S E C R E T BAGHDAD 000830

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/08/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ
SUBJECT: HASHIMI ON UPCOMING TRAVEL TO SYRIA, IRAN;
DE-BAATH LAW; BLOC LEADERS MEETING


Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (S) Summary: VP Hashimi and the Ambassador met on the eve
of the VP's March 5 trip to Syria and discussed the
possibility of a bloc leaders' retreat to raise key political
issues and reach agreement on a way forward. Hashimi noted
that he would return from Syria at the end of the week and
leave for Iran shortly after. Hashimi, who has been
contemplating a trip to Iran for months, said that while he
did not trust Iranian intentions, it was necessary to
confront them with his concerns over their interference. On
the De-Baathfication law, Hashimi said that VP Abdel Mahdi
appeared to be in favor of the compromise version personally,
however was facing difficulties getting the Shi'a coalition
support for the bill. The VP and the Ambassador agreed that
joint submission of the compromise draft to the CoR from the
Tawafuq, Iraqiyya, and Kurdish Alliance bloc leadership was a
good alternative to Presidency Council submission, and would
send a strong message of support for a De-Baathification law
that contributes to national reconciliation. End Summary.

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ON BLOC LEADERS RETREAT: AGENDA MORE IMPORTANT THAN LOCATION
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2. (S) The Ambassador raised the possibility of a meeting
between VP Hashimi, VP Abdel Mehdi, Abdel Aziz Al Hakim, PM
Maliki, Masoud Barzani and others to agree on a political
agenda in the wake of the security gains achieved by the
troop surge. The Ambassador noted Barazani's preference for
holding the meeting in Kurdistan, where the leaders would be
forced to sit down for an extended period of time to work out
their differences. Hashimi said that the meeting's location
was less important then getting a commitment from all
participants to focus on a meaningful agenda. The VP
suggested that the agenda consist of reconciliation issues
such as "welcoming the national resistance" (NFI), amnesty,
and addressing the needs of former officers; he added that
building mutual trust among leaders and addressing the PM's
"overstepping of boundaries" were of crucial importance.

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REGROUPING ON COMPROMISE DE-BAATH LAW
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3. (S) Hashimi said that while the compromise draft of the
de-Baathification law had his and President Talabani's
support, VP Abdel Mehdi had been slow to sign off. He said
that while Abdel Mehdi was personally in favor of the bill,
he was facing difficulties garnering Shi'a coalition support;
as such it was unlikely that he would sign. Both agreed that
VP Abdel Mehdi should have a few more days to try and rally
His coalition, however in the event he did not sign, there
should be an alternative approach to pushing the bill forward
to the CoR. A joint Iraqiya, Tawafuq, and KAL submission of
the compromise draft to the CoR at the start of the new term
would send a strong message of political support for an
alternative de-Baathification law and bode well for its
passage.

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TRAVEL TO SYRIA AND IRAN
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4. (S) Hashimi said he intended to discuss with the Syrians
the potential for good bi-lateral relations - if the Syrians
would become serious on border and airport security issues.
He noted that he intended to return to Iraqi briefly and
continue on to visit Iran before traveling to Japan in late
March. Hashimi said that Talabani and Shi'a coalition
leaders had been pressuring him to visit Iran for months, and
pointed to a positive conversation between King Abdallah and
the Iranians where they agreed to work towards ending
sectarian violence. While Hashimi had low expectations of
the visit outcomes, he had come to believe that he must
directly confront the Iranians with his concerns over their
interference and request assurances that they would play a
positive role. He said he would raise Iranian funded and
directed death squads, the presence of Moqtada Al-Sadr and
fears that JAM elements were being re-trained and re-armed in
Iran.
KHALILZAD