MAYSAN GOVERNOR DISCUSSES SECURITY SITUATION,

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 000620

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/14/2017
TAGS: PGOV PINS PREL IR IZ
SUBJECT: MAYSAN GOVERNOR DISCUSSES SECURITY SITUATION,
IRAN, POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

Classified By: PRT Maysan Team Leader Julie Nutter for reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d).


1. (U//REL USA, MCFI) This is a PRT Maysan cable.

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Summary
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2. (C//REL USA, MCFI) In a January 22 meeting with the new
head of Multinational Forces Division (Southeast),Maysan
Governor Adil Al-Maliki focused on his province's upcoming
transition to Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC),noting that the
security situation in Maysan was currently calm. Attributing
much of the provincial violence in October 2006 to the tribal
rivalry underlying militias and the "ignorance" of certain
armed groups that still consider Coalition Forces to be an
occupying army, Al Maliki highlighted the competence of
provincial officials in meeting the challenge. Al Maliki
told the Commander that to go fully to PIC, the province
needed arms and training for the Iraqi Army and Police Force,
as well as reconstruction projects. He advised the Commander
that the road to PIC in Basra will be difficult, and that the
UK and US will have to "change the face" of CF, reducing the
visible signs of military force and concentrating more on
restoring/providing essential services to Basra's citizens.
Regarding Iranian involvement in Maysan, Al Maliki said that
Maysanis are tied to Iran "ethnically, religiously, and
geographically" and that for Coalition Forces to take steps
like closing the Sheeb border crossing will only have
deleterious economic consequences. He added that he would
agree to extra security measures to reduce the weapons flow,
as long as commerce could continue. Addressing Iran's
general influence in Iraq, Al Maliki noted that Iran will act
in its own interests, not Iraqi interests, and that Iran
wants to "move the borders of its war with the West to Iraq."
End Summary.

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Security in Maysan
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3. (U//REL USA, MCFI) On January 22, Maysan Provincial
Governor Adil Mohder Al-Maliki met in Basra with the new
Commander of Multinational Division, Southeast (MND-SE),
Major General Jonathan Shaw. The Governor began the
introductory meeting by noting that he and General Shaw
shared the same aims: 1) to establish security within Iraq in
general; 2) to establish security in Maysan; and 3) to
transition to Provincial Iraqi Control in the province as
soon as possible. Al-Maliki highlighted the importance of
continued dialogue in that process.


4. (C//REL USA, MCFI) Al-Maliki observed that security in
Maysan was much improved, at one point claiming that Maysan
did not have "real, ideological terrorism, like IEDs."
Maysan, he claimed, has "turned that page", by which he
presumably was referring to the recent ending of the state of
emergency in the province, some of the actions of the new
police chief, and the tentative assessment from MND-SE that
Maysan was on the cusp of PIC readiness.


5. (C//REL USA, MCFI) General Shaw noted that some of the
past difficulties between Coalition Forces (CF) and Maysan
stemmed from an Iraqi wish not to have others dictate to
them. The Governor agreed that the desire to control one's
own affairs was human nature; and noted that "London would
not like Washington running things" either. Building on the
Governor's comments, General Shaw asked whether Maysan would
tolerate Iranian control. The Governor deflected the
question, saying he would return to the subject of Iran later
in the conversation.


6. (C//REL USA, MCFI) The Governor then described his efforts
and those of other provincial officials to hold meetings with
political parties and tribal leaders in the province to
underline the necessity of entering the political process.
On one hand, he said, Maysan needs to deal with this process
diplomatically, and rely on dialogue. On the other hand,
there are security issues that must be addressed; he had met
in Baghdad with General Casey and other governors and
stressed the need for training and equipping the Iraqi army
and the police force.

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Iran in Maysan
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7. (S//REL USA, MCFI) Turning back to Iran, the Governor
noted that "Iran would work for its own interests" in Iraq
and "wishes to move the battlefield with the West to Iraq".
The extent of Iranian influence in the province was

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understandable ) Maysan's population is "ethnically,
religiously, and geographically" related to Iran. There are
also, the Governor added, Iranian security service personnel
in Maysan, he said, along with those from the Syrian and
Saudi Arabian services.


8. (C//REL USA, MCFI) General Shaw asked the Governor how he
managed to effect a disbanding of the emergency security
committee in Maysan. The Governor said he had convinced
officials in Baghdad that there was no longer a need for the
emergency committee since conditions had improved enough in
Maysan to return security control to provincial officials.
(Comment: The replacement of Abu Maythem as police chief with
General Hassan was presumably part of the deal struck. End
Comment.) Continuing on the security theme, the Governor
observed that "it was good" that General Shaw's predecessor
did not take violent steps in Maysan during the emergency
period, but he did not elaborate on the comment.


9. C//REL USA, MCFI) When asked by General Shaw what had
precipitated the violence in Al Amara in October, Al-Maliki
claimed that "some groups" in Maysan have not yet digested
the changing security circumstances in Maysan. They still
see Multinational Forces as an occupying army. What MNF
needs to do, according to the Governor, is to "change the
face" of CF ) provide services, reduce the visible armed
presence, and make the transition to PIC.


10. (C//REL USA, MCFI) General Shaw thanked Al-Maliki for his
advice, but returned to the subject, noting that fighting
between Jayesh Al Madhi and the Badr Brigades seemed to be
the cause for most of the violence. The Governor agreed, but
also attributed the violence to underlying inter-tribal
rivalry, saying that "JAM has tribal links, so do the Badr
Brigades." However, the situation was brought under control
by the province itself; and "even Margaret Beckett (UK
Foreign Secretary) complimented the way local officials dealt
with the situation." When General Shaw asked if violence was
likely to break out again, Al-Maliki asked him if he believed
in the expression "Inshallah". Al-Maliki added that he did
not completely believe in fate; that individuals have to do
their best to shape a situation and then God assists.

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Moving to PIC
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11. (C//REL USA, MCFI) When General Shaw asked the Governor
what he needed to go to PIC, Al-Maliki said he needed arms,
equipment, and training for the Iraqi army and police, as
well as reconstruction projects. Turning to Basra, the
General asked the Governor what his thoughts were on what
Basra would need to make the same transition. Al-Maliki
underlined that Basra was a more difficult challenge ) it
has Shia, Sunnis, and Wahabbis; a much larger population; is
the location of five sets of major land or water crossroads;
is a major economic engine for Iraq; and is the site of much
of Iraq's oil storage capacity. What the MNF need to do in
Basra, he said, is to "calm the anger" and "contain" the
violence. The solution is not "amputation", but containment.



12. (C//REL USA, MCFI) The Governor then focused on
reconstruction, complaining that media reports portray the UK
as not pulling its weight on reconstruction projects compared
with the US and the Japanese. The General noted that Iraqi
money, not funds from international donors, is the source of
the most significant amount of reconstruction funds, and MNF
and the PRT could assist in Maysan's effort to tap into these
funds. PRT Team Leader offered the services of the PRT in
that effort.


13. (C//REL USA, MCFI) The Governor then returned to
political subjects, telling the General that he followed the
teachings of Moqtada al Sadr, but as a "spiritual ideology,"
not as a political affiliation. Sadr, he said is the link
between God and individuals. "I have struggles with JAM", he
claimed, but "even with JAM, diplomacy can work." It doesn't
mean, he added, that "I don't believe in decisive military
action when needed. I do. But I start with diplomacy." Right
now, he noted, the IA and the police are clearing some areas
of Al Amarah of "criminal" elements.

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Potential Sheeb Border Closure
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14. (C//REL USA, MCFI) The General then raised the possible
GOI closure of the Sheeb border crossing into Iran, one of
the most significant border crossings in Maysan. He pointed
out the concerns of MNF regarding the large number of weapons
being smuggled into Iraq from Iran, particularly through

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Maysan. The General pointedly asked the Governor whether he
could influence the situation.


15. (C//REL USA, MCFI) The Governor claimed the number of
weapons smuggled was exaggerated, and said that British
border operations were having an effect in reducing the
numbers. Maysan was not the main transit point, he said, for
the following reasons: British border operations were
successful; if Maysan were the main transit point, there
would be more anti-Coalition operations in Maysan; and border
trade had been going on at the border crossing for years with
no problems. (Comment: We were not convinced. End comment.)


16. (C//REL USA, MCFI) Blocking Sheeb does not make sense,
said the Governor. It would have serious economic
consequences on trade (particularly agricultural trade) and
on transport; increase prices; and lead to significant
unemployment, especially for drivers. The Governor said that
he would be happy to have extra security measures put into
place to reduce the smuggling, but would not advocate closure.

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Comment
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17. (C//REL USA, MCFI) The Governor, in Basra for a meeting
of the PRT and the Provincial Reconstruction and Development
Committee, was clearly focused in his MND-SE meeting on the
near-term prospect of Maysan going to PIC. The transition,
and perhaps larger political developments in Baghdad, are
having a salutary effect on the level of cooperation the PRT
is experiencing with the Governor and the Provincial
Reconstruction and Development Committee, but as the
Governor's comments on the October violence reveal, the
reasons for violence in Maysan are complex and multi-layered.
With militia and tribal rivalries as well as in Iranian and
other external influences bearing down, the security
situation will most likely remain unpredictable, even after
PIC is achieved. That said, the PRT will work to make the
most of this relative calm and the resumed cooperation,
however fleeting it may be. End comment.
KHALILZAD