NINEWA: ANTI-KURD COALITION DEFEATS MOVE TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 000455 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/11/2017 TAGS: PGOV KDEM IZ SUBJECT: NINEWA: ANTI-KURD COALITION DEFEATS MOVE TO STRENGTHEN PRO-KRG CONTROL OF PROVINCIAL COUNCIL REF: 06 BAGHDAD 04017 Classified By: PRT Team Leader James Knight, Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). This is a Ninewa Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) message. -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) At the Ninewa Provincial Council's 4 February weekly meeting, the majority Kurdish Alliance (30 of 41 members) attempted to impose a complete reshuffle of Council committees, including abolition of some committees and addition of an Article 140 committee to oversee 'disputed territories' resolution in Ninewa (Note: Article 140 is the article in Iraq's current Constitution which offers the option of referenda to resolve 'disputed territories'. End note). ¶2. (C) This heavy-handed attempt to place pro-KRG hardliners in control of all key Council committees was vigorously and successfully opposed by the Council's minority opposition -- including Christian, Sunni, and Shi'a members, joined by some disaffected Kurdish Alliance adherents. This unprecedented unified opposition and its expert deployment were satisfying examples of democracy at work. More important, this Kurdish Alliance attempt may signal still more energetic efforts by the Council's Kurdish majority to promote incorporation of significant areas of Ninewa into the KRG. In particular, provincial councils are now key to distribution of very substantial GOI development funds, and thus offer great leverage to political factions which control them. END SUMMARY. -------------- THE KURDS MAKE AN UNEXPECTED MOVE . . . -------------- ¶3. (C) Efforts to reorganize some Ninewa Provincial Council (PC) committees have been under discussion for some time -- especially the Reconstruction and Human Rights committees, both of which have problematic leadership and key to some Ninewa PRT programs. The 4 Feb meeting was expected to reorganize those committees. However, the PC meeting was delayed by an unexpected convocation of Kurdish Alliance PC members hosted by Deputy Governor Khasro Goran and Governor Kashmoula at Provincial Hall (across the street from Ninewa's Council Hall). 30 of the 41 Ninewa PC members were elected from the Kurdish Alliance list (dominated by the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union (PUK); Deputy Governor Khasro is the head of the Kurdish Alliance as well as Chair of the Ninewa branch of the KDP. Interestingly, PC Chair Salim al-Haj Issa was specifically excluded from this Alliance meeting, although he too was elected as a member of the Alliance. ¶4. (C) At the Kurdish Alliance meeting prior to the Council session, Khasro and other Alliance members apparently presented at length a detailed plan for reorganizing all/all PC committees and replacing all Council committee chairs. After the Alliance meeting finally ended, the group went to Council Hall and the scheduled PC meeting began nearly an hour late. Governor Kashmoula and Khasro attended the PC meeting with other Alliance members. -------------- . . . AND STIR UP A HORNET'S NEST -------------- ¶5. (C) After PC Chair Issa dealt with some routine business, Deputy Governor Khasro brought up committee reorganization and presented a new matrix of committee assignments for the PC as a whole to complete -- clearly anticipating rote insertion of key members as directed at the Alliance meeting. However, Khasro's introductory remarks were immediately followed by vigorous objections from several minority PC members, especially those representing the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI-- mostly Shi'a),the BAGHDAD 00000455 002 OF 003 Assyrian Democratic Movement (ADM -- Chaldean and Assyrian Christian),and the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP -- mostly Sunni). Raucous debate focused on efforts by quote the Kurdistan parties unquote to dominate the Council. (Note: Although Sunnis represented by the IIP formally boycotted the January 2005 Provincial elections, the IIP remained on the ballot and, in the event, gathered enough votes to encumber two PC seats. End note.) ¶6. (C) Several peripheral Kurdish Alliance members (a number are not ethnic Kurds) echoed the emergent Sunni-Shi'a-Christian coalition, agreeing that interests of non-Kurdish citizens should be reflected despite the anomaly created by the Sunni boycott in 2005. As debate became more heated, both Governor Kashmoula and Deputy Governor Khasro asserted that their proposed realignment of PC committees was simply an effort to make the Council more effective. ¶7. (C) Governor Kashmoula became quite exercised after IIP member Mamtuz Mahmud Ibrahim rebutted his 'effectiveness' argument in detail. The Governor loudly insulted Mamtuz before the Council, stridently noting that anyone who would question his intentions 'had a black heart' -- then stormed out of the session. ¶8. (C) Faced with unexpected ferocious opposition to his Kurdish Alliance proposal and lost control of the meeting, Deputy Governor Khasro proposed a meeting of Alliance and opposition parties at a later time to discuss committee changes. Khasro then left the Council meeting as well. At the end of the day, no committees were reconfigured and no Council chairs were changed; PC Chair Issa adjourned the meeting shortly after Khasro departed. -------------- A SUNNI-SHI'A-CHRISTIAN COALITION -------------- ¶9. (C) After the Council session ended, four of the non-Alliance members who sparked the Council's rejection of the Alliance's committee reshuffle proposal requested an urgent meeting with PRT Leader Knight, who also attended this contentious PC session. ADM member Gevara Zia Yokhanna, SCIRI members Aref Yousif Qamber and Muhamad Ibrahim Ali, and IIP member Hasan Thannoon Saleem accordingly met Team Leader Knight and other PRT members 5 February at PRT offices. ¶10. (C) All four emphasized that their efforts to contain hardline Kurd agendas at the Council were at best only modestly effective. Despite their success at the 4 Feb meeting, all insisted that they will meet future power grabs of this kind by ceasing to participate in Council meetings. Team Leader Knight noted that such boycotts are rarely an effective means to pursue political action, but the group countered that the opposition's withdrawal would deprive the Council of moral authority and render it ineffective. ADM member Gevara pointed out that if the non-Alliance members decide to boycott PC meetings, they will present their decision and its justification to the public on local television. ¶11. (C) IIP member Hassan suggested the opposition Council members may propose appointment of an unelected group 'similar to Ramadi's Salvation Council' (NFI) to supersede the current Provincial Council. He pointed out that although such a council would not be elected, it would still better represent the population of Ninewa as a whole than the current Kurd-controlled PC. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶12. (C) Defeat of the Kurdish Alliance leadership's imperious effort to place pro-KRG hardliners in all key Council positions suggests that anti-Kurd coalition-building -- pursued especially by Ninewa's IIP -- is bearing fruit (reftel). As such, this episode indicates growing political maturity among the political leadership of Ninewa's majority Arab BAGHDAD 00000455 003 OF 003 Sunnis, Shi'a, and other non-Kurds. However, it remains to be seen whether they can sustain this victory -- a Council quorum is reached with 19 members present; the Kurdish Alliance now encumbers 30 seats. ¶13. (C) More worrisome, this episode illustrates how aggressive Ninewa's Kurdish Alliance leadership has become in support of the KRG's expansion agenda. The volatility of this issue is clearly growing in Ninewa. Ninewa's Kurdish leaders expect Article 140 referenda in several Districts this year (septel), and remain unconcerned about political consequences -- or inflaming tension between Kurds and Ninewa's non-Kurd majority. ¶14. (C) Equally troubling is the risk that opposition withdrawal from the Provincial Council could trigger progressively more popular opposition to Ninewa's current Kurdish leadership, both at the Governor's office and in the Provincial Council. The popular credibility of Ninewa's government has been reasonably sound, despite the firm grip the Kurdish Alliance holds on both executive and legislative institutions. However, Kurd control of the province unbuffered by Arab and minority participation in government could evaporate that legitimacy, especially if Ninewa's non-Kurds come to believe they are safer under the IIP umbrella as the Kurds press onwards towards their vision of Greater Kurdistan, and while new provincial elections remain a distant hope. END COMMENT. KHALILZAD