal, which would be submitted to the GOAJ shortly. Production from ACG deep gas can provide a significant boost in gas exports to Europe via the Turkey-Greece-Italy and Nabucco pipelines). However, the GOAJ was "concerned with BP tactics," as it was reducing BAKU 00001007 004 OF 004 production and increasing capital expenditures in an effort to forestall the date at which more profit oil would go to the GOAJ vice BP (from last quarter 2008, as currently scheduled, to 2010). BP was also trying to recalculate the BTC's Total Transportation Costs to the detriment of GOAJ revenue. The GOAJ, who had to approve BP's annual work projections, would not allow this to happen. The GOAJ seeks agreement with BP, but it will insist on "fair play." (NOTE: On August 9, BP Azerbaijan President Schrader told Embassy that he will be meeting President Aliyev the week of August 14th). ¶17. (C) In summing up the energy part of the discussion, President Aliyev said that USG and GOAJ interests are fully aligned, perhaps more than ever before. Aliyev expressed gratitude for U.S. support over the past year in jump-starting the Southern Corridor. "Without that support, nothing would have happened," Aliyev said. The GOAJ is strengthening its energy alliances with Greece, Poland, Hungary, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, among others. It is increasing gas production, both within and outside the Shah Deniz consortium, and will be sending gas to Greece and Georgia. IRAN -------------- ¶18. (C) Bryza told President Aliyev that now was no time for "business as usual" with Iran. Aliyev said he could no longer postpone the upcoming visit of President Ahmadinejad. Bryza said that if such a visit is unavoidable, the USG hoped that no substantive agreements would come from such a visit. MEDIA FREEDOM -------------- ¶19. (C) Bryza shared USG concerns about media freedom in Azerbaijan with President Aliyev, suggesting that alternative dispute resolution might be a good substitute for the current practice of criminal libel prosecutions. Aliyev said that the USG should talk to journalists about improving their professionalism, since "they listen to the Embassy." ¶20. (C) COMMENT: As President Aliyev said, U.S. and GOAJ energy strategies have grown into full alignment during the past 18 months. The major pending issues now are seeking to bring Turkmen gas westwards, and facilitating a Turkish-Azeri agreement on a fair and transparent gas transit regime. END COMMENT. ¶21. (U) DAS Bryza has cleared on this cable LU