PRT TIKRIT: ODIERNO, GRAND MUFTI, PROVINCIAL

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000507 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/13/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PINR IZ SUBJECT: PRT TIKRIT: ODIERNO, GRAND MUFTI, PROVINCIAL LEADERS DISCUSS CEASEFIRE POSSIBILITIES AND SUNNI ISSUES REF: BAGHDAD 379 Classified By: PRT LEADER Stephanie Miley, for reasons 1.4 b/d ¶1. (U) This is a PRT Tikrit, Salah ad Din cable. It has been cleared by MNC-I Commanding General Odierno, MND-N Commanding General Mixon, and the 3/82 Brigade Combat Team. ¶2. (S) SUMMARY. In a February 8 meeting, MNC-I Commanding General Odierno, MND-N Commanding General Mixon, Grand Mufti Sheikh Jamal al Dabaan, the ranking Sunni religious authority in Iraq, and the Salah ad Din Governor and Deputy Governor discussed a possible ceasefire between the Coalition Forces (CF) and Sunni insurgent groups. According to Sheikh Jamal and the Deputy Governor, many of the Sunni insurgent groups can be convinced to abandon fighting and to join the political process, with the notable exception al Qaeda (AQIZ). Sheikh Jamal, who claimed he was "only translating the opinions of the resistance," called for a meeting between the CF and insurgent groups and recommended the "watchful eye of the CF" help the GOI and insurgent groups to find a political solution. The SaD provincial leadership also used the meeting as an opportunity to bring up other issues of import to SaD Sunnis, including debaathification reformation, changes in the electoral system, and bridging the gap between the GOI and the province. The meeting was a cursory discussion on ceasefire possibilities, and it is still unclear with which insurgent groups the Grand Mufti and the Deputy Governor have contact. Before discussions move forward, that will have to be made clear, possibly in the form of a letter or message from the groups authorizing the Grand Mufti and the Deputy Governor to speak on their behalf. END SUMMARY. -------------- --- Meeting with the Grand Mufti, Provincial Leaders -------------- --- ¶3. (C) On February 8, MNC-I Commanding General Odierno, MND-N Commanding General Mixon, the Brigade Taskforce Commander with responsibility for Salah ad Din, and the PRT Leader met with Grand Mufti Jamal al Dabaan, the ranking Sunni religious authority in Iraq, Salah ad Din Governor Hamad Hamoud al Shakti al Qaisi and Deputy Governor Abdullah Ajabarah al Jabouri. Without apparent communication with the Sunni insurgency, Governor Hamad was present for largely ceremonial purposes. The principal interlocutors were Sheikh Jamal and Deputy Governor Abdullah. -------------- Insurgent Groups Approach the Grand Mufti -------------- ¶4. (S) According to Sheikh Jamal, while he was on the recent hajj, several insurgent leaders from the province approached him to say that they were ready to open ceasefire negotiations with the CF and to join the political process. Asserting that "a great amount of the jihad in Iraq can change from fighting to political engagement," he said many insurgent groups were ready to meet with the CF, with the notable exception of AQIZ. Sheikh Jamal, who claimed he was "only translating the opinions of the resistance," called for a meeting between the CF and insurgent groups and recommended the "watchful eye of the CF" help the GOI and insurgent groups to find a political solution. As evidence of the Grand Mufti's pro-political engagement stance, the Deputy Governor said that Sheikh Jamal had made a fatwa banning IED emplacement in Tikrit and on the surrounding highways and that, if ceasefire negotiations proceed, he was willing to make a similar decree banning all attacks against the CF. (NOTE: While it is often difficult to determine who emplaced an IED, there has been no noticeable decrease in the number of IEDs in Tikrit or on the surrounding highways. Additionally, we hear conflicting accounts as to whether issuing the broader fatwa is permissible under Islam. END NOTE.) ¶5. (C) While discussing the recent detainment of several high-level individuals, the Deputy Governor argued that many of them had changed. He acknowledged that a year ago several of them were actively promoting the insurgency, but that now they were part of the current climate of change in the insurgency. He alluded to the fact that their release may be one of the good faith initiatives required to move ceasefire negotiations forward. ¶6. (C) The Deputy Governor also asserted that the province's Iraqi security forces (ISF) were ready to take greater control of the security situation, but that they lack the BAGHDAD 00000507 002 OF 002 necessary equipment. He recommended the CF provide helicopters and additional armored vehicles to the IP. Odierno committed to withdrawing troops from areas where there is little violence, like the northern portion of the province. Odierno did note that more security work had to be done in Bayji. -------------- - Debaath, Elections, and the GOI-Provincial Gap -------------- - ¶7. (C) Bringing up other issues of concern to the Sunnis of Salah ad Din, the Governor and Deputy Governor highlighted the need for debaathification reform, calling for drastic reduction in the law's authorities and the immediate return of many suspended workers (reftel). Additionally, the Deputy Governor recommended that the current closed-list proportional electoral system be changed to a system were voters elect candidates directly to positions/offices. ¶8. (C) The Governor said that the gap between the central government and the provincial government needs to be bridged and that he was frustrated that the security situation made it impossible to travel between Salah ad Din and Baghdad. He expressed gratitude for the USG's engagement on this issue by facilitating trips for the provincial government to Baghdad to meet with central government officials on their issues of interest. He expressed his desire to see this continued. ¶9. (C) The Deputy Governor expressed concern about detainees who are often held for long periods of time without a trial. Citing one specific incident, he said former SaD Chief of Police Muzir had been detained in 2005 and had not yet had a trial. General Odierno promised to look into the matter. -------------- Trouble Brewing in Kirkuk -------------- ¶10. (C) The Deputy Governor also expressed concern that a dangerous situation was brewing in Kirkuk, as he fears Arab residents will be forcibly displaced. He said he has heard rumors that Kurds are migrating to the area from Iran. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶11. (C) Falling short of the groundbreaking meeting the Deputy Governor had implied it would be, the meeting was a cursory but necessary initial discussion on potential ceasefire negotiations. However, it is still unclear with which insurgent groups the Grand Mufti and the Deputy Governor have contact, and if they have the necessary influence to coax them into the political fold. Before discussions go forward, that will have to be made clear, possibly in the form of a letter or message from the groups authorizing the Grand Mufti and the Deputy Governor to speak on their behalf. ¶12. (S) COMMENT CONTINUED. A timely meeting given other reporting of a growing schism between insurgent groups and AQIZ, this opening definitely holds potential and could result in a greater Iraqi-base in the fight against AQIZ. We should try to capitalize on it quickly, as there may be further complications (such as debaathification legislation that may fall short of Sunni hopes, delays in provincial elections, referendum on Article 140, etc.) in the near future which could renew the Sunni sense of aggrievement and disaffection that could refuel insurgent aggression. END COMMENT. ¶13. (U) For additional reporting from PRT Tikrit, Salah ad Din, please see our SIPRNET Reporting Blog: http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Tikrit. SPECKHARD