IRAQ: SIGNIFICANT THREATS TO EDUCATIONAL AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 000909 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR R STAFF - KARYN POSNER-MULLEN NEA/PPD FOR ALBERTO FERNANDEZ AND ROBIN SMITH ECA/P FOR DONNA IVES ECA/PE/V/G/N FOR CHRISTOPHER MCSHANE ECA/A/E/NEA/SA FOR JOHN SEDLINS AMMAN FOR ISU - RICHARD BOOHAKER E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/14/2017 TAGS: SCUL APER IZ SUBJECT: IRAQ: SIGNIFICANT THREATS TO EDUCATIONAL AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT EXCHANGES REF: A. STATE 1071 ¶B. STATE 4817 ¶C. STATE 16383 ¶D. BAGHDAD 0304 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Daniel Speckhard per 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: The introduction of new passport requirements for Iraqis, coupled with continuing staffing problems within the Cultural Affairs Office, seriously threaten the viability of Embassy Baghdad's educational and professional exchanges. CAO Baghdad continues to pursue a variety of creative solutions to sustain its exchange programs, and it requests the Department's support in these efforts. End Summary. -------------- The "G" Passport Scramble -------------- ¶2. (SBU) While CAO Baghdad understands the rationale behind the recent decision on the part of U.S. authorities to impose new passport requirements for Iraqi travelers (ref A and B), the implementation of this policy has been disruptive to post's International Visitor Leadership Program (IVLP). Baghdad's IVLP is one of the largest in the world, and the new rules mandating only Iraqi "G" or "H" passports for travel to the U.S. meant that participants with older "S" series passports had to first apply for new passports and then re-apply for their J-1 visas. More damaging, however, than the postponement of programs has been the reluctance of many program participants to travel into Baghdad to apply for new passports, and to travel back into the International Zone for a second visa interview. In some cases, program participants are flatly refusing to come into the city because of continuing violence. Entry into and out of the International Zone can also cause concern for some program participants for fear of their association with the Embassy being identified. ¶3. (C) When the new passport rules were published, CAO met with Consul General to discuss their impact on program participants. CAO was informed that according to Iraqi authorities the new Iraqi passports could only be obtained through the Ministry of Interior (MOI) in Baghdad, and that none of Iraq's overseas missions are currently issuing the �A;new "G" series passport. Subsequent discussions with program participants revealed that some Iraqis are able to obtain passports via contacts in regional passport offices. CAO has been informed by program participants that persons wanting passports are obliged to pay bribes to passport officials ranging between USD 500 and 1500 per passport. (Comment: CAO feels that the fact that legitimate travelers are now forced to use bribes in order to get passports from GOI officials raises serious questions about the integrity of the "G" series passport and other official Iraqi travel documents. End Comment.) -------------- Critical Staff Shortages -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Embassy Baghdad's Cultural Affairs Office (CAO) faces a critical shortage of staff to support its programming. In particular, CAO is concerned about the continued viability of the International Visitor Leadership Program (IVLP) in Iraq unless additional human resources can be found to support the program. Over the past six months, the Cultural Affairs Office has lost on average one Iraqi staff member per month. CAO has three Iraqi LES left to run its International Visitor Leadership Program (IVLP),one of the largest in the world. No LES are left to assist in the running of the Fulbright program, also one of the largest in world. Replacing lost staff is extremely difficult, as CAO has encountered few qualified applicants are willing to risk their personal safety by entering and leaving the International Zone each day and being associated with the U.S. Embassy. Currently, housing for LES is only provided on a temporary, case-by-case basis. Baghdad PAS, which includes CAO and the Press Office, has found it extremely difficult to recruit third country nationals (TCNs),including Jordanians, to accept positions in Baghdad. ¶5. (SBU) With the advent of the Iraqi Refugee Program (ref C),CAO anticipates that its three remaining staff will apply and qualify to become refugees based upon their respective vulnerabilities as associates of the USG. We anticipate that the three remaining Iraqi staff currently working on the IVLP will be gone within months. These three staff members represent CAO Baghdad's last remaining institutional memory, and their departure would be a major setback for cultural exchanges in Iraq. -------------- A Way Forward -------------- ¶6. (SBU) PAS appreciates HR Baghdad's continuing support and flexibility in helping us bridge staffing gaps within the section. However, PAS does not believe that continued recruitment of Iraqi LES is a productive solution in the current operating environment. HR Baghdad has coordinated with ISU Amman to try recruiting in neighboring countries (beyond Jordan). ¶7. (SBU) Post is also seeking assistance from other missions to help staff Baghdad. Experienced LES from other Embassies, already capable of running educational and cultural exchanges, could arrive here fully prepared to support ongoing efforts. Per reftel D, HR Baghdad has requested NEA's assistance in sending out a worldwide recruitment cable to LES at other missions, encouraging them to come to Iraq on a TDY basis for 6-12 months. The cable includes a recommended Iraq Recognition Support package for LES TDYs. While the program is being fine-tuned, post has successfully recruited one LES from another mission, who will arrive shortly to begin a six month TDY. CAO requests the Department's continuing assistance in helping to recruit LES TDY support from other missions, and in working with CAO to find creative solutions that will sustain its important work in Iraq. ¶8. (SBU) PAS also plans to move ahead on several fronts in order to supplement its reduced staff and to replace lost Iraqi LES. CAO is actively seeking Bilingual-Bicultural Advisors (BBAs) to assist in the operation of the IVLP and Fulbright programs, as well as with cultural programming and English teaching initiatives. BBAs have proven an effective solution for other Embassy offices, and CAO already has two BBAs working on Cultural Heritage and Youth and Sports initiatives, respectively. CAO also hopes to hire former Iraqi exchange program alumni on grants for defined projects, including assisting with Post's book program. We request that the Department emphasize the importance of the LES TDY program outlined in reftel D, and other "out of the box" strategies that will allow the Section to sustain itself. SPECKHARD