PM MALIKI VISIT TO ANBAR WELL RECEIVED BY LOCAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000910 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/13/2017 TAGS: PGOV KDEM IZ SUBJECT: PM MALIKI VISIT TO ANBAR WELL RECEIVED BY LOCAL GOVERNMENT, TRIBES, ISF Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Daniel V. Speckhard for reasons 1.4 (b ) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: At the initiative of MNF-I Commanding General, PM Maliki visited Anbar March 13, accompanied by MoD Abdul Qader, MoI Bolani, and MinState for Foreign Affairs Rafaa Essawi. In separate meetings with the Anbar provincial council and the tribal sheikhs, he emphasized that all Iraqis regardless of sect, tribal, or ethnic affiliation were one people. He pointed to the Anbaris' efforts in fighting AQI and the work of the Anbar Coordination Committee as a model for the rest of Iraq, and called for all Anbaris - government officials and tribal notables alike - to work in harmony for the good of the province. Maliki deftly handled the tribes' impassioned calls for immediate elections in Anbar by noting that elections were shared concern throughout Iraq, and calling for speedy CoR action on elections legislation. The PM promoted the hydrocarbons law, highlighting the possible benefits Anbar could reap from a flourishing oil industry in Iraq. Maliki came prepared to respond to the grievances expressed by PC members and tribal leaders; he made co mmitments on a number of services projects and referred ISF concerns to the security ministers for action. Despite some sparring among tribal sheikhs, and between the sheikhs and the governor and PC chair, the atmosphere was genuinely cordial and Maliki's interventions were well-received. Most meeting participants Emboffs spoke to afterwards called the visit an important step. The PM continues to rally national support for the hydrocarbons bill and other key priorities, and plans to travel to Erbil in the near future. End Summary. -------------- IRAQIS SHOULD UNITE - AND SO SHOULD ANBARIS -------------- ¶2. (C) Maliki, who was visiting Ramadi for the first time since he lived there as a teacher in 1976, delivered a firm message of national unity to the Anbar audience. He told 26 assembled PC members that the division of Iraq was unacceptable. While Iraqis should be proud of their ethnic and religious identities, their loyalty must be to Iraq. Iraqis must stand together to face the challenges affecting its provinces. To understand these challenges, Maliki said, he called a meeting the previous day of all Iraq's governors where they discussed the security and administrative hurdles linked to spending their budget allocations, and ways to overcome these obstacles. (Note: By highlighting the difficulties in budget execution Iraq-wide, Maliki's statement could serve to deflect corruption charges against Governor Ma'moun from Anbari tribal leaders. End note.) ¶3. (C) On a security front, the "rule of law" plan was showing early signs of success that were bringing increased stability to Baghdad, and it was hoped its effects would reverberate throughout Iraq. Maliki praised the bravery of the "sons of Anbar" who were fighting AQI. The PM said that true stability would only come from reconciliation and frank dialogue, and in this regard he expressed appreciation for the positive role of the Anbar coordination committee as a mechanism for representing all points of view and advocating for the interests of the province. He said that many Iraqis sought to replicate the efforts of Anbar, noting that Diyala locals were organizing to fight against AQI and there was talk of forming a "Diyala Coordination Council." -------------- PM CAME PREPARED TO ADRRESS ANBAR'S CONCERNS -------------- ¶4. (C) The PM appeared well-versed on the issues affecting Anbar province; this became apparent as he fielded questions and concerns from provincial council members and Directors General. In the course of the meeting, he announced that a 400-bed hospital would be opening in Anbar, passport/identity documents services would be offered on a more regular basis, that he would ensure the re-opening of the glass and ceramic factories of Anbar. In response to the numerous questions on compensation for the families of martyrs and for those whose property was destroyed, the PM recognized this was a long-standing demand and promised he would act on this issue. As a short term solution to the electricity shortage the PM offered a number of mobile electricity plants for each city of the province. ¶5. (C) In response to a complaint about weapons shortages among ISF, Minister of Interior Bolani told the Anbaris that a "weapons distribution committee" had been appointed that was looking into this issue. (Note: This is an improvement from Bolani's previous statement to Anbar local government officials January 23 that distribution of extra weapons were entirely "in the hands of the Americans." End note.) On the understaffed 7th IA Brigade, a sore point with the Anbaris, BAGHDAD 00000910 002 OF 002 MoD Abdul Qader repeated his assertion that if the men of Anbar signed up, he would be happy to equip, train, and send them into service. ¶6. (C) Maliki made a pitch for his legislative priorities, calling the hydrocarbons law an important step forward for Iraq. He said that this law would ensure that all of Iraq's provinces received an equal share of Iraqi oil wealth, and pointed out that Anbar-based transportation companies stood to benefit from a flourishing oil industry in Iraq. -------------- -- CAUGHT IN THE CROSSFIRE, PM AVOIDS TAKING SIDES -------------- -- ¶7. (C) It quickly became apparent during the meeting with the Anbar Salvation Council that the tribal sheikhs sought the opportunity to air their long-standing grievances with the governor and PC Chair in front of the PM. They raised the lack of tribal representation in the provincial council, budget execution decisions, and in consultations on important government appointments. One sheikh likened Governor Ma'moun's decision making style to Saddam Hussein's, which set off a heated debate that only stopped when the PM intervened. The sheikhs raised the illegitimacy of the elections that brought the current government to power, and frustrations over delays in government and ISF salary distribution. The sheikhs called for immediate elections, arguing that they should occur in Anbar even before the rest of Iraq in order to address the injustices perpetrated against those who "had given the most" to Anbar. ¶8. (C) The PM diffused the situation by acknowledging the bravery and the sacrifices of the tribes, and pointing out that over the past six months he understood there had been a re-balancing of political representation in Anbar to include the input of the tribes. Minister of State Rafaa Essawi played moderator, as he reviewed the state of play on many of these grievances for the PM and pointed out and what action if any the Anbar Coordination Committee had taken. ¶9. (C) The PM told the sheikhs that elections for Anbar ahead of everyone else were not tenable; he pointed out that many Iraqis shared the desire to hold elections soon. The PM noted that elections commissioners were currently being chosen, and that he expected an elections procedures law to arrive to the CoR in the coming weeks. (Note: The Embassy has not received any indication from CoR contacts that such a law has been drafted yet. End note.) The PM encouraged the Anbar tribal leaders to organize themselves into political parties in preparation for the upcoming elections. He also encouraged them to move on from past disagreements, and emphasized the importance of harmony amongst Anbar's leaders. Pointing to the CoR as an example, he said that public fights between leaders often directly led to violence on the street. -------------- ATMOSPHERICS -------------- ¶10. (C) The PM's level of preparedness for the session, and the warmth with which he was received in Anbar is in stark contrast to the October 7, 2006 Anbar Tribes Conference held at the Rasheed Hotel in Baghdad, which appeared to be more of an encounter between strangers. The optic of PM Maliki and MoI Bolani warmly greeting each tribal sheikh was a powerful one; Maliki's willingness to hear out each and every individual most likely won him credit among members of the audience. The IA soldiers were also extremely welcoming; the Iraqi Provincial Joint Command Center staff proudly briefed the PM and even encouraged him to use their telephone system to cold call another PJCC cell in Karbala. Everyone listened intently and chimed in as the PM surprised the PJCC staff in Karbala with greetings and encouragement to keep up the good work, and to maintain good communication with their colleagues in Anbar. ¶11. (C) While acknowledging the important contribution of the tribes and the concerns they brought to bear, Maliki (who ran both meetings flanked by the Governor and PC Chair) took a supportive stance towards the local government and the work of the Anbar Coordination Committee. This was an important signal to the tribes that their concerns must be dealt with through the established mediation channels. Most of the meeting participants Emboffs and PRT Officials spoke to agreed that this visit was a positive step. One sheikh noted that Anbaris had heard many promises in the past, and would be waiting to see what tangible improvements materialized on the ground. SPECKHARD