PRT TIKRIT: MINISTERS OF OIL, ELECTRICITY, AND 4TH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 000681 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/22/2017 TAGS: ENRG EPET KCOR EIND IZ IR SUBJECT: PRT TIKRIT: MINISTERS OF OIL, ELECTRICITY, AND 4TH IA DESCRIBE PLAN TO RESTORE BAYJI OIL REFINERY REF: BAGHDAD 539 Classified By: Classified by Leonard Hatton, PRT Deputy Team Leader, fo r reasons 1.5 (b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is a PRT Tikrit, Salah ad Din cable. ¶2. (C) SUMMARY. During a February 19 meeting at the refinery, Minister of Oil Al Shahristani, Minister of Electricity Al Hasan, and the deputy commander of the 4th IA, BG Nabeel, revealed their plan to improve oil infrastructure security and increase public fuel distribution. Attending the meeting were refinery officials, the Governors of Salah ad Din (SaD),Nineveh, and Kirkuk, and embassy officials. The presentations made by Al Shahristani, Al Hasan, and Nabeel emphasized separate points, but communicated one central message: effective control of the distribution of refined fuel from Bayji - and the security necessary - will pass from the Ministry of Oil (MoO) in Baghdad to the governors of the north-central provinces, in conjunction with the IA. Given a fixed allotment of fuel per week, governors will now be tasked with organizing and ensuring the distribution of fuel to their constituents during a four week trial period, after which the plan,s success/failure will be reviewed. While offering an opportunity for decentralized decision making and encouraging greater local accountability, the new plan also tasks provincial governments with new responsibilities without definite support from the GOI. When questioned about this by the Governor of Nineveh, Al Shahristani did not offer specific resources to help the governors of the largely Sunni provinces, simply stating &the MoO will help.8 END SUMMARY. -------------- 4th IA in Charge -------------- ¶3. (C) The Deputy Commander of the 4th IA Brigade, BG Nabeel, laid out a detailed security and distribution plan at the refinery which - if fully carried out - will transform operations at Bayji. Nabeel described the mission of the IA and SIB in simple terms: secure fuel for the Iraqi people and protect the residents of Bayji and the refinery. Nabeel claimed that significant success has already been achieved; stating that the black market price of benzene fell from 35,000 ID to 20,000 ID per 20 liter can since the IA assumed responsibility for security at the refinery. (NOTE: Nabeel,s claim that black market prices have dropped appears to be on target. According to atmospheric data released on February 20, prices of benzene have fallen to around .40 USD per liter, compared to .76 USD on February 11. END NOTE.) However, stating that there was much yet to accomplish, Nabeel detailed the following objectives for the 4th IA: --Control over entrances and exits of the refinery. --Control over distribution procedures within the refinery. . --Separation of tankers by product type. --Armed escort of fuel tankers to provide security on highways. --Encouraging a stronger, incorruptible Oil Protection Force (OPF). --Success in fighting the terrorists and AIF. --Successful exploitation of the media to keep public informed of successes. Nabeel also listed longer term projects. These included reorganizing the parking lot, installing cameras and other monitoring devices throughout the refinery and outside, and upgrading communications capabilities within the facility. Nabeel also stated that after the operations completely secured the refinery, Strategic Infrastructure Battalions (SIBs) would also assume responsibility for the propane distribution facility in Siniyah. -------------- Fewer Tankers, But Better Organized -------------- ¶4. (C) Fuel distribution at Bayji is often a scene of bedlam, with hundreds of tankers waiting outside the gate. Nabeel described a completely overhauled process which limits the number of tankers receiving fuel to 100 per day in order to provide for greater accountability and order at the gates. (NOTE: Currently distribution hours run from 7am ) 1am, although in practice, due to confusion at the gates, fuel is often dispensed for a far less number of hours. END NOTE.) According to Nabeel, this would provide six hours of more efficient and transparent distribution each day, allowing for three or four hours of clean-up, equipment maintenance, and BAGHDAD 00000681 002 OF 004 security operations ¶5. (C) Previously, the ability to organize daily shipping manifests for fuel tankers was limited to Baghdad; the distribution office in the refinery would receive faxed documents ostensibly detailing the tankers which would receive fuel that day. In practice, chaos was often the rule. For example, on a February 6 visit to the refinery there were approximately 25 tankers waiting near the HFO distribution gate that weren,t on the manifest for the day, while the trucks that were did not show. Nabeel announced a new distribution plan provides for a predetermined amount of fuel to be allocated for each province, appropriately divided by fuel type, i.e. benzene, kerosene, etc. Provincial governors of each would assume responsibility for the entire distribution process inside of the province; including the election, destination, and security of tankers. Nabeel also emphasized that this was an interim strategy ) it would be reassessed in four weeks. (Note: MinOil has never run point-to-point distribution. Local distribution has always been handled within a province. Nevertheless, Nabeel's plan still gives the provinces a greater role, in both allocation decisions and security.) -------------- OPF Taken Under Wing? -------------- ¶6. (C) One of the central issues regarding the &military invasion8 (as described by PM Al Maliki during the December 29 meeting) of the Bayji refinery is the ongoing relationship between the OPF and the IA. So far, according to CF elements on the ground, the two sides appear to be &keeping tabs8 on each other and encouraging accountability. In the meeting, Nabeel spoke positively of OPF cooperation, referring to the OPF as colleagues whom the SIBs considered as &one of their units.8 The feeling however, may not be mutual. Nebhan Mehjoob, the refinery OPF Chief, told IPAO before the meeting began that the SIBs were not adequately communicating with the OPF. (NOTE: OPF officials ) Sami, Nebhan, Sabah, etc. - previously expressed concern to IPAO about the IA assumption of responsibility for security duties at the refinery. It is unclear if their skepticism reflects an ongoing internal power struggle within the refinery or mere professional rivalries (septel). END NOTE.) Breaking ranks with his refinery colleagues, Regional Chief of Distribution Samir Abbas requested that the Ministry of Oil &strengthen8 the OPF. -------------- Media Savvy -------------- ¶7. (C) Pointing out that improved communication with the media was necessary, Nabeel emphasized that another primary objective of the IA would be to utilize the media to provide the population with regular updates from the refinery. The updates, which would detail precise numbers of tankers arriving and being fueled each day, would encourage overall accountability and convince the public that the GOI was responding to the fuel shortage crisis. -------------- Al Shahristani Tasks ) and Governors Respond -------------- ¶8. (C) Al Shahristani echoed many of the same points as Nabeel, naming security as the greatest challenge facing the MinOil. Describing pipeline security ) refinery inputs as well as export pipelines ) as inadequate, the Minister emphasized that most of Iraq,s hard currency is derived from petroleum exports delivered by pipelines. Al Shahristani also described the highway security situation as appalling and a major impediment to the efficient distribution of refined fuel to the general population. In order to remedy the situation, Al Shahristani assigned the governors of the Iraq,s north-central provinces and the 4th IA the responsibility for increased security, saying that they knew their respective areas better than anyone. The Minister also said he was requesting that the Ministry of Defense give the 4th IA additional control of the SIBs protecting the vital Kirkuk ) Bayji crude oil pipeline. ¶9. (C) The Governor of the province of Nineveh, Ghanim Al Basso, raised serious concerns with the Minister,s strategy, stating that the MinOil contracts with tribal leaders ) at the price of $750,000 per kilometer ) who, according to Al Basso, often take the money and later steal fuel anyway. Al Basso also argued that the funds given to the tribes often are funneled to insurgent groups. Both Al Basso and the Governor of Salah ad Din, Hamed Al Quissi, also strongly BAGHDAD 00000681 003 OF 004 objected to Al Shahristani,s highway and pipeline security tasking in principle as well, claiming that ) in reality - neither the provinces nor the IA or SIBs had the resources to expand their security operations. This support, according to the governors, would have to come from Baghdad. Al Shahristani,s response to the governors was simple: &Give me your (the governors) plan, and the Ministry of Oil will help.8 Specifics, however, were conspicuously lacking. -------------- Syria and Iran to the Rescue -------------- ¶10. (C) Admitting that the shortage of refined fuel would remain an enormous problem in the near future, Al Shahistrani explained that the MinOil was in the process of negotiating new contracts with Syria and Iran for the importation of fuel. (Note: the inarguable shortage is of subsidized fuel. Fuel is more widely available from unofficial sources, but at 2-4 times the official price of 350 dinars.) The imports, Al Shahristrani explained, would be province specific: gasoline from Iran would be delivered to Diyala, while imports from Syria were earmarked for Nineveh. While, according to the Minister, Kurdistan would be allowed to negotiate its own contracts, Salah ad Din and Anbar presently did not have any foreign import contracts. ¶11. (C) Al Shahistrani also recognized that the glut of HFO was forcing the closure of the refinery on a regular basis ) 7,000 cubic meters per day need to be distributed in order to ensure continued production at the refinery ) and that coupled with the frequent power failures, it was the greatest barrier to higher production levels (reftel). Acknowledging that the HFO build-up was due to a break-down in contracting with Turkey as well as the lack of highway security (and possible AIF targeting of tanker drivers),Al Shahristani promised refinery officials and the governors that the MinOil had finalized HFO export contracts with Syria and Turkey (which he said provided for 7000 tons of HFO to be exported to each at the international market price). He also suggested that railroads could be potentially be used to transport much of the HFO in lieu of the highway security situation (Al Shahristrani claimed that 1500 to 2000 tons of HFO per day could be moved by rail); however, he admitted that that railway security had to be addressed before this would be a viable option. Al Basso suggested that the Ministry provide 50 tanker trucks to carry away some of the excess fuel; Al Shahristani again was non-committal. -------------- Obeydi,s Reach Back -------------- ¶12. (C) Al Shahristani strongly backed new director Dr. Ali Obeydi, declaring that he had the authority and license to obtain necessary equipment for the refinery. This could be a major step forward; the Bayji refinery currently lacks a significant amount of vital spare parts. During a February 6 visit, former Abdel Khader told IPAO that the refinery requested for years in vain over 3 million dollars worth of equipment from the MinOil. The Minister also reiterated a commitment to providing back-up electrical generators in the future; again, however, refusing to provide details or a time frame of when the generators could be delivered. -------------- Ministry of Electricity to Help -------------- ¶13. (C) Minister of Electricity Kareem Al Hasan Al Hasan detailed a plan to increase the amount of HFO which could be used as fuel by the nearby power plant. Al Hasan explained that the power plant operates three thermal units and is repairing a fourth; when all four are operational, the plant will consume approximately 6500 tons of HFO per day. He also described the Ministry,s strategy to convert two of the main turbines to run on HFO instead of diesel. This project, which Al Hasan said should be completed by the summer of 2008, would increase HFO consumption by the power plant to 9000 tons daily ) greatly assisting the refinery in the disposal of HFO. ¶14. (C) Pointing out that the power plant also depends on pipeline supply of fuels, the Minister echoed the request raised by Al Shahristrani to increase security on the pipelines. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶15. (C) Al Maliki,s plan to provide security and overhaul fuel distribution at the Bayji refinery appears to be paying BAGHDAD 00000681 004 OF 004 positive dividends. Oversight has noticeably increased at the gates and the pumps; there are more boots and eyes on the ground ) watching each other as well as the tankers. The 4th IA seems to have a workable, practical strategy to take control of the situation, at least in the refinery. In addition, the plan is showing positive results in the streets of Salah ad Din; black market prices for benzene have dropped drastically over several weeks. ¶16. (C) In theory, Al Shahristrani,s decision to assign increased responsibility for fuel distribution to the governors increases accountability and simplifies the process; indeed, one of the central flaws in the old system was the complete centralization of distribution planning and contracting in Baghdad. However, the provincial governments and governors are probably not ready to completely assume the responsibility to provide security necessary to ensure adequate fuel distribution. Local pressures would probably ensure that much of the fuel reaches its destination; however, a strategy which transfers complete responsibility to provincial authorities who may be implicated in fuel smuggling themselves - as in the case of Salah ad Din province - may not prove the most successful course of action. Al Shahistrani offered MinOil assistance for security and distribution. If this assistance is not ultimately forthcoming, central government in Baghdad may run the risk of appearing in the eyes of many Sunnis here to be handing them the problem and walking away. END COMMENT. ¶17. (U) For additional reporting from PRT Tikrit, Salah ad Din, please see our SIPRNET reporting blog: http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Tikrit. KHALILZAD