PRT MAYSAN: NO ANBAR AWAKENING IN MAYSAN

S E C R E T BAGHDAD 004189 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/27/2017 TAGS: PGOV IR IZ SUBJECT: PRT MAYSAN: NO ANBAR AWAKENING IN MAYSAN Classified By: Deputy Political Counselor Greg D'Elia for reasons 1.4 ( b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is a PRT Maysan reporting cable. ¶2. (S/NF) Summary. PRT assesses that the unique demographics and historical legacy of Maysan make it infertile ground for a Concerned Local Citizens (CLCs) approach to tribal engagement. Incorporating tribal members into a community security force would be ineffective and endanger many of the fragile political gains with Maysan's leadership. However, the PRT will continue to engage with tribal members on developmental and political issues. End Summary. ¶3. (S/NF) The two largest tribal confederations (qabila) in the Maysan area (and bordering areas in Iran, Basrah, and Wasit) are the Bani Lam and the Albu Muhammad, under which a host of clans ( ashira) claim membership. Other tribal affiliations found within the province include but are not limited to the as-Sawa,d, as-Sarai, al-Bahadil, Albu Darraj, Ka,ab, Kinana, Banu Malik, as-Saadun, Ubada, Khafaja, Tameem, al-Maryan, and the al-Zairij. Like other Iraqi tribes, their constituent clans have merged, fought, and formed alliances over the centuries. ¶4. (S/NF) A variety of factors weakened the strength and influence of Maysan,s tribes over the last century. In the late 1920s, Maysanis began large-scale emigration from the rural areas of the province to urban centers in Baghdad and (to a lesser extent) Basrah. Subsequent large-scale emigrations occurred in the mid-1970s and during the Iran-Iraq war. While many sent remittances back to family in the tribal areas and visited from time to time, those ties to the province and to the tribe began to fray over time and at a distance. Tribal leaders' inability to protect their people during the Iran-Iraq war further weakened their influence, as did internal tensions among tribes that straddled the Iran-Iraq border. The killings and arrests that followed the 1991 Shi'a revolt, as well as the draining of the marsh areas, reinforced a sense of tribal helplessness. Finally, the Coalition has directed the majority of its reconstruction spending through the Provincial Council (PC),Provincial Reconstruction Development Committees (PRDCs),and elected government structures, targeting mixed population centers at the expense of rural areas. ¶5. (S/NF) PRT assesses there is no grassroots movement or underlying motivation that a CLC program could capitalize on to interdict lethal aid. Despite widespread Maysani distrust of 'Persians', most Iranians along the border are Arabs and belong to the same tribal networks. If these networks are being used to smuggle lethal aid, we assess that few Maysani tribesmen would be willing to betray their family for an occupying power. Likewise, JAM's ruthlessness as well as Sadrist engagement with tribal officials would reduce the possibility of tribesmen cooperating against JAM. To date, the PRT has met with the leader of the al-Sawa,d and senior members of the al-Gharawi and al-Saadi, and plans to meet with a wide range of Maysan tribal leadership over the coming month and will report these meetings septel. ¶6. (S/NF) Comment: Given the provincial government,s interest in being seen as the legitimate, elected leadership and representation of the Maysani people, a policy of tribal engagement involving even the appearance of military training or donation of equipment in Maysan would endanger recent political progress made in the province and be unsuccessful at stopping lethal aid flows. End Comment. CROCKER