MOI BOLANI SLOW TO DEVELOP REFORM PLAN

S E C R E T BAGHDAD 000042 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/06/2017 TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL MOPS PINS PNAT IZ SUBJECT: MOI BOLANI SLOW TO DEVELOP REFORM PLAN REF: A. BAGHDAD 04718 ¶B. BAGHDAD 04270 ¶C. BAGHDAD 04292 Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (S//REL GBR AUS) SUMMARY. PM Maliki is frustrated by the lack of progress by Minister of Interior (MOI) Jawad al-Bolani and National Security Advisor Muwafak al-Rubaie to develop a plan for comprehensive MOI reform as was ordered by Maliki at the October 22 meeting of the Ministerial Committee for National Security. Without this plan, Bolani has been unable to take significant actions to remove those members of MOI's Shia-dominated leadership with links to corruption, illegal activities, and sectarianism. Nor have sufficient steps been taken to plan for and implement the recent decision to place Facility Protection Service personnel under the MOI. Progress has been hindered by Bolani's travel schedule and personal security situation, as well as the recent execution of Saddam Hussein and the Eid al Adha holiday. Despite the lack of progress on a comprehensive reform plan, Bolani still receives good marks for making at least some positive change, particularly in the area of human rights. END SUMMARY. REFORM PLAN DELAYED -------------- ¶2. (S//REL GBR AUS) Minister of Interior Jawad al-Bolani and National Security Advisor Muwafak al-Rubaie have not developed on a comprehensive MOI reform plan as ordered by Prime Minister Maliki at the October 22 Ministerial Committee for National Security (MCNS). Maliki extended the initial deadline of November 15, in order to give Rubaie the time he needed to focus on Ministry of Defense reform. Six weeks after the extension, however, little progress has been made on efforts to reduce corruption and eliminate sectarian influence. ¶3. (S//REL GBR AUS) When Prime Minister Maliki expressed frustration at the slow pace of MOI reform at the December 24 MCNS session, Rubaie and Bolani admitted that little had been so far accomplished by the ministerial committee charged with developing the reform plan. They claimed however, that the committee would meet again to take up this subject within a week. Due to Saddam's execution, however, this did not occur. With Rubaie and other officials out of Baghdad for Eid al Adha, progress towards MOI reform was further delayed. BOLANI UNABLE TO TAKE NEEDED REFORMS -------------- 
 ¶4. (S//REL GBR AUS) Without an approved plan, Bolani appears unable to take the decisive action necessary to transform the Ministry of Interior into a reliable security organization. No significant action has yet been taken to remove those in the Shia-dominated leadership linked to corruption, illegal activities, and sectarianism. Despite months of U.S. pressure, Bolani has failed to enforce arrest warrants against the fifty-seven police officers (including a major general) suspected of human rights violations at the Site 4 detention facility despite months of U.S. pressure (REF A). ¶5. (S//REL GBR AUS) The need for MOI reform became both harder and more necessary by the GOI's decision in September to place most Facility Protection Service (FPS) forces -- except the Oil Protective Force and Electrical Facilities Protection Service - under the authority of the MOI. Thus far, implementation of this decision has been proceeding extremely slowly, especially in the areas of pay, training and logistics. While Deputy Minister of Interior for Support Forces Major General Admed Al-Kafajy has developed a program to retrain FPS personnel, no retraining has actually taken place. Furthermore, the MOI has yet to assume responsibility for paying FPS personnel. At the December 24th MCNS meeting, Prime Minister Maliki expressed frustration with the speed of MOI's integration program and stated that he would reemphasize to each minister that their FPS units now report to the MOI. Finance Minister Jabr asked for a copy of this order so that he can begin transitioning appropriate budgetary resources to the MOI (Ref. A). BOLANI'S TRAVEL AND PERSONAL SECURITY HINDER REFORM -------------- -------------- ¶6. (S//REL GBR AUS) Bolani has been out of the country for much of December and we are unaware of any meetings on this topic being held by Ministry of Interior staff. Most planning discussions have been between Rubaie and senior Multinational Forces - Iraq leaders, with little Ministry of Interior participation. ¶7. (S/REL GHR AUS) Bolani's ability to take decisive action on police reform is further constrained by his personal security situation. Bolani now lives outside the International Zone and has survived at least one assassination attempt. Coalition forces are working to obtain housing within the IZ. The threat of assassination and abduction is a real concern for senior MOI leaders: on December 26, Ministry of Interior Director General for Ports of Entry Major General Imad Muhsen Jaafar was assassinated in Baghdad's Adhamiyah district. BOLANI'S POSITIVE CHANGES -------------- ¶8. (S//REL GBR AUS) Despite Bolani's failure to make significant changes in the senior Interior Ministry leadership, some MOI officers credit him with making positive changes and improving the ministry's respect for human rights (REF B). He has reassigned several officers to positions of reduced authority. Recently, Bolani fired Major General Mohsen Abdulhasan Lazim, Director General of the Directorate of Border Enforcement - although we can not yet confirm the cause for Lazim's firing. At meetings, Bolani has reassured senior U.S. Embassy and elected officials that he is working incrementally, citing a proverb that "good health comes slowly" (REF A). KHALILZAD