VP MAHDI DISCUSSES DE-BAATHIFICATION REFORM,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 000798 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/03/2017 TAGS: IZ KJUS PGOV PREL SUBJECT: VP MAHDI DISCUSSES DE-BAATHIFICATION REFORM, STRAINS IN SCIRI-US RELATIONSHIP Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. In a February 28 meeting with the Ambassador, Iraqi Vice President Adil Abd al-Mahdi described the assassination attempt against him, calling it a "well organized inside job." He discussed the issue of de-Baathification reform and stressed the importance of addressing the needs and concerns of victims of the former regime. Mahdi also expressed concern about a series of recent events that have appeared to target SCIRI members, and passed the Ambassador a letter that he sent to the President and other GOI officials requesting clarification of the authorities and responsibilities of the Iraqi and US governments (full text attached). END SUMMARY. -------------- VP: "If I had taken one step forward..." -------------- ¶2. (C) Mahdi entered the room stiffly and with the use of a cane. He had a small gash on his forehead and showed the Ambassador ball bearings that had been removed from his finger. He said that several other pieces of shrapnel had not been removed from his legs as they were embedded too deeply. Mahdi said he had been told that the bomb was either concealed in a false ceiling or in one of the chairs. He recalled that his name had just been announced and that he had hesitated before approaching the podium. He speculated that the bomber had possibly been in the room or listening nearby, and had intended for Mahdi to receive the full force of the blast. He was confident that the MOI had recovered enough evidence to conduct a thorough investigation, but gratefully accepted the Ambassador's offer of FBI assistance during the process. -------------- -------------- De-Baathification Reform Must Offer Something for Victims -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) Mahdi told the Ambassador that he would work on de-Baathification reform, but needed concessions for victims of the Baath Party in order to get the support of the Shia Coalition. He expressed support for a scholarship program that would benefit relatives of victims, and noted that he was open to other suggestions. He also mentioned that an affirmative action program may make reform more palatable, since certain government offices and ministries were still unbalanced. He cited the Ministry of Foreign �00A;Affairs as an example, noting that it employs few Shia. Mahdi promised to review the various draft laws and agreed to work with the Presidency Council to issue a compromise draft by March 8. ¶4. (C) In a follow up meeting with Mahdi on March 3, PolCouns stressed that de-Baathification reform should further national reconciliation, and offered to work with Mahdi to incorporate ideas to balance reform with measures to compensate victims. She presented several proposals - special medical and psychological care for victims, discounted medications, preferential access to training and education, and symbolic measures like a national day of recognition and public monuments - that could help to redress past suffering, but noted that these measures must be available to all victims, and not based on sectarian identities. "They should be based on justice," he stated. ¶5. (C) Mahdi expressed concern about moving too quickly on reform efforts, noting that passing laws quickly may solve one problem, but often creates others. He predicted that it would take time to convince the Shia Coalition and thought that a law introduced by Ahmed Chalabi and the de-Baathification commission, rather than the Presidency Council, would be more successful. PolCouns expressed concern that Embassy efforts to engage Chalabi on reform had produced few results, with Chalabi unwilling to consider fundamental changes to the commission or to pursue reconciliation. PolCouns instead suggested that the Presidency Council release a draft law within the next week, and then open up the issue for public consultation. This would ensure broad support and reassure Shia Coalition partners who are more sensitive to reform efforts. ¶6. (C) PolCouns further suggested that Prime Minister Maliki issue an order to suspend the work of the de-Baathification commission until new legislation is passed. Mahdi supported the idea, noting that "the PM can help." -------------- Recent Incidents Strain US-SCIRI Relations -------------- BAGHDAD 00000798 002 OF 004 ¶7. (C) The Ambassador apologized for confusion surrounding the attack on Mahdi that resulted in the VP being turned away from the Combat Support Hospital (CSH). He explained that the problem was likely due to confusion over the number of cars in the VP's convoy. Mahdi accepted the apology, and hoped that the unfortunate incident would result in better communication in the future. ¶8. (C) Mahdi briefly touched on the issue of the detention of Ammar Al-Hakim, noting that Hakim's version of the facts seemed to indicate that his detention was "coordinated." He also made reference to a recent incident in which the private plane he was traveling on was not allowed to land at Baghdad International Airport and had to return to Ankara. Mahdi said that he had written a letter to complain about the issue to the Presidency Council, PM and CoR Speaker. He gave the Embassy a copy of the letter, full translation is below. The letter requested that the PCNS revisit "the security agreement" between GOI and USG, and that authorities and responsibilities of each side be clearly delineated. BEGIN TEXT: Date: February 23, 2007 His Excellency President Jalal Talabani, His Excellency the Prime Minister and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, Nouri Al Maliki, His Excellency the Vice President, Tariq Al-Hashimi His Excellency Speaker of the Council of Representatives, Mahmoud Al-Mashhadani We have accepted the official invitation addressed to us by the Turkish government for an official work visit for the period of 20-21 February 2007, after consultation with Your Excellencies and after discussing the matter in the Political Council for National Security (PCNS). The Turkish government had appreciatively sent a special government plane to facilitate the trip back and forth. The visit took place as scheduled and we came back to Baghdad expecting that the plane would land at six o'clock in the evening of February the 21st. Six minutes before the landing the aircraft captain was informed that he could not land because the civilian airport was closed. We attempted to obtain an approval from the military airport but to no avail. Thus we were forced to go back to Ankara after we circled over Baghdad for a period of more than forty minutes in order to obtain the necessary approvals for landing. We were informed later that a civilian plane landed on that same day at five o'clock and that two other civilian planes landed around seven thirty p.m, which shows that the news about airport closure was not accurate. We were also assured that all necessary approvals were obtained before the plane left Ankara. Additionally, our protection and follow up team in Baghdad was following up on the subject of landing with all relevant parties without any positive results. This incident has caused an embarrassment on the level of sovereignty as well as the political and MEDIA levels. We stated in the MEDIA that the inability to land was for technical reasons and this was based more on assumptions rather than on real facts. We are going to wait for the results of the investigation but principally we believe that the issue goes beyond human or technical errors that can usually happen in these circumstances. We believe there is a major problem that has to do with what we have raised repeatedly which is the distribution of authorities and responsibilities between the Iraqi government and the friendly American side. If such matters are not resolved, many consequential things will happen- as have happened many times- whether from this side or the other. Significantly harmful things will happen- as has happened before and continue to happen now- without the ability to investigate them, let alone stopping them or at least curtailing them, because every side will lay the responsibility on the other side, without the ability to offer sound solutions because responsibilities are not well defined. This will hamper reaching positive results for the benefit of both sides. Your Excellencies, We had hoped to reach a "security agreement" between Iraq and the United States in February of 2004 according to the agreement of November 15, 2003, but nothing came of that. Then we requested the resumption of negotiations to achieve this agreement in most - if not all- of the meetings that were held with the American side without any meaningful progress, despite the fact that all agreed on the BAGHDAD 00000798 003 OF 004 importance of the matter. Iraq, before extending the mission of the MNF at the end of last year, insisted on the importance of achieving this agreement. The Prime Minister's letter has become part of the last resolution issued by the Security Council concerning the mission of the MNFI. And in order not to turn the incident of the plane into a new personal matter, I suggest to Your Excellencies that you approve placing the subject of "the security agreement" among the priorities of the agenda of the PCNS in order to advise the government to resume the discussions with the American side about reaching an agreement within an agreed upon period that will be decided after consultation with the American side. The desired agreement should be able to clearly define the authorities and responsibilities in many matters. The most important ones are the following: -- The command of the Iraqi Forces, their movement, the role of the MNFI in accordance with U.N Security Council Resolution and the governing rules to prevent violations against the sovereignty of Iraq and the independence of the Iraqi decision, the authority exercised by the Iraqi State over its citizens, territories, space, waters, wealth, rights and interests and to take all of this into consideration in order to achieve the highest coordination and cooperation in the performance of duties between the two parties. -- The controls for the role of the MNFI in areas not related to security. -- Periods and limits of control by the MNFI on those Iraqi facilities, institutions, lands and areas currently under its administration. -- The file of immunities and legal and juridical authorities to settle cases and violations. -- Camping, mechanisms and controls for movement to and from and to the country and inside it. -- The controls for movement on the air passages of civil and military aircraft and the administration of the civil and military airports. -- The controls for controlling border entry points. -- The controls for arrests and releasing and the administration of prisons and the role of the Iraqi Judiciary in all of this. -- The timings that are agreed upon for receiving the security files and the command of forces and for receiving the facilities and other issues aiming to regulate the relationship in a way that defines the authorities and responsibilities of both sides in the above mentioned matters and others and leads to achieving the duties assigned to the MNFI and their successful return to their countries. Please accept our warmest greetings, and peace be upon you, (Signed) Adel Abdul Mahdi Vice President of the Republic A copy to: - His Excellency, Zalmay Khalilzad, the Ambassador of the United States. - Commanding General Petraeus Note: After signing this letter, we received the news about the detention of His Eminence Ammar Al-Hakim by the U.S. forces, and despite the intensive communications with His Excellency the Ambassador, General Petraeus and other Iraqi officials who all confirmed that a mistake was made and that His Eminence would be released with an apology, yet His Eminence's release happened after approximately ten hours of detention. This incident and others which mix the cards, confuse the thoughts, shake the confidence and subject Iraqi leaders to degrading and serious situations( as well as others carried out by the U.S Forces - as they did in fact with my bodyguards and the guards of Ammar Al-Hakim - of aiming their weapons at the accompanying individuals from the Iraqi Army and Police, disarming them and having them lay down and even blindfolding and handcuffing them, are not simple mistakes but they are big and serious violations whose consequences do not affect only the Iraqis but they also negatively impact on the U.S Forces and the MNFI. They are added evidence to the mixing BAGHDAD 00000798 004 OF 004 of duties, authorities and orders which will lead to the accumulation of mistakes preventing the establishment of successful and effective policies and relationships. END TEXT KHALILZAD