PROVINCIAL ELECTIONS: SHIFTING GOI PRIORITIES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 004142 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM IZ SUBJECT: PROVINCIAL ELECTIONS: SHIFTING GOI PRIORITIES REF: A. BAGHDAD 3885 ¶B. BAGHDAD 3840 ¶C. BAGHDAD 3540 Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for Reasons 1.4(b) and (d). -------------- Summary and Comment -------------- ¶1. (C) Summary/Comment: Draft legislation on provincial elections has stalled in the Prime Minister,s office, in part because Iraq,s dominant national political parties assess that new elections would work to their disadvantage. Moreover, Iraqi politicians now say they must finish the provincial powers law before turning to the elections law. Notwithstanding the obvious political motivations at work, this proposed sequencing makes some sense -- ironing out provincial powers will provide a sounder basis for the next elections at the provincial level. In any event, convincing the Iraqis to abandon this course would likely require more political capital than it is worth. Meanwhile, with top-down political reconciliation not in prospect for the moment, improving day-to-day life for the average citizen takes a higher priority in the minds of Iraq's leaders than benchmark legislation. Likewise, the Embassy is increasingly focused on improving GOI services, developing ministerial capacity, and reducing corruption/militia influence. While the benchmarks remain important milestones, and the prospect of passage of a Budget Law and the Accountability and Justice Law by late January will send much needed signals of a leadership engaged in reconciliation, the provincial powers and provincial elections legislative benchmarks will not necessarily ensure reconciliation in and of themselves )- especially if they come at the cost of confrontation with our Iraqi political allies. In short, we are adapting our priorities to match the political reality and the need to produce immediate, tangible improvements in daily life for the average Iraqi. End Summary/Comment. -------------- Why the Election Law is MIA -------------- ¶2. (C) In June 2007, in response to Embassy pressure, the Prime Minister,s Office (PMO) agreed to draft an elections law. On July 1 the Prime Minister issued a press release stating that "we are determined on performing the provinces (sic) councils election this very year, we should not give up because of challenges." Five months later, the PMO has yet to complete a first draft of the elections law, and in fact has made no progress since September. ¶3. (C) Why this inertia? Because neither the Dawa party (Shia) nor its principal allies in the United Iraqi Alliance are likely to benefit from a fresh round of provincial elections. Readers will recall that the Sunnis and Sadrists boycotted the January 2005 provincial elections. As a result, the following five provinces had a turnout below 60% in January 2005: Anbar 2%, Ninewa 17%, Salah ad-Din 29%, Diyala 33%, and Baghdad 51%. All remaining provinces had turnouts in excess of 60%, and the three Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) provinces had voter turnout in excess of 80%. ¶4. (C) When provincial elections do actually occur, the disenfranchisement of the Sunnis and Sadrists stands to be redressed, to dramatic effect. In Baghdad, the Office of Muqtada Sadr (OMS) will go from zero representation on the Baghdad provincial council to a near majority. In the other Southern provinces, OMS will likely gain seats at the expense of Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI - Shia) control. The Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP - Sunni) may well lose control of Anbar to local Sunni groups. Similarly, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK - Kurdish) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP - Kurdish) will almost certainly lose their disproportionate influence on the Ninewa, Diyala, Salahaddin and perhaps Kirkuk provincial councils. ¶5. (C) Accordingly, most of the dominant national parties, including the IIP, ISCI, the PUK, and the KDP, are not rushing to facilitate provincial elections. In the Council of Representatives (CoR) ISCI has 30 seats, the IIP has 26, the KDP has 23, the PUK has 22, and the miscellaneous Kurdish parties hold 8; out of 275 seats in the CoR, blocs totaling 109 seats stand to lose local power if provincial elections are held. This goes some way in explaining the Prime Minister's and the CoR's general reluctance to draft and push an elections law, despite the occasional public pronouncement in favor of provincial elections. -------------- Procrastinating on Elections -------------- BAGHDAD 00004142 002 OF 002 ¶6. (C) This reluctance to facilitate elections is manifesting itself in the very ugly fight in the CoR to appoint the twenty Governorate Electoral Officers (GEOs) (Note: Baghdad has two, each remaining province has one, and the KRG region has one. End Note). The Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) law requires that the CoR nominate a slate of five candidates for each provincial GEO, after which the IHEC selects one of the five. Although the CoR nominated and the IHEC selected, on November 18, twelve of the twenty GEOs, the UN-led International Electoral Advisory Team deemed the process fraught with political and sectarian interference. ¶7. (C) In fact, the CoR has been deadlocked for the past six months on the appointment of the remaining eight GEOs. It should come as no surprise that the deadlocks exist over the provinces in which the Kurds and ISCI have the most to lose: Baghdad (2 GEOs),Basra, Najaf, Karbala, Wasit, Ninewa, and Diyala. Their refusal to compromise over these GEOs foreshadows additional gridlock on the choice of electoral system, treatment of internally displaced persons, and dates for elections - all required components of an elections law. -------------- A Self-Serving Sequencing -------------- ¶8. (C) Lack of enthusiasm for elections is also discernable in the GOI's and CoR's preference to finalize the provincial powers law before holding provincial elections. Interlocutors argue that this is eminently logical, since this law will clearly define the powers and authorities of the provincial councils who are to be elected. (Note: The GOI could technically pass an elections law first and then debate and pass the provincial powers law during the six month timeline required to prepare for the elections. As long as the provincial powers law is passed before elections day, either approach would be acceptable. End Note.) ¶9. (C) Supporting the GOI,s proposed sequencing (i.e., provincial powers first, then the elections law) makes sense, if only because progress on most other pieces of benchmark legislation appears even more remote. The Constitutional Review process is stalled over: first, Kurdish objections to the lack of an Article 140 process; and second, the Sunni/Shia debate over federalism. In addition, top-down reconciliation has stalled and the 3 1 process is dead in the water. The provincial powers law is the one piece of legislation that everyone seems willing to negotiate. -------------- De-emphasizing Benchmarks -------------- ¶10. (C) Although national level reconciliation has stalled, the GOI is making progress where it matters most to the average citizen: in the day-to-day neighborhood security and delivery of services (reftel B). A focus on services has already begun to provide tribal leaders a powerful role in their communities by allowing them to identify local service priorities (reftel C). Proof of progress is reflected in the fact that families displaced from their homes in Baghdad have begun returning, according to Post and PRT contacts, officials at the Ministry of Displacement and Migration, and local press reports (reftel A). While returns are taking place throughout Iraq, the trend appears more prevalent in Baghdad than in other provinces, and may continue to accelerate should security gains consolidate. ¶11. (C) Comment: Prioritizing benchmark legislation higher than the Iraqis themselves do could lead to unconstructive outcomes. If we press for an elections law over Iraqi objections or their preference to focus on provincial powers first, we could obtain a poorly drafted elections law that defeats the beneficial effect we are trying to achieve. For example, we may lose our ability to shape a more responsive electoral system or prevent the disenfranchisement of internally displaced persons. Our experience with de-Ba'athification reform serves as a cautionary reminder of how too much pressure on the fragile GOI legislative capacity can generate multiple, competing, low-quality draft laws that do not fully achieve the original desired outcome of reconciliation. While deficiencies in the de-Ba'athification law can be compensated for via adroit implementation, weaknesses in the framework for provincial powers and provincial elections laws could, over time, actually inflame rather than dampen ethnic and sectarian violence. Getting these difficult issues "right" means allowing Iraqis the space to proceed at their own pace towards common understandings of the underlying issues without outside pressure. End Comment. CROCKER