FORMER IRAQI MILITARY OFFICER DISCUSSES ANBAR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000639 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/22/2017 TAGS: PGOV IZ SUBJECT: FORMER IRAQI MILITARY OFFICER DISCUSSES ANBAR PROVINCIAL POLITICS Classified By: Deputy Political Counselor Charles O. Blaha, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Lieutenant Colonel Ahmed Khalaf, a well-connected former military officer from Ramadi, told Poloffs on February 19 that the Anbar Salvation Council capitalized on anti-Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) momentum in the province and the Council's police recruits are mostly loyal to Iraq, not the Salvation Council leader. He complained that the spike in Anbar police recruits is being handled in an ad hoc manner, and that the police chief does not have sufficient command and control over the new units. Khalaf criticized Anbar's leaders as weak, and said he thought the province should be governed by a former military officer who could garner former officers' support to fix the security situation. Khalaf said the province needs a more strategic approach to its development projects, as well as a functioning court and prison system. Khalaf has experience working with Iraqi security forces - both before and after Operation Iraqi Freedom - and is apparently highly regarded by Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi. END SUMMARY. -------------- -------------- Salvation Council Capitalized on Anti-AQI Momentum -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) Khalaf was an instructor in the Iraqi Military Academy for seven years and has been helping the Iraqi police obtain funding and police stations since they were founded in 2003. He knows many of the provincial leaders, from Governor Mamun to Sheikh Sattar Abu Risha, the leader of the Anbar Salvation Council, a coalition of Ramadi-based sheikhs who are fighting AQI. He calls himself an "independent" and appears to have no loyalties, criticizing Mamun and Sheikh Sattar equally. ¶3. (C) Khalaf said Sheikh Sattar and the Salvation Council capitalized on the assassination of Khalid Arak, a prominent sheikh and major general. Khalaf said he and Arak were part of a group of former military officers who were tired of AQI's assassinations, and the murder of Arak was the last straw for the group. The group, which did not trust the Coalition Forces (CF),initially tried to form brigades with tribal membership and looked for support from wealthy sheikhs. According to Khalaf, Sheikh Sattar knew the group needed a leader and stepped in to fill the void. Khalaf stressed that eighty percent of the rank and file of the emergency police units are fighting because they are against AQI, not because they are loyal to Sattar. He said these eighty percent are former military officers who are motivated to fight because they believe their province is falling apart before their eyes. ¶4. (C) Khalaf believes that the situation in Anbar has improved since the Salvation Council was formed and said the tribes in rural areas have gotten rid of AQI except in Bubani, an area near Habbaniyah, which lies east of Ramadi. However, Khalaf complained that the police recruitment took place in an ad hoc manner. He said each tribe now has its own police station, but there is no institutional command and control. The Anbar police chief cannot move units or collect and react to intelligence and could use three or four deputies to help him retain control of the force, according to Khalaf. He complained that Sheikh Sattar could intervene with the police despite having no official position of authority in the police force. He added that the integrity of security positions has been violated by random promotions to unearned ranks. ¶5. (C) Khalaf criticized the leaders of the Salvation Council, saying they are not professionals and the Council contains only one "true" sheikh. Khalaf stressed that he is friends with Ahmed Abu Risha, Sheikh Sattar's brother and a top Salvation Council representative, but, Khalaf continued, friendship is not the same as work affairs. "I respect the sheikhs but they are not my leaders," Khalaf said. He complained that for the right price, the sheikhs will do more for the Coalition than they did for Saddam Hussein. -------------- Anbar Leadership is Weak -------------- ¶6. (C) Khalaf criticized the leadership of Anbar, saying the same weak leadership had been in place there since 2003, with the same individuals recycled to different positions. For example, Governor Mamun al-Alwani was the Provincial Council Deputy Chairman for the terms of the three governors who preceded him, and according to Khalaf, Mamun ran the Provincial Council as the Deputy Chairman because the former Chairman was weak. Khalaf said Ahmed Abu Risha also is not new to Anbar politics because he was the security chief for BAGHDAD 00000639 002 OF 002 Mamun's predecessor. Khalaf said the Anbar Provincial Council and the provincial Director Generals are dominated by IIP members who have not done enough to stop the terrorism in the province. -------------- -------------- Military Leader, Strategic Thinking, the Solution for Anbar -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) To solve Anbar's security problems, Khalaf believes that Anbar needs a military leader, not an engineer or doctor. (Note: Khalaf was referring to Governor Mamun and the PC Chairman Abdul Salam al-Ani, respectively. End Note.) Khalaf estimated there are 5,500 former Army officers in Anbar, and if an older Army officer were to be in charge in Anbar, this officer could pull the other officers out of their "dormancy" and have them help fix the security problem. While he recognized that installing a military leader would be undemocratic, Khalaf replied that Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki could declare a state of emergency in Anbar and install a new government. ¶8. (C) Khalaf also believes Governor Mamun is not looking at the strategic needs of the province. He said Anbar has no statistics or records to help understand what the province's needs are. For example, he said there are no facts on unemployment, the status of Anbar University, or the economic potential of the province. Khalaf said Anbar needs to collect this kind of information, and then use it to ensure development projects are put into the right places. He complained that schools have been built in places where it was more critical to have health centers. ¶9. (C) Khalaf said Ramadi's lack of courts and a central prison was another problem. He said that if he were governor, first thing he would do is build a prison, and have moderate imams visit the prisoners to make sure the prisoners did not leave the prisons more radicalized than when they entered. Finally, Khalaf said that the Seventh Army Division based in Anbar is only forty percent full. Khalaf opined that Anbaris have no incentive to join the Army when the police allow them to work near their homes, working from only six hours a day with full wages. -------------- Comment and Bio Note -------------- ¶10. (C) Khalaf's desire for military rule is a common one in Anbar. Many Sunnis long for a strongman ruler who can restore stability, even at the price of sacrificing democratic principles. His comments underscore the difficulties in shoring up popular support and legitimacy for the local governmental institutions. Khalaf helped found an NGO called the Society for Rehabilitation and Reformation - a group of intellectuals, professionals and former army officers that hoped to be politically active in the wake Saddam's fall. He is working with the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs and the PM's point person for Anbar, Dr. Rafai Issawi, to increase police recruits in Anbar. Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi speaks positively of Khalaf and has mentioned him as a good candidate to replace the Minister of Defense. Khalaf is 36 years old and married. He attended a military college in India and speaks some English. KHALILZAD