THE KURDS FIRE A SHOT OVER PM MALIKI'S BOW

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 004193 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/26/2017 TAGS: PGOV IZ SUBJECT: THE KURDS FIRE A SHOT OVER PM MALIKI'S BOW Classified By: Acting Political Counselor Robert Waller for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: In a lengthy open letter to Prime Minister Maliki dated December 21, the Kurdistan Alliance registered its concern over "lost opportunities, crippled wills, the confusion in taking decisions and obstructing the participation and reform process" and presented Maliki with a list of twelve recommendations for moving forward on national reconciliation and other urgent priorities. Post has e-mailed the original Arabic text of the letter and a translation to NEA/I. In a related development on December 24, Vice President Tarik al-Hashimi joined President Jalal Talabani and KRG President Massoud Barzani in signing an agreement to produce a "social contract" leading to reconciliation. End summary. Kurdish Missive -------------- ¶2. (C) The Kurdistan Alliance sent Prime Minister Maliki an open letter on December 21 enumerating a lengthy list of concerns. Post has e-mailed the full orginal Arabic text of the letter and a translation to NEA/I. Highlights include: -- An expression of happiness with the progress on security, for which the Alliance gives Maliki some credit; -- Criticism of the Office of the Commander in Chief for (effectively) replacing the Ministry of Defense. -- Accusations that the PM's advisors negotiate and make statements on behalf of the government and the ministers; -- An implicit criticism that the PM has allowed his staff to form offices (that amount to) an alternative government; -- Criticism of the Council of Ministers Secretariat (Comsec) for issuing executive orders that exceed its constitutional authorities; -- Mention of the GOI's failure to achieve "any significant progress in producing oil and gas, building refineries, or making progress in important service areas like education, health, transportation . . ."; -- An observation that the GOI has failed to create an Investment Committee as per the Investment Law of 2006, or to publish instructions regarding the law's implementation; -- Mention of the GOI's lack of strategic vision in dealing with ration cards; -- A critique of the GOI's tardiness in submitting the de-Baath law and its withdrawal (sic) of the Provincial Powers law; -- The Alliance notes its concern over the defections from the unity government, adding: "We are not saying that the Prime Minister bears the full responsibility for this, but that he is requested to . . . (expand) the circle of participation . . . (and propose) policies that promote solidarity and unity, and not the opposite." -- Criticism of the PM for becoming the Acting Minister for Higher Education in addition to his own post, "as if his other obligations allow him to do so"; -- Accuses the Federal Government of not managing its relationship with the Kurdish region in accordance with the Constitution and the political program agreed to by the unity government. (NB: This list notably does not mention any KRG-specific demands.) ¶3. (C) The letter also sets out a number of recommendations to the Prime Minister, namely: -- Implementing the Aug. 26 Declaration via the 3 1 mechanism; -- Establishing a Secretariat for the Political Council for National Security and factoring the Council's recommendations into GOI policy; -- Improving coordination between the CoR and the executive branch; -- Approving the bylaws of the Council of Ministers in a way that "consolidates solidarity" and distributes dossiers among the two deputy PM's and the ministers; -- Ending the promulgation of executive orders except for those approved by the CoM; -- Making security decisions in a more participatory fashion; -- Tackling issues that hinder increased oil production; -- Boosting the performance of oversight entities to fight corruption; -- Dealing with security reports in a neutral and professional way; -- Promoting cooperation with all political forces, including those outside of the political process; -- Coordinating relations between the Federal Government and the regional and provincial governments; -- Strengthening relations with the neighbors, especially Iran and Turkey. ¶4. (C) The letter claims not to serve "any special goals that may be related to the Kurdistan Alliance or to Kurdistan" in BAGHDAD 00004193 002 OF 002 isolation from the rest of Iraq. Rather, it expresses concern "over lost opportunities, crippled wills, the confusion in taking decisions and obstructing the participation and reform process." It ends with a fairly blunt warning to the PM. "Dear brother . . . We did, and continue to, offer you all possible support in order to assist this government to succeed. However, with deep regret, we are witnessing disintegration . . . we share common responsibilities and cannot let matters deteriorate in this fashion for fear for our people who may be subject to additonal . . . unfavorable consequences." Enter the IIP -------------- ¶5. (C) In a related development on December 24, Sunni Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi signed an agreement with President Talabani and KRG President Massoud Barzani to "build a joint vision" to produce a "social contract" promoting reconciliation. The parties pledged to cooperate on nine points, many of which were somewhat vague (e.g., "reject the policies of monopolization and alienation"). The chief agreements were to: -- Work for a unified, democratic, federal Iraq; -- Support the independence and professionalism of the Iraqi security forces, and the readiness of the armed forces so as to permit the withdrawal of foreign troops according to a "balanced" schedule; -- Coordinate and exchange views through an agreed upon mechanism (no further details); -- Refuse external and regional interference in Iraq's affairs. ¶6. (SBU) The agreement allegedly includes an appendix on Mosul which Post will forward as soon as it becomes available. ¶7. (C) Septel follows with reports of the Ambassador's 12/26 meetings with President Talabani and KRG President Massoud Barzani. CROCKER