SPECIAL ENVOY RALSTON VISITS MAKHMOUR, TALKS WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 000592 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/19/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREF MPREL PTER TU IZ SUBJECT: SPECIAL ENVOY RALSTON VISITS MAKHMOUR, TALKS WITH KRG PRESIDENT BARZANI Classified by: RRT Erbil Leader James Yellin, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) This is a Regional Reconstruction Team Erbil cable. ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: KRG President Barzani told Special Envoy Ralston that settling the PKK problem requires a political solution from Turkey, but that the KDP and PUK are also anxious to see this source of conflict between Turkey and the KRG resolved. Ralston informed Barzani and other KRG officials that Iraqi and UNHCR steps in Makhmour refugee camp form the basis for discussion of refugee voluntary returns to Turkey. Barzani stressed the need for amnesty and Ralston described initial discussion of amnesty in Turkey, but said the Turkish election in May could preclude any conclusion during the campaign period. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (SBU) U.S. Special Envoy for Countering the PKK Gen. (r) Joseph Ralston met Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) President Massoud Barzani in Salah al Din, Erbil, on January 29 on a one-day trip to northern Iraq during which he also visited Makhmour refugee camp. Kurdish participants in the meeting and luncheon included: Massoud Barzani (KDP),KRG Vice-President Kosrat Rasool (PUK),KRG-KDP Minister of Interior Karim Sinjari, KRG Deputy Prime Minister Omar Fatah (PUK),and KRG-KDP Minister of Peshmerga Za,im Ali. American participants included Ralston with a Department of State and U.S. military delegation, U.S. Regional Coordinator, and RRT PolOff. -------------- Makhmour -------------- ¶3. (C) Ralston thanked Barzani and Sinjari for steps taken to restore civilian status to Makhmour refugee camp and said the UNHCR census of residents provides a basis for discussion of voluntary return of these Turkish Kurds to their homes in southeastern Turkey. After seeing it with his own eyes, he said, he could tell Turkish authorities that the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) conducted a professional operation in restoring the refugee camp to civilian status. ¶4. (SBU) Ralston said he would tell the Turks that the many young people in Makhmour camp need the positive goal of return to Turkey, integration, and jobs, or they may turn to the PKK for excitement and meaning. It is to Turkey,s advantage, he pointed out, to have these young people settled back in Turkey. -------------- Ceasefire -------------- ¶5. (C) Ralston said PKK leaders in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region may still be involved in planning operations inside Turkey. He called on the KRG to get the PKK to continue its declared ceasefire through the spring, resisting the traditional return to attacks during the spring snow melt and the March 21 Kurdish holiday of Newroz. Barzani protested that the PKK cease-fire is not due to winter but is because the KRG and Government of Iraq asked the PKK to stop attacks. ¶6. (C) Barzani assured Ralston that the KRG has great influence on the PKK leadership and can maintain the ceasefire. He said that if Turkey does not attack PKK areas, the PKK will not break its ceasefire. However, he said, there are small splinter groups that may skirmish with Turkish forces but that is a different issue. -------------- No Military Solution -------------- ¶7. (C) Barzani said Turkey knows a military solution will not succeed, but the KRG sees no signs that Turkey is working on a peaceful solution. He stated that the PKK wants to be part of the political process. Ralston told Barzani he agreed that there would be catastrophic consequences if Turkey were to invade the northern Iraq to attack the PKK, with ramifications for Iran and other important regional issues. He said he would make the case to the Turkish government that no military solution will be successful. ¶8. (C) Kosrat Rasool said Turkey would not invade northern Iraq without a &green light from the Americans8 and such an invasion would make conditions worse for the U.S. in Iraq. He said the Kurds consider themselves to be &strategic allies8 of the U.S., but the KRG also has to consider its own &national interest.8 Rasool accused some Turkish military commanders and PKK leaders of preferring conflict rather than a peaceful solution. Ralston responded that he BAGHDAD 00000592 002 OF 003 will make it clear than an attack would not be a wise move for Turkey, but that all parties need to find a political solution. -------------- An Increase in Terrorism? -------------- ¶9. (C) Rasool told Ralston that Syria and Iran have ceased support for the PKK but warned that a Turkish attack could reconnect the PKK with those sources of funding and support. Omar Fatah said Turkish military action on Iraqi soil against the PKK would destabilize Iraq and enhance terrorism in the region as a whole by encouraging PKK affiliation with transnational terrorist organizations. The Iraqi government, he warned, cannot handle more pressure. -------------- KRG Reactions to Turkish ) PKK Clashes -------------- ¶10. (C) If Turkey attacks the PKK, Barzani said, the KRG will not join Turkey against the PKK. He stated that if a peaceful and democratic solution is offered and the PKK refuses, then a Turkish military intervention will ¬ be much of a problem for us, because the PKK will lose popular support.8 In that case, he said, the Turks know where the PKK is in the mountains but the Turks must do it by themselves, without KRG support. Rasool told Ralston that both the PUK and KDP had fought the PKK. ¶11. (C) Comment: Barzani,s statement is consistent with earlier comments that the KRG would stay neutral in a conflict between Turkey and the PKK if the PKK openly broke the KRG-brokered cease-fire. However, the neutrality arises more from resistance to renewing conflict between the KRG parties and the PKK than from KRG agreement with Turkish military action. End Comment. -------------- A Political Solution -------------- ¶12. (C) Barzani reported a significant movement among PKK leaders toward participation in a democratic process. He said that a Turkish effort to resolve Kurdish concerns inside Turkey would effectively undermine support for the PKK, especially if the PKK is allowed a role in the political process. Ralston agreed that there are steps Turkey must take other than military action. He commented that Turkish politicians are beginning to discuss some form of amnesty. However, during the Turkish election year it is difficult for politicians to take this difficult position openly. ¶13. (C) Barzani called on the Turkish government to look at its policies toward Kurds within Turkey, saying that if the &existential denials8 by Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria of Kurdish national identity had been effective, Kurdish identity would already be lost. He said Turkey has room to revise its policies and thereby gain Kurdish support, without any security risk, because Kurds in Turkey seek neither partition nor secession. He stressed that neither compulsory unity nor compulsory partition can be successful. Any sign of Turkish flexibility would cost the PKK significant grass-roots support, and Turkish acceptance of a Kurdish nation within Turkey would do much to resolve the conflict, he concluded. -------------- Relations Between Turkey and the KRG -------------- ¶14. (C) Ralston pointed out that the economic growth and political stability of the KRG would be jeopardized by military conflict with Turkey, and it is not to the KRG,s advantage to risk this by allowing a small group of radicals to use Iraqi territory. ¶15. (C) Rasool noted that Turkey is an important country in the region and a neighbor, and both the KRG and Turkey are allies of the U.S. He noted that the KRG and Turkey cannot change their geographical locations, and so they should solve conflicts by meetings rather than military action. Barzani said Turkish trade and investment amounts to one billion U.S. dollars in the KRG and there is room to double this amount. He stressed that Turkey and Iraqi Kurds are &neighbors and friends,8 and the KRG has no bad intentions toward Turkey but rather wants good relations between the government of Turkey and the KRG. -------------- Kirkuk BAGHDAD 00000592 003 OF 003 -------------- ¶16. (C) Rasool accused Turkey of mixing the issues of the PKK and Kirkuk, and he said Turkey has no voice in the internal Iraqi issue of Kirkuk,s future. Barzani added that control of Kirkuk will be determined constitutionally. Regional Coordinator confirmed that there are mechanisms in the Iraqi constitution for dealing with the issue of Kirkuk. Ralston said he will urge Turkey to avoid media comment on Kirkuk but rather to talk to the Iraqi government and the KRG. ¶17. (U) Special Envoy Ralston did not have an opportunity to clear this cable before departing Erbil. KHALILZAD