MOI ON FOREIGN TERRORISTS AND BORDER SECURITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 004125 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2017 TAGS: PBTS PGOV PINS PREL PTER IZ SA SY SUBJECT: MOI ON FOREIGN TERRORISTS AND BORDER SECURITY REF: BAGHDAD 2974 Classified By: POL-MIL MINISTER-COUNSELOR MARCIE B. RIES, REASONS 1.4 ( B) AND (D) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: At a December 12 meeting, Pol-Mil M/C discussed foreign terrorists, border security, and the PKK with Interior Minister Jawad al-Bulani. While Syria had taken some actions and there had been a reduction in the number of foreign terrorists entering Iraq, Syria was hampered in its efforts by corruption and needed to do more. Bulani described the variety of techniques and routes used for infiltration and the complications caused by tribes living along the Iraqi-Syrian border. Bulani plans to visit his counterpart in Saudi Arabia after the groundwork has been laid. At a separate meeting, DBE Chief MG Mohsen related his impressions of Syrian efforts to improve border security and described the challenges facing his forces in the coming year. -------------- FOREIGN TERRORISTS -------------- ¶2. (C) After expressing condolences regarding the recent assassination of the Babil provincial chief of police, Pol-Mil M/C initiated a discussion regarding foreign terrorist infiltration into Iraq. Pol-Mil M/C noted the possibility that Syria had taken some steps to block foreign terrorist transits, described USG outreach efforts including the S/CT-led delegation,s recent visits to source countries, and asked Interior Minister Bulani for his views on the problem and whether there had recently been any improvement. ¶3. (C) Syria presented two problems in terms of border security, opined Bulani. Its leaders were divided in their attitude towards the GOI and there was significant corruption in Syrian institutions which resulted in support for terrorists. Some high-level Syrian officers ignored directives to restrict the travel of military-aged males and otherwise neglected their duties. While the SARG had the ability to interdict most foreign terrorists, it was handicapped in its efforts because some of its high officers &chose to close their eyes.8 Of course, corruption was not just a problem for Syria but also for Iraq. Despite these shortcomings, Iraqi intelligence showed that the number of foreign terrorists entering Iraq had dropped in the last four months and Syria had taken some actions leading to this reduction. Syria agreed to Iraq,s request for direct communication between border officials at its three ports of entry on the Syrian border. Syria had intensified its border security efforts, but had not done enough in Bulani,s estimation. -------------- TRIBAL COMPLICATIONS -------------- ¶4. (C) Control of the tribes which lived on both sides of the Iraqi-Syrian border would be critical for long-term border security, explained Bulani. These tribes engage in smuggling and facilitate the flow of foreign terrorists. Because they have families and, in some cases, houses on both sides of the border it is difficult to control them. These conditions exist over a 70-80 km stretch of the border in Ninewah province and for a shorter stretch around Al Qaim in Anbar province. When he suggested that a trench be built along the border to stop illegal border-crossing, the Syrians &went crazy8 because they profit from smuggling and are not yet worried about the reverse flow of terrorists, related Bulani. -------------- REGIONAL ASPECT -------------- ¶5. (C) Bulani related that foreign terrorists were using a variety of methods and routes to enter Iraq. Counterfeit identification documents were allowing some to pose as businessmen. Many were moving through a variety of transit points between their home countries and Iraq, possibly including Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iran, he claimed. Foreign terrorists from Kuwait and the Gulf nations were coming by sea into Basrah, where they meet guides who bring them to their operational areas. Bulani encouraged U.S. engagement with Syria and other countries in concert with Iraqi diplomatic efforts. Pol-Mil M/C pointed out the opportunities for such engagement provided by the Neighbors Process and requested GOI support for U.S. observer status at the next Border Security Working Group expected to take place in January. BAGHDAD 00004125 002 OF 002 -------------- SAUDI INVITATION -------------- ¶6. (C) Bulani explained that he had an invitation to visit the Saudi Interior Minister to discuss security issues which he intended to take up after lower level officials from each government had met and prepared the groundwork. The interior ministers from Iraq,s neighbors had expressed satisfaction with his work and that of his ministry at improving Iraq,s security when he attended the regional interior ministers meeting in Kuwait in late October, he added. (COMMENT: Bulani mentioned the Saudi invitation to us in early September (reftel) but provided no explanation for his delay in taking it up. We understand that the Saudis extended this invitation in January in Tunisia on the sidelines of the Arab League interior ministers meeting. END COMMENT.) --- PKK --- ¶7. (C) Pol-Mil M/C praised GOI efforts to rein in the PKK and inquired about the next steps to be taken in this effort. Bulani related that the GOI and the KRG were carrying out their responsibilities under the Turkey-Iraq counterterrorism agreement and that the MOI was leading an interagency committee to coordinate these efforts. He explained how the counterterrorism agreement, which had initially been opposed by Kurdish groups, was now understood by the KRG as fulfilling an important GOI responsibility. Pol-Mil M/C urged Bulani to arrest any PKK operatives found in Iraq, drawing attention to ongoing U.S. assistance to improve airport security in Erbil and help in distributing information regarding INTERPOL-listed arrest warrants. -------------- DBE CHIEF,S PERSPECTIVE -------------- ¶8. (C) In a separate meeting, Directorate of Border Enforcement (DBE) Chief Major General Mohsen expanded on Bulani,s description of Iraq,s efforts to work with its neighbors on border security and described his plans and challenges for 2008. Mohsen visited Syria in late November and reported his impression that Syria was making an effort to improve border security by steps such as improving and paving roads and building further observation posts. He related that his Syrian counterpart admitted that corruption, in particular smuggling of petroleum products, undermined Syrian efforts. Mohsen indicated that improving intelligence-sharing with Iraq,s neighbors would be one of his key goals in the coming year. ¶9. (C) Mohsen presented a litany of challenges facing the DBE in 2008. His budget was being cut 65% from 408 billion to 143 billion Iraqi dinars in 2008. Command and control of Border Forces was becoming more complicated due to the role of the provincial operations centers which have directed some battalions to perform internal security duties instead of their DBE missions in Basrah and Karbala. Some 6,000 DBE staff lacked proper training because slots at the three MOI training academies were going to the police services. Mohsen stated that the Prime Minister had already issued an order placing all seaports under DBE authority, but that the Ministry of Transportation had not ceded authority over airports to the DBE. (COMMENT: Post and MNF-I/MNSTC-I agree that adding the challenges of administering sea and airports to the DBE,s already full plate is not a wise move in the near-term, although it may have merit as a long-term goal. END COMMENT.) CROCKER