Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BAGHDAD628
2007-02-21 13:44:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

FADHILA BLOC LEADER DISCUSSES DEBAATHIFICATION

Tags:  PGOV IZ 
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VZCZCXRO3149
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #0628 0521344
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 211344Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9793
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 000628 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/18/2017
TAGS: PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: FADHILA BLOC LEADER DISCUSSES DEBAATHIFICATION
PROPOSALS


Classified By: Political Counselor Margaret Scobey for reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d).

-----------------------
DeBaathification Reform
-----------------------

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 000628 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/18/2017 TAGS: PGOV IZ SUBJECT: FADHILA BLOC LEADER DISCUSSES DEBAATHIFICATION PROPOSALS Classified By: Political Counselor Margaret Scobey for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). -------------- DeBaathification Reform -------------- ¶1. (C) Hassan al-Shammari, Fadhila bloc leader in the Council of Representatives (CoR),told PolCouns on February 14 that Fadhila supported an approach to deBaathification reform that made reconciliation the driving priority. Fadhila, he said, wanted to see the "rehabilitation" of Baath party members who did not commit crimes, after which they should be able to return to political life. He professed indifference as to whether deBaathification would affect those starting at the firqa level or those starting at the shawba level, as long as they were able to receive pensions (if they had not commited crimes) and "were not pushed to become terrorists." He expressed concern at reports he had received that former Baath party members at the shawba level and higher were receiving letters threatening that they would be killed if they did not join the resistance. Al-Shammari noted that individuals who worked with Saddam's special security services presented a difficult problem, in that they believed "in God and then Saddam" so firmly that rehabilitation might not be possible. ¶2. (C) Al-Shammari, who had read the draft laws submitted to the CoR by Tawafuq and the Higher National DeBaathification Commission (HNDBC) and also Ayad Allawi's proposal, seemed to favor the Tawafuq submission. He dismissed Allawi's proposal as "points rather than a real law" and observed that it would basically gut the deBaathification process. He contrasted the HNDBC draft with Tawafuq's draft, clearly favoring the Tawafuq version. He noted that the HNDBC draft was more focused on bringing Baath party members to account whereas the Tawafuq draft was more focused on promoting reconciliation. Al-Shammari said he supported the Tawafuq proposal to separate the commission into a council of advisors and an executive board as opposed to the more centralized structure of the commission in the HNDBC proposal, where the political power and implementing power rested with the commissioner. He also supported the right to appeal found in the Tawafuq version and criticized the HNDBC version for having the judicial function subsumed under the commission. He suggested two amendments to the Tawafuq version, namely that the council should be required to meet more than once per month and that the council should have full time employees. -------------- Ministerial Changes: Fadhila Wants In -------------- ¶3. (C) Al-Shammari, who is a member of the constitutional review committee (CRC),said he had chosen not to travel over the CoR recess (as opposed to most CRC members) because negotiations over ministerial changes were intensifying and Fadhila was pressing for a ministry. He said that he doubted there would be a major overhaul because "the bloc leaders will not agree to it." On the Baghdad security plan, al-Shammari said that he thought it would be effective in stopping militia activity but expressed doubt that suicide bombers could be stopped. KHALILZAD

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