IRAQIYYA LEADERS DISCUSS WITHDRAWAL FROM GOI

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000828 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/07/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS PINR PTER KDEM IR IZ SUBJECT: IRAQIYYA LEADERS DISCUSS WITHDRAWAL FROM GOI Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (S) Summary: During the Ambassador's March 1-4 trip to Kurdistan with Iraqiyya leaders, Ayad Allawi and Adnan Pachachi discussed options for pursuing their party's secular, nationalist agenda. Allawi professed his support for the Maliki government in establishing security and moving forward on key political priorities, but expressed extreme frustration with the GOI's sectarian approach and its failure to act on national reconciliation. Allawi complained that Iraqiyya has been marginalized and has no role in government decision-making despite its five ministries. Allawi and Pachachi discussed Iraqiyya's potential withdrawal from the GOI, wondering if they might be a more effective as an opposition force. Allawi shared the text of his March 1 letter to the Prime Minister in which he called for implementation of the political reforms necessary for the Baghdad Security Plan (BSP) to succeed. End summary. -------------- GOI: Failure as National Unity Government -------------- ¶2. (S) Allawi criticized the UIA-led GOI, calling it incompetent, inefficient, and heavily influenced by Tehran. The Ambassador pressed Allawi to support the PM's current effort to implement the BSP, pointing to his recent operations to go after all violent elements regardless of sect. Allawi professed his support for stabilization efforts, but complained that the GOI behaved as a majority government, encouraging sectarianism and failing to make progress on reconciliation issues critical to Iraq's future. -------------- Allawi's Letter to the Prime Minister -------------- ¶3. (S) Allawi shared with the Ambassador the text of his March 1 letter to PM Maliki. The letter stated Iraqiyya's support for the BSP, but called on the GOI to carry out the necessary political reforms to coincide with the security plan (full text below). The letter lists 14 "demands" including: cleansing the Iraqi security forces from militia infiltration; suspending the High National Council of De-Ba'athification pending de-Ba'athification reform and transfer of its duties to the judiciary; establishing a formula for a participatory government of national unity and ending the sectarian quota system of representation in the government; dealing with the problem of the former Iraqi army; and, issuing an amnesty to those who worked for the state under Saddam but committed no crimes against humanity. ¶4. (S) Pachachi made a public statement on behalf of Iraqiyya coinciding with delivery of the letter to the PM; he expressed the party's disappointment in the Maliki government, saying "it may become difficult to remain in this government for a long time." Allawi said these words were carefully crafted to be strong enough to convey his nationalist party's frustration, without directly threatening a withdrawal from the GOI. Pachachi suggested that withdrawing from the government might increase Iraqiyya's influence, particularly since as part of the government they had been sidelined. Allawi said that the national list would likely have more credibility in the Council of Representatives (COR) as a force of opposition. The former PM characterized joining the Maliki government as a mistake. The Iraqi people are fed up, he continued, hoping that building opposition to sectarianism would pressure the GOI to implement the political elements of the BSP and eventually advance a nationalist, secular future for Iraq. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶5. (S) Iraqiyya's leadership is strong on vision but weak on practical planning to implement its agenda. Allawi's letter to the PM seems more designed to put his position on the record than to elicit change within the GOI. Iraqiyya does not appear to have actual plans to withdraw from the government, despite its complaints of marginalization. Frustrated with the impasse in the executive, Allawi has proven to date unwilling to engage in Parliamentary politics to push forward his political agenda, preferring instead to spend most of his outside of Iraq lobbying heads of Arab governments to support his nationalist secular vision for the future of Iraq. End Comment. Begin text. To His Excellency the Prime Minister Subject: Political reforms coinciding with the Operation of BAGHDAD 00000828 002 OF 002 Law and Order The Iraqi list conveys its greetings to you Excellency, in support of Operation Law and Order and to restore security to our beloved Iraq, the Iraqi National List stresses the necessity to carry out reforms on the course of the political work to coincide with the security plan. Stemming from this, the Iraqi National List demands the following: ¶1. To review the Terrorist Law in line with the serious, sincere and action movement and not at the level of the media only, toward national reconciliation and for the building of a unified democratic Iraq away from sectarianism. ¶2. To draw up a clear and effective plan for the clean up of the Iraqi army and police from infiltrated elements especially those associated with militias, forces of terror and officers who do not hold appropriate academic certificates. Selection should be based on loyalty to the homeland, and rely on professionalism in building the army and security agencies. ¶3. To suspend the Law of the High National Commission for De-Ba'athification until its discussion and approval by the Council of Representatives in preparation of transferring it into a judicial issue in which the judiciary is the arbitrator. ¶4. To suspend the work of the "Balancing Committee" and to cancel all manifestation of sectarian and partisan dimensions which lead to igniting religious and ethnic sedition in the country, also to adopt the principles of integrity and efficiency in appointments and not political, sectarian, or ethnic affiliations. ¶5. To work on establishing a formula for true participation in the government of national unity far from the sectarian quota system in which all Iraqis are represented even those who are outside the political process and for the government to be capable to save Iraq and ensure its unity. ¶6. In order to achieve genuine reconciliation, to prevent interference from neighboring countries in the Iraqi issues and for the reconstruction and building of Iraq and its national economy, we call for convening an international conference and anther regional one under the supervision f the UN. ¶7. To draw up an immediate plan to deal with the problems of the former Iraqi Army particularly what is related to restoring confidence and assuring dignity for them and to determine their salaries consistent with the present standard of living, also to embrace the former army's technical competencies so as to be a true building factor in an Iraqi army for all Iraqis. ¶8. To draw up a clear and carefully studied plan to return those forcible displaced inside Iraq to their areas and homes from which they were displaced, and to provide future protection for them so that this will not be repeated in the future. ¶9. To issue a comprehensive amnesty for whoever took up arms against the State and its military and security agencies and those who took up arms against the Coalition Forces, but have not committed crimes against humanity. ¶10. To draw up a clear and well studied plan for the return of millions of Iraqi refugees and migrants in the Arab and foreign countries to Iraq with pride and dignity, even if that requires seeking the assistance of Arab and international organizations. ¶11. To mobilize all Iraqis to achieve security and stability. ¶12. To ask the UN and the Arab League and the Organization of the Islamic Conference to play a wider role in Iraq and for the benefit of Iraq. ¶13. To disclose names and details, in a clear and courageous manner the harmful interference in Iraq and to its people by neighboring countries. ¶14. To release political prisoners, and issue a general amnesty that does not include who has committed a crime against the Iraqis or the international community. End text. KHALILZAD