CONTINUING A STRATEGIC DIALOGUE WITH SCIRI

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000878 SIPDIS SIPDIS NOFORN E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/11/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL PINS ECON IZ SUBJECT: CONTINUING A STRATEGIC DIALOGUE WITH SCIRI REF: 2006 BAGHDAD 4172 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Daniel Speckhard for reasons 1.4 (b) a nd (d). -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (S/NF) The Charge and Vice President Adel Abdel Mehdi chaired on March 11 a second round of strategic dialogue between the US and SCIRI. The Charge emphasized the U.S. commitment to developing its relationship with SCIRI despite recent events that had caused some tension in the relationship. Abdel Mehdi acknowledged this tension but reaffirmed SCIRI's resolution to move forward. Senior Embassy and MNF-I officials previewed principles and priorities important to the US in the three issue areas identified in the initial round of dialogue. Abdel Mehdi expressed full agreement with the Embassy's thinking on economic issues but noted several potential differences in perspective on security issues. On the political track, Abdel Mehdi discussed the connection in Shi'a minds between reconciliation initiatives such as deBaathification and the problem of terrorism, much of which emanated from Arab states. The next step in the strategic dialogue will be to break into working groups to discuss these three tracks in more depth. End Summary. ¶2. (SBU/NF) Embassy participants included the Charge, PolCouns, EconCouns, General Caldwell, IRMO Director, and Acting PolMilCouns. Abdel Mehdi and Tahsin al-Azawi (CoR member and deputy Badr commander) participated from the SCIRI side. -------------- -------------- US Committed to Continuing the Strategic Dialogue -------------- -------------- ¶3. (S/NF) The Charge began the meeting by telling Abdel Mehdi that the Embassy wanted to continue the strategic dialogue with SCIRI begun in November 2006. The initial dialogue, he said, showed that SCIRI and the US shared many common principles that would be a good basis to build on. The Charge observed that SCIRI leader Abdulaziz al-Hakim's December visit to the US was an important step in furthering the SCIRI-US relationship. Yet recent months had also seen tests to the relationship, the Charge noted, including realization from the U.S. side of the degree of Quds Force complicity in EFP networks and of the associations the Badr organization had with the Quds Force. The SCIRI side, the Charge acknowledged, also had concerns about events such as the detention of Badr members, the shooting of the VP's guard on Christmas Eve, the brief detention of Ammar al-Hakim, and a recent incident involving landing clearance for a plane carrying Abdel Mehdi. The Charge explained that it was important not to allow these incidents to disrupt the important strategic dialogue begun in November. The Embassy, he said, had correspondingly assembled a senior team indicative of its commitment to this dialogue. This team was prepared to engage in discussions on political, economic, and security tracks, the same tracks identified by the Vice President in November. -------------- A Catholic Marriage -------------- ¶4. (S/NF) Abdel Mehdi expressed appreciation for the Charge's message and agreed that it was important the dialogue continue at a faster pace. "We are in a Catholic marriage," Abdel Mehdi said. "We have gone too far to be able to divorce." SCIRI and Shi'a more broadly, he continued, had feared during the fall that U.S. policies were changing. While al-Hakim's visit to the US had given SCIRI confidence that the relationship was on the right track, the raid on the SCIRI compound and Ammar's detention had raised questions about how serious the US was in pursuing the relationship. Without exaggerating or downplaying these incidents, SCIRI was resolved to move forward, Abdel Mehdi said; "I can't say that 100 percent of our people believe in what we are doing, but the vast majority do." Abdel Mehdi, who had just returned from Karbala, apologized that he had not had enough time to bring a full team from the SCIRI side and promised to have his team assembled for the next round of the dialogue. -------------- Political Track: Reconciliation and Terrorism -------------- ¶5. (S/NF) Turning to PolCouns, the Charge suggested that the BAGHDAD 00000878 002 OF 002 Embassy side preview some of the principles and priorities it planned to raise with SCIRI in each of the three issue areas. PolCouns touched briefly on principles of importance to the US in a strategic partner, including commitment to democracy, rule of law, and human rights. She identified four priority areas for discussion with SCIRI: deBaathification reform, provincial elections and provincial-central government relations, constitutional review, and regional outreach. Abdel Mehdi said these issues would make an excellent starting point. He asked for U.S. help on regional outreach, noting that the Arab world was concerned about Iranian influence in Iraq as well as the "Shi'a emergence." Abdel Mehdi raised the political aspect of terrorism, saying that Iraq wanted strong relations with the Arab world but that most of the terrorism in Iraq was financed in the Arab or Islamic world: "The Shi'a are asking why we should be flexible on deBaathification or constitutional review if terrorism continues and they keep killing us." The Charge noted that there was a change in dynamics in Sunni communities in Iraq, and that it was important to provide political support to those Sunnis who chose to fight Al-Qaida. -------------- Security Track: Some Differences Identified -------------- ¶6. (S/NF) General Caldwell then shared the U.S. vision for helping to build a secure Iraq through developing Iraqi security forces (ISF) as the sole security entity in Iraq. The ISF, he said, needed to be free of sectarian bias, represent all Iraqis, and understand the importance of human rights. Embassy priorities for the U.S.-SCIRI working group on security, General Caldwell continued, included the impact of deBaathification on security institutions, the popular committees, and DDR programs to address the militia problem. Abdel Mehdi noted the importance of having a real discussion on these issues, as the US and SCIRI might understand some of these terms differently. In evaluating candidates for the new Iraqi army, Abdel Mehdi claimed, some would call an officer from the old army "neutral" and a Badr member "biased." SCIRI, on the other hand, believed that the Badr member was far more likely to be loyal to the new regime. Abdel Mehdi asked why the US was supporting the arming of tribes in Anbar to fight al-Qaida but was concerned about local Shi'a groups arming themselves for the same purpose. Finally, Abdel Mehdi stressed the importance of negotiating a security agreement to redefine authorities and responsibilities. The Charge remarked that this exchange would be the starting point for a good discussion, though he pointed out that the issue of the security agreement was perhaps better addressed in a U.S.-GOI dialogue. -------------- Economic Track: Broad Agreement -------------- ¶7. (S/NF) EconCouns then outlined the principles the US thought important for the development of Iraq's economy, including diversification, a healthy private sector, development of the oil and gas sector, budget execution, and a needs-based social safety net. In addition to passage of the hydrocarbon law and continued progress on budget execution, EconCouns identified implementation of the investment law, alleviation of the fuel crisis, and signing of the International Compact with Iraq as key U.S. priorities. Abdel Mehdi said SCIRI agreed completely on the principles, noting his concern that state subsidies had reached the equivalent of about USD 200 per Iraqi family per month. He highlighted the need to work with officials and business people in the provinces on implementation of the investment law and to remove bureaucratic obstacles to innovation that remained from the extreme centralization of the Saddam era. Abdel Mehdi asked whether it made sense to seek a single international consortium to develop Iraq's oil and gas sector. EconCouns replied that current thinking was that several international consortia might form to compete with each other in different areas of Iraq. -------------- Looking Ahead -------------- ¶8. (S/NF) Shortly after Abdel Mehdi returns from his trip to the US and Brussels, we plan to continue the strategic dialogue through working groups in the economic, security, and political tracks. SPECKHARD