CHIEF OF STAFF DISCUSSES IRAQI PM ROLE IN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000807 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/06/2017 TAGS: IZ KDEM KJUS PGOV PREL SUBJECT: CHIEF OF STAFF DISCUSSES IRAQI PM ROLE IN DE-BAATHIFICATION REFORM Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Daniel Speckhard for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. In a March 5 meeting with DCM and PolCouns, PM Chief of Staff Tariq Abdullah said that the PM preferred a de-Baathification policy that targeted only those involved in criminal activities rather than entire classes of members, but cautioned that the matter was exclusively reserved for the Council of Representatives to decide. He noted that the PM had organized a conference in support of former military officers and was quietly taking steps to suspend the implementation of de-Baathification orders. Abdullah confirmed that many political leaders supported the Presidency Council compromise draft, however they feared public reaction. The DCM noted that the PM was currently working from a position of strength, and could use the momentum from the Baghdad Security Plan to make key announcements on de-Baathification. END SUMMARY. -------------- -------------- CoR Controls De-Baath Policy, but PM Working Towards Reconciliation -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) Abdullah began by emphasizing that the Prime Minister firmly believes that any initiative on de-Baathification must start from the Council of Representatives (CoR),per the Constitution. The PM has publicly announced his position, which is that current de-Baathification policies that exclude entire groups of people based on their membership level in the Baath Party are flawed. The PM instead advocates a policy that would target only those former Baathists who have criminal charges or civil cases against them in the courts. However, Abdullah emphasized that the de-Baathification mandate cannot be changed or eliminated by the Prime Minister. ¶3. (C) Abdullah noted that the PM is taking steps to provide relief to those affected by de-Baathification, the majority of whom are former military officers and Iraqi Army staff. To that end, Abdullah explained, the PM had organized a recent reconciliation conference to bring as many former officers as possible back into the military or to provide them with adequate pensions. On the civilian side, the PM was unofficially working to postpone the implementation of orders against individuals who do not otherwise face charges in court. The PM had instructed ministers not to implement orders, Abdullah explained, and most were following the PM's order. This instruction includes both new orders and ones that were previously issued but have not yet been implemented. Abdullah stressed that the PM was pursuing this initiative quietly and informally (i.e. without documentation) because it would be viewed as a violation of his position were it to be known. ¶4. (C) The DCM praised the PM's position, noting that the USG also supported a policy that would only punish those individuals involved in criminal activity. However he noted that if the public is not aware of ongoing reconciliation efforts, those efforts will have no impact on reducing violence and fostering cooperation. He also noted that implementation of orders was not the only problem, there is also a problem with ministries which refuse to implement exemptions that would reinstate previously removed employees. PolCouns mentioned that this was a problem in Salah ad-Din, where the Ministry of Education had not reinstated almost 600 teachers who had been issued exemptions by the de-Baathification commission. Abdullah agreed that ministries should immediately implement reinstatements. -------------- -------------- DCM: PM Could Take Lead While CoR Reviews Legislation -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) The DCM suggested that the way forward may be the compromise draft that the Presidency Council had been working on. Abdullah confided that although the political leaders agreed with the draft in principle, they would have difficulty supporting it as they were afraid of public reaction. The DCM noted that if enough leaders came out in support of the compromise draft, the political risk would be less as it would be shared. He suggested that the PM and VP Mahdi could agree to support the draft. ¶6. (C) Abdullah said that such a scenario may be possible, but reasoned that the PM would need "some credit on the security front" from the Baghdad Security Plan before he could make such an announcement. The DCM suggested that the PM could take a few steps in the interim to lay the groundwork. He suggested that the PM could make an announcement that a compromise draft on de-Baathification reform would be presented to the CoR shortly. The PM could then publicly ask his ministers to postpone implementing BAGHDAD 00000807 002 OF 002 de-Baathification orders until the CoR reviews this legislation. The PM could also insist that ministers reinstate those employees who have received exemptions. The DCM reasoned that all of these actions could be taken under the cover that de-Baathification needs to be addressed by the CoR in a neutral environment. ¶7. (C) Abdullah said that de-Baathification is an important issue, but reiterated that "we must work slowly so that it matures properly." He noted that early concessions on de-Baathification would be perceived as a weakness by the insurgents and could be used against the government. The DCM countered that the GOI was actually approaching the issue from a position of strength and should move quickly to capture the momentum generated by the Baghdad Security Plan. He acknowledged that it was a politically sensitive issue and that the PM would need the support of other political leaders to move forward and reiterated USG's commitment to helping gain that support. KHALILZAD