KURDISH LEADERS AGREE TO GIVE MALIKI ONE LAST

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 004199 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/28/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS PTER PINR IZ SUBJECT: KURDISH LEADERS AGREE TO GIVE MALIKI ONE LAST CHANCE ¶1. (C) Summary: Ambassador Crocker met on 26 December in Erbil with Iraq,s senior Kurdish leaders to discuss their support for Prime Minister Maliki, negotiations for a long-term security agreement between Washington and Baghdad, Article 140, and Turkish attacks on the PKK. Assembled Kurdish leaders included Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) President Masoud Barzani, Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister (DPM) Barham Salih, KRG Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani, KRG Vice President Kosrat Rasul, former Iraqi DPM Rosch Shaways, and Kurdistan Alliance COR bloc leader Fuad Massoum. All expressed deep frustration with PM Maliki, but somewhat reluctantly conceded that the time is not right for replacing him. Talabani stressed that Turkish military operations against the PKK have destroyed the KRG,s credibility and set back their efforts to persuade the PKK to disarm. End summary. -------------- Sticking With Maliki But Expecting Little -------------- ¶2. (C) Talabani opened the meeting by saying the Kurds are extremely frustrated with Maliki, but the time is not right to change Prime Ministers. If a change is to happen, it will only be with a successor already agreed upon, and with the acquiescence of the U.S. and "other countries." Masoud Barzani seconded the need to avoid a power vacuum, but said the current arrangement is worse than a vacuum, with no progress on reconciliation, services, or legislation. The Dawa party in his view is behaving as though it had won a huge electoral victory. He twice repeated his conviction that there is no hope of salvaging the Maliki government. ¶3. (S) Barham Salih stressed that the Kurds demand Maliki,s performance improve on national issues like reaching out to the Sunnis, not on Kurd-specific issues like the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) oil contracts or funding for the Peshmerga. He said the Kurds would name a committee to coordinate with Maliki "point by point" on the demands in their 26 December letter, and if progress was unsatisfactory by an unspecified date, they would use their weight in the COR to change the government. Talabani and Barzani both argued that all sides must be ready for such a change in the absence of measurable gains. Talabani called for greater U.S. pressure on Maliki during this grace period, saying the Secretary,s upcoming return to Iraq was a good start and SIPDIS suggesting a step-by-step road map for the Prime Minister. ¶4. (C) The Ambassador responded that Iraq needed significant political gains in a short period of time, meaning all parties must work to improve the government, not change it. He reminded the delegates that continued stalemate would encourage voices in Washington calling to reduce funding for Iraq, and one of the first casualties would be US-sponsored programs to employ members of CLC groups. The Ambassador encouraged the participants to reinvigorate existing bodies: the 3 1 1 should meet as soon as possible, set an agenda, and reach specific agreements; the preparatory committees should perform their designated role in converting these agreements to actionable draft legislation; and bloc leaders should discipline their blocs to vote these agreements into law. -------------- Long-Term Security Talks Must Be Inclusive -------------- ¶5. (C) The Ambassador raised the upcoming negotiations for a long-term security arrangement. He made two key points: the Iraqi delegation must include both technical expertise and a broader political background than the group that negotiated the SPD and UNSCR, and the GOI will need to make far-reaching reforms if it expects to inherit significant authorities from MNF-I. He cited as one of many examples detention procedures and conditions: the current state of Iraq,s detention system simply does not permit the Coalition to transfer detention authority. He stressed that the upcoming discussions will not be abstract like the SPD and UNSCR talks, but detailed, technical, and comprehensive. ¶6. (C) Barzani answered that the choice of a lead negotiator is particularly important, and that no individual alone can define an issue so vital to Iraq,s future, especially not Maliki or one of his advisors. Talabani predicted that the "dishdasha government" - Maliki,s circle of Dawa party advisors - would again attempt to dominate negotiations. Although neither leader suggested a possible head of the delegation, Talabani mentioned the good work VP Adil Abd al-Mahdi,s commission had done preparing for the SPD, before the Dawa advisors he sarcastically called the "brilliant experts" discarded their findings. Rosch Shaways added that the 3 1 1 should initiate BAGHDAD 00004199 002 OF 002 the process, and Fuad Massoum suggested other COR delegations be informed the U.S. soon will name its own delegation. -------------- -------------- Article 140: Seeking US Guarantees, Working with IIP -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) Ambassador Crocker congratulated all present on their difficult but admirable acceptance of UN involvement and a six-month extension on Article 140, and to the Kirkuk Provincial Council for ending the Arab bloc,s boycott. He added that Secretary Rice,s visit last week reflected USG acknowledgment of the importance of Article 140, but expressed concern that declining security in Mosul stemmed in part from Al Qa,ida exploiting Sunni fears of Kurdish encroachment. Barham Salih said the Kurds need USG guarantees of progress on Article 140, because the six-month delay had not been easy to market to the Kurdish street. Talabani noted the Kurds, agreement with the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) this week had included establishing a joint local committee to preserve security in Mosul (NFI). Talabani also accused Turkey of playing an unhelpful role by helping "the others" in Mosul and Kirkuk, saying IIP head Tariq al-Hashemi would give further details. -------------- Turkish Bombings Destroying KRG Credibility -------------- ¶8. (C) Barzani and Talabani together raised the recent Turkish bombings that, according to Barzani, killed seven Kurdish civilians and displaced 400 families. Barzani was especially emotional, threatening multiple times to retaliate if the bombings continue and warning the PKK would retaliate in any event. Barzani criticized the US on several points: sanctioning a Turkish attack on a civilian area, providing the Turkish military with intelligence for its attacks, failing to condemn the bombings, excesses, and opening Iraq,s skies for Turkish bombardment. Talabani vowed that the PKK would not enjoy the free movement it once had, but all the principals argued the KRG had lost credibility as an intermediary between the PKK and Ankara. Talabani said he and Barzani had arranged meetings between Turkish and PKK officials in Brussels and Iraq, and had facilitated steps toward PKK disarmament in return for amnesty. The 16 December bombing of a Kurdish village, however, had come only two days after one of these meetings, undermining KRG sincerity. Talabani summarized that "before, (Barzani) and I could do something; now we can do zero." ¶9. (C) Ambassador Crocker first verified with Barzani that the civilian casualties and displacements all resulted from the attack on 16 December rather than subsequent operations, then stressed that Turkey had not coordinated this attack with the U.S. and that Secretary Rice had said so publicly. He agreed with the Kurds that the PKK problem had no purely military solution, and reiterated the three-step process for curtailing PKK militancy, increasing cooperation among the relevant governments, and effecting a political solution. He urged a restrained KRG response, and that the Kurdish leadership not accuse the U.S. of complicity in an uncoordinated attack. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶10. (S) The Secretary,s message last week seems to have persuaded the Kurds to stick with Maliki a while longer, but their frustration remains deep. Masud Barzani, Nechirvan Barzani, and Rosch Shaways all said they had no hope the Maliki government would reform, and at no point did the Kurdish leaders offer specific deliverables or timeframes through which Maliki could regain their support. They already are looking forward to the anticipated congressional testimony in March, in the apparent hope that Washington will be more receptive to dropping Maliki once that hurdle is behind us. The immediate danger is that the Kurds may calculate that a few more months of political stagnation will solidify a damning report card for Maliki; consequently, they may consider stalling on key legislation that might bolster Maliki,s standing. The Kurds say Maliki has one more chance, but their despair that he will change suggests his replacement remains at the front of their minds. CROCKER