IRAQI PARLIAMENTARIANS DISCUSS STATUS OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 000508 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/06/2017 TAGS: IZ KDEM KJUS PGOV SUBJECT: IRAQI PARLIAMENTARIANS DISCUSS STATUS OF DE-BAATHIFICATION REFORM Classified By: Political Counselor Margaret Scobey for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. In a series of meetings on February 5, CoR members updated poloffs on the current status of draft proposals and party strategies for approaching de-Baathification reform. A CoR de-Baathification committee member confirmed that the committee was now meeting regularly to consider two draft laws, one prepared by Tawafuq and one by the current HNDBC (Ahmed Chalabi). The toughest Shia resistance so far had come not from the Sadrists, but from the Dawa Party. The Legal Committee Deputy Chairman confirmed that he had shared the competing draft proposals with moderate Shia and Kurdish Alliance members. He expressed willingness to meet with representatives from other blocs, along with poloffs, and to enter into early discussions and negotiations on compromise language. Cross-sectarian secular Iraqiyya's party secretary confirmed that her list had drafted a third de-Baathification reform proposal which they intended to present to the CoR Presidency Council before the recess began on February 10. END SUMMARY. -------------- -------------- -------------- CoR De-Baathification Committee Considers Drafts -------------- -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) Sunni CoR De-Baathification Committee member Rasheed Al-Aazawy (IIP) told poloffs that the committee, which had only met twice since the CoR's inauguration, has met three times in the past week to consider de-Baathification reform. (Azzawi noted this was in part due to letters he had sent to both Committee Chair Falah Al-Shenshel (Sadrist) and the CoR Presidency Council, complaining about the Committee's inactivity. He said that both the Shiite- dominated Higher National De-Baathification Commission (HNDBC) and Sunni Tawafuq draft laws were currently with the committee for consideration, and that the committee had just finished discussion of the HNDBC proposal. Al-Aazawy said that he had managed to make some amendments to the HNDBC draft, including a significant concession allowing firqa members to remain in public sector employment as long as there is no evidence of criminal activity. He also believed that he had made progress on provisions affecting higher level Baathists, convincing the committee to allow for members at shu'aba level and above with 25 or more years of government service to be retired on pension, and to work part time as advisors to their ministries. He admitted that complicated details and conditions contained in this provision did not satisfy minimum standards for transparency, but noted that willingness on the part of the Sadrists to negotiate any benefits for higher level Baathists showed that their stance on the issue was softening. The committee hoped to finish discussion on the Tawafuq version by the end of the parliamentary session on February 10. ¶3. (C) Al-Aazawy said that the committee had agreed to extract the points of agreement in both laws as the basis for a compromise draft. However, on points where the versions differed significantly, Al-Aazawy explained that the committee would present the two separate versions of disputed text side by side, and allow the full CoR to vote on which version to insert into the law. Al-Azawy acknowledged that this was not the ideal approach, but pointed out he had few options given that his influence in negotiations was limited by the fact that he is the only Sunni on a committee dominated by Shiite Dawa and Sadrists. He noted with measured optimism that SCIRI had "seemed more moderate" on de-Baathification issues, and that the Sadrists had "improved," however he is clearly proceeding cautiously with negotiations so as not to upset the delicate balance of the committee. ¶4. (C) Regarding the other committee members, Al-Aazawy complained that Iraqiyya's Izzat Shabander, a moderate, never attended meetings, and committee secretary Abdullah Muhammad Al-Alyawi, Kurdish Alliance, contributed nothing to discussions. He urged emboffs to engage Iraqiyya on de- Baathification reform, noting that the more moderate drafts the committee had to consider, the better the compromise draft would be. He added that the Kurdish Alliance did not appear to be taking sides on the issue, and asked the USG BAGHDAD 00000508 002 OF 003 to weigh in with KAL bloc leadership. -------------- IIP Strategy on De-Baath Draft -------------- ¶5. (C) Legal Committee Deputy Chairman Dr. Salim Al-Jeboori (Tawafuq/IIP) told poloffs that once the draft law/s left the De-Baath committee and was under the review of the Legal Committee, there would be a second opportunity for revisions and negotiations. As the legal committee deputy, Al-Jeboori (who enjoys an excellent relationship with the committee Chair Sadrist Baha' Al-Ariji) was in a better position to condense the laws and focus on what Tawafuq's priorities for reform and lay out the areas where they were willing to compromise. Al-Jeboori said that he would push for a complete draft instead of a draft with either/or options. Further, he appeared confident that Tawafuq would be able to push further amendments after the first reading, although he stressed the importance of beginning negotiations with other blocs as early as possible. ¶6. (C) Al-Jeboori reported that Tawafuq had accepted 80% of the changes recommended by poloffs, and that he planned to incorporate those changes into the draft while it was in the legal committee. Among the recommendations that they did not plan to implement was shortening of the sunset clause, which could extend the commission's mandate by up to five years according to their current draft. Although poloffs objected to this decision, Al-Jeboori felt strongly that recommending anything less would alienate the Shia and could block negotiations on other key issues. He noted that key Shia leaders like SCIRI's Jalal ad-Din Al-Sagheer and Dawa's Ali Adeeb have strong opinions against extensive reform, and that he doesn't want to start a "bad will campaign" this early on in negotiations by presenting a proposal that goes too far. -------------- Reaching Out to Other Blocs -------------- ¶7. (C) Al-Jeboori mentioned that he had given copies of the Tawafuq draft to Fadhila's Nadeem Al-Jebouri, with whom he expected to discuss the draft before the first reading. He also gave a copy of the law to the Kurdish legal advisor in the CoR Research Directorate, who would present his analysis to the KLA bloc leadership in the coming days. Al-Jeboori requested poloffs to organize a meeting between IIP and HNDBC representatives to discuss the drafts, pointing out that although the HNDBC had already submitted its draft, they would likely play an indirect role in negotiations on the final draft. Shia leaders would likely turn to HNDBC officials for advice during negotiations on the law, therefore it was important for both Tawafuq and Embassy representatives to continue to engage the commission throughout the process. -------------- Iraqiyya Produces Formal Draft -------------- ¶8. (C) Iraqiyya party secretary Maysoon Al-Damluji told poloffs that Adnan Al-Janabi had drafted a formal proposal on de-Baathification reform based on Ayad Allawi's recommendations (NOTE: Dr. Allawi sent these same comments to the Ambassador. END NOTE.). Allawi's proposal would reinstate everyone, regardless of Baath Party membership level, if they could not be proven to have committed crimes. His proposal would also remove restrictions on the ability to hold higher positions within the government, and would give pensions to everyone, even those found guilty of crimes. It would allow the commission jurisdiction over both crimes committed under the former regime, but also, importantly, crimes committed since the liberation. Media reporting suggests that the formal proposal incorporates most of these concepts. ¶9. (C) Al-Damluji acknowledged that de-Baathification committee member Izzat Shabander had never attended a committee meeting, but said that there no one else to take his place on the committee. She lamented that the small number of Iraqiyya members meant that they had to spread out committee memberships. Poloffs urged Al-Damluji to gather ten signatures and present the Iraqiyya law to the Presidency Council before the recess, as it may not be considered afterwards. She said that getting the signatures would be no problem and that she would submit the proposal by the end of the week. BAGHDAD 00000508 003 OF 003 -------------- Comment -------------- ¶10. (C) While Tawafuq was slow to engage on the issue of de- Baathification reform, their recent efforts are commendable and show real desire for change. They have clearly thought through a strategy that includes both of the key CoR committees, as well as cooperation with other blocs. While they appear happy to have Embassy support and assistance, the implication was that Al-Aazawy and Al-Jeboori preferred to take the lead on this sensitive topic, working closely to identify areas (for example, with the Kurds, Iraqiyya and Fadhila) where Embassy influence and pressure could be useful. In less than a month, Iraqis have produced two additional drafts, both much better than the original HNDBC draft, and initiated dialogue across political blocs. Embassy is nevertheless still not satisfied that either draft adequately addresses requirements of reconciliation. Embassy is developing a draft for possible use in bringing the parties together. The three extant Iraqi drafts will be e- mailed to NEA, but they are all undergoing constant revisions and cannot be considered final. SPECKHARD