READ OUT FROM MARCH 11 MCNS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000879

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

CONFIDENTIAL

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/12/2017
TAGS: MOPS MARR PINS PNAT PINR PREL IZ
SUBJECT: READ OUT FROM MARCH 11 MCNS

Classified By: Charge d,Affaires Daniel V. Speckhard, reasons 1.4 (a),
(b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Prime Minister Maliki presided over the March
11 meeting of the Ministerial Committee for National
Security, during which:

-- Maliki requested his cabinet focus their efforts on
securing Diyala, the 'most dangerous place in Iraq.'

-- Minister of Industry Twazi Al-Hariri pleaded for
government assistance in securing state owned-enterprises
within the Al Taji and Al Tarmiyah corridor where: employees
have fled; operations have halted; and the facility
protection services have proven useless.

-- Minister of Finance Bayan Jabr, like last week, rebuffed
the National Security Advisor's weapons buyback proposal for
Baghdad.

-- Minister of Interior Jawad Bolani said his ministry may
not be able to complete all permanent weapon licenses for
personal security details by May 1 as desired by MNF-I.
National Security Advisor Dr. Mowaffak al-Rubaie advocated
against limit the issuing of weapons licenses to the MOI as
desired by MNF-I. END SUMMARY.


COMMITMENT TO DIYALA
--------------


2. (C) Prime Minister Maliki said the security situation in
Diyala was intolerable and the government must bring the
province under control. He described a support council that
provincial officials and residents recently established to
address the multitude of problems. Maliki said he expects
the central government to support this group and directed
that MOD, MOI and other relevant ministries participate in
Monday's Council meeting in Baghdad. MNF-I Commanding
General offered MNF-I participation.


3. (C) Maliki said more security forces were needed to
stabilize Diyala. Bolani agreed, saying while the new
provincial police chief is 'excellent' and many police
members are 'good', the police service is riddled with 'bad
elements' that contribute to the chaos. He also said the
current security forces in Diyala cannot match the strength
and sophistication of the Diyala enemies - Al Qaeda,
Saddamists, and other hardcore extremists.


4. (C) Minister of Defense Abdul Qader said while the
situation in Diyala was not as grave as many people are
describing it to be, he estimated that two brigades would be
needed to calm the situation. He cautioned, however, against
fragmenting the forces already committed to Baghdad and noted
that a CF Strker battalion would soon be up there to
reinforce the effort. He recommended that before any more
troops are committed, the GOI with participation from MNF-I,
conduct a thorough needs assessment. He warned that without
a coordinated plan carried out by one central headquarters in
Diyala chances of success were minimal.


5. (C) General Petraeus agreed that Diyala was a serious
issue and assured the Prime Minister that more security
assistance was on the way. He said a Coalition Stryker
battalion was headed to Diyala in the next few days and that
the arrival of the three U.S. brigades to Baghdad in the next
several months would also help the situation as the latter
brigades are to focus on securing the Baghdad belts.
Petraeus recommended that the GOI look at how best to speed
up Iraqi Police creation in Diyala, without creating tribal
militias, similar to what is being done in Anbar. He stated
that a central command is vital and noted that the Commander
of the 5th Iraqi Army Division needs to move his headquarters
from Kirkush to the provincial capital, Baqubah. This would
entail establishing one ISF-MNF coordination headquarters,
gaining tribal support, and expediting the hiring of local
Iraqis for the security forces.


6. (C) Deputy Prime Minister Zawba'i cautioned that force is
only part of the solution to Diyala. If the major factions
in Diyala, the Kurds, Sunni, and Shia and various tribes do
not unite politically, the terrorists will continue to
achieve success against the currently divided populace.
Zawba'i stated that the political solution between the major
sects must occur before success could be attained in the
military fight against AQI.

BAGHDAD 00000879 002 OF 002



MINISTER OF INDUSTRY PLEA FOR SECURITY ASSISTANCE
-------------- --------------


7. (C) Minister of Industry Twazi Al-Hariri requested
security assistance for ten state-owned companies and its
employees located north of Baghdad between Al Taji and Al
Tarmiyah. He said the deteriorating security situation in
this area has resulted in the halting of all facility
operations and the displacement of hundreds of local
employees. He said the current facility protection service
has proven ineffective and corrupt. He said without military
or police assistance, the situation would remain as is and
the vacated buildings vulnerable to 'terrorist' takeover.


8. (C) Bolani and Qader said they would speak with their
respective force commanders in the field to see what
assistance is currently being provided in the area, while
Rubaie asked for a needs- assessment to be completed on the
issue. Maliki stressed that the security force, the Samarra
Brigade that was currently being stood up to operate in the
Taji zone would be tasked to help with the Industry
situation. Bolani emphasized his Ministry was busy
developing a reform program for the overall FPS and could
also ameliorate the problems in the longer term.

WEAPONS BUY-BACK PROPOSAL STILL NOT SOLD
--------------


9. (C) Deputy National Security Advisor, Dr. Safi Safaa
outlined a weapons buyback program for Baghdad. He said the
program was designed as a 'carrot-stick' mechanism. Iraqis
who turn in certain types of weapons to district joint
security operations centers would be rewarded with
less-then-market payments. Each district headquarters would
have an expert committee to evaluate the received weapons and
the program would be time limited. After the time period
expired, Iraqis found with these categories of weapons would
have them confiscated and be arrested. Similar to last week,
the Minister of Finance Bayan Jabr opposed the concept,
saying the program was a waste of government money and would
not improve security. The MoD chimed in, arguing that
millions of weapons are flowing across the borders and
citizens may try to dig up old mines along the border regions
to sell back, thus exacerbating the situation.

WEAPONS LICENCES PROGRAM IN FLUX
--------------


10. (C) Bolani said his ministry needs to vet license
applicants, and although they can produce 2000 per day, the
might not be able to issue permanent weapon licenses to all
Iraqi ministry security personnel by May 1 as desired by
MNF-I. He said the full process would take much longer. He
said no one even knows the size of the PSD population, and
Abdul Qader added that the MOD alone has between 10,000 and
12,000. Rubaie, supported by Iraqi National Intelligence
Service representative, advocated retention of the current
weapon license issuing practice established by a Prime
Minister directive. This directive authorizes NSA, INIS,
MOD, and Minister of the State for National Security to issue
weapons licenses to its staff. They believe this policy is
more appropriate for Iraq than MNF-I's proposal to restrict
licensing to MOI.
SPECKHARD