BRITISH FS SAYS HMG AND USG THINKING ON IRAQ

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 004143 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV UK IZ SUBJECT: BRITISH FS SAYS HMG AND USG THINKING ON IRAQ CONSISTENT; COORDINATION KEY GOING FORWARD Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (S) SUMMARY: In a December 17 meeting, British Foreign Secretary David Miliband, (FS) accompanied by UK Ambassador SIPDIS to Iraq Christopher Prentice and MNF-I Deputy CG William Rollo, told Ambassador Crocker and MNF-I CG Petraeus that, post-Basrah PIC, Her Majesty's Government (HMG) wanted to work with the US on a broader policy on Iraq within a regional context and wished to ensure progress continues given the current &fair winds" in Basrah and in the rest of Iraq. Miliband added that USG and HMG thinking on Iraq were "consistent" and that joint planning of both countries' future commitments in Iraq was crucial. The CG described an improving security environment, but cautioned that Al Qaeda Iraq (AQI) remained "dangerous" and had "regenerative powers" the Coalition should not underestimate. Ambassador Crocker told the Foreign Secretary that the Maliki government was increasingly "under scrutiny" from the Iraqi political class. UK Ambassador Prentice asked AMB Crocker if he thought the floodwaters of Iraqi politics were ready to wash Maliki away. Ambassador Crocker replied that Sistani,s view would likely prevail and that ISCI may not be as ready to dump Maliki as they claim. Foreign Minister Miliband assured Ambassador Crocker and the CG that despite a more complex legal environment, HMG's planning for Iraq runs into 2009. END SUMMARY. CURRENT POLITICAL CLIMATE ¶2. (S) Both Ambassador Crocker and the CG pointed out that Prime Minister Maliki realizes his government is "under scrutiny" and the CG volunteered that earlier in the day, MNF-I had flown KRG Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani to Najaf to meet with Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani. Both the Ambassador and the CG confided to FS that the Iraqi political class is talking "government change." This, they said, may help explain why they were finding the Prime Minister more accommodating to their concerns and less responsive to Iranian and Sadrist pressure. Ambassador Prentice asked if the PM could be pushed out even without a US signal. Ambassador Crocker said he did not think the Iraqis were there because of the emphasis Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani has always placed on Shi'a solidarity. Ambassador Crocker also estimated that ISCI might not be as willing to unseat Maliki as Vice President Adel Abdel Mehdi claims. The CG noted that President Talabani's thinking about the Prime Minister had noticeably "hardened" but that the Kurds, overall, were "more pliant," partly because of the Turkish issue. BASRAH ¶3. (S) The CG commented that the Basrah PIC "visuals" were good, and commended UK MG Binns, the MND-SE commander, for the "fantastic" job he has done in Basrah. The Foreign Secretary mentioned he had not planned his Iraq visit around SIPDIS the Basrah PIC and emphasized that HMG wanted a "whole Iraq" policy that puts efforts into Iraq in regional strategic context. HMG, he continued, wished to ensure continued progress given the &fair winds" post-PIC in Basrah and elsewhere in Iraq. General Petraeus commented that the key to this was greater coordination between Baghdad and other parts of Iraq. He advised the FS to "get some bright folks to connect what's going on in Basrah to what's going on in Baghdad." According to the CG, Basrah offers "enormous economic opportunity": and there are already a number of "reasonable" local development opportunities underway. The province needs to be linked with the central government for big projects to get underway. Better coordination with the central government might also help with the provinces "absorption problems" for the several billion dollars (much of it from Japan) in development aid already earmarked for Basrah. ¶4. (S) Ambassador Crocker noted that the PIC was a "driving event" that allowed Prime Minister Maliki and Basrah Governor Wa'eli to get back on "speaking terms." He hoped the improving personal relationship would permit the province to strengthen ties with the central government. Both the Ambassador and the CG gave guarded responses to Miliband's question about private sector prospects in the Basrah. CG regretted the continued lack of a legal, regulatory and security environment strong enough to encourage private sector investment. Private investment, he concluded, was "not coming soon to a theater near you" for Basrah until regulatory framework laws can be put in place and private confidence in the security situation improves. FS noted "a lot of complacency" from private sector actors in Iraq, but Ambassador Crocker cautioned against underestimating security concerns, pointing out that, despite our pressure on the GOI to take effective action, JAM remained in control of the port of Umm Qasr. The CG added that the Prime Minister delivered to Governor Wa'eli an ultimatum to expunge within two months BAGHDAD 00004143 002 OF 003 perceptions of Wa'eli's corruption. SECURITY ¶5. (S) The CG provided a detailed briefing on current MNF-I anti-AQI efforts including the killing of 35 AQI operatives in the Hamrin mountains the previous week. The CG noted that the Tigris river valley continued to provide AQI "some refuge" and that the northern city of Mosul, in Ninevah province, remained "a concern." The CG warned that AQI remained dangerous and cautioned the FS against underestimating AQI's regenerative capability. The CG described Syria as "more on side" but tempered this estimate by noting it was completely "out of self interest." Concern in Syria, he said, focused on possible International Criminal Court action against SARG members in the wake of the Hariri assassination. This, he concluded, gives the US and the UK leverage with the SARG and the two countries "absolutely had to take advantage" of the SARG increasing "lean" towards the West and away from Iran. The CG mentioned that regional source countries also were being more pro-active in the fight against AQI. SECTARIAN VIOLENCE ¶6. (S) The CG underscored that IED attacks were at their lowest levels since spring of 2005 and that Coalition forces were finding significantly more devices in the field and in caches because of the MNF-I surge, Concerned Local Citizens (CLC) programs, and a dramatic (160,000) increase in IA and IP numbers since January 2007. To FS's Miliband's inquiry about attacks on CLCs, CG pointed out that there was a "fair amount" of violence against them and that they were targets for AQI because of their effectiveness. CG described CLCs as part of an anti-insurgent strategy that includes a "wide variety of tools, including finances, command and control and public opinion." He emphasized that kinetic operations were not enough and Miliband pointed out that HMG were also very interested in the financial and ideas aspect of counter-insurgency/counter terror warfare. The Foreign Secretary added that HMG were also "very interested in SIPDIS de-radicalization" and CG noted that MNF-I Maj. General Stone was already doing important work in that area, which the CG agreed was a key to winning the fight against AQI. IRAN ¶7. (S) The CG noted a "huge Iranian influence" in Iraq but told FS he thinks Iran is "leaning" on Moqtadah Al Sadr, whose reputation was tarnished by this summer's violence in Karbala. The Iranians, assisted by Lebanese Hezbollah elements, continue with militia training inside Iran and the CG said at the next (anticipated) round of trilateral talks, he would provide US representatives with intel gleaned from captured militia fighters which they could show the Iranians. The CG stated that Iran would raise US support to the PJAK, but assured FS that the organization receives no USG support whatsoever. TURKISH RAID ¶8. (S) The CG told Ambassador Wilson in Turkey we had "very serious concerns" about the way the Turks conducted the CBO, adding the Turks "flew way outside" cleared airspace and came near the Iranian border, prompting the Iranians to scramble jets to meet them. Wilson's reply was that the Turkish military had "to do something now." Petraeus told the FS that our message to the GOI should be "if you don't like this kind of operation, do something about the PKK problem." The Foreign Secretary, who was traveling to Erbil the next day, asked what his message to the KRG should be. Ambassador Crocker said it was imperative the "KRG stay the course they are on, and that they not use these air strikes as a pretext to back away" from the positive steps they have taken so far against the PKK. The CG added that FS could tell the KRG that we "had pushed back" over the raid which we did not approve ahead of time. He noted that in private, GOI contacts were not inclined to over-react to the event. WAY FORWARD ¶9. (S) To the Foreign Secretary's direct question, the CG emphasized that MNF-I would continue to reduce forces, and that his drawdown planning generally ran in six month increments. FS wondered if security gains had reduced political pressure in Washington for drastic action and the CG confirmed that they had. Foreign Secretary Miliband continued that USG and HMG thinking on the way forward was "consistent" and that joint planning for future commitments was crucial. The question, he went on, was "will we want to say we have wasted 4-5 years, or have we done something for Iraqis." Ambassador Crocker said SPD was a clear signal our BAGHDAD 00004143 003 OF 003 focus went beyond 2008, even though current legal authorities expired at the end of 2008. FS noted that the lack of a Security Council mandate "complicated the legal terrain" for HMG and both Ambassador Crocker and FS agreed they would have liked to continue with a UNSCR framework beyond 2008, but political realities made that impossible. FS assured the Ambassador and the CG that HMG's Iraq planning ran into 2009. CROCKER