PRT SALAH AD DIN: GOI AND PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 004070

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/15/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: PRT SALAH AD DIN: GOI AND PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT
RELATIONSHIP REMAINS STRAINED

Classified By: PRT Team Leader Steve Buckler for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (U) This is a PRT Tikrit, Salah ad Din cable.

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Summary
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2. (C) Salah ad Din Provincial government officials tell
PRTOffs that on every issue that is important to them - from
provincial powers, to De-Baathification and
institutionalizing arrangements made on the tribal security
front - the central government has failed to deliver on
promises made. Provisional government officials, including
the Governor and Deputy Governor, complain there is limited
contact between the province and the central government,
aside from required discussions on the distribution of GOI
capital budget funds to the province. An increase in the GOI
2008 budget allocation to Salah ad Din argues for GOI
commitment to the Province, despite the absence of progress
on other key reconciliation issues. End Summary.

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Baghdad Fails to Deliver
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3. (C) According to provincial government officials, the
central government has failed to deliver on numerous promises
made on issues of concern to the Sunnis in Salah ad Din
(SaD). The lack of a substantive role for the province in
the absence of a Provincial Powers Act inhibits the
province's ability to affect programs that would make a
positive difference in the lives of the residents of Salah ad
Din.

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2008 Budget is One Bright Spot
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4. (C) The one bright spot in the SaD/GoI relationship is in
the allocation of capital budget funds. The Province
recently received an unexpected surprise when the GoI
increased its 2008 budget allocation from USD 96 million (117
billion ID) to USD 144.7 million (176 billion ID). This
allocation will challenge the ability of the Province to
monitor and oversee the spending of this money in 2008.
However, in the absence of movement on other reconciliation
issues, it is the fundamental manifestation of GoI commitment
to the Province.

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SaD Residents Doubt GOI Intentions
on Reconciliation
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5. (C) On the National Reconciliation front, there are two
major issues of interest to province residents. First,
resolving the De-Baathification issue is critical given
Saddam Hussein's status as a "native son of Salah ad Din" and
the large numbers of former regime military and civilian
employees. Despite the promise that De-Baathification
legislation will soon be passed to allow former Baathists
back into public life, the lack of any real progress
reinforces for the average Salad ad Din resident the notion
that Salah ad Din is of little strategic value to the GoI.


6. (C) The PRT recently brought the Chairman of the
Provincial De-Baathification Commission to Baghdad after the
PRT was able to secure a meeting with the National
Commission. The meeting was cordial, and the Commission
promised action within ten days once the files of all former
Baathists contained official dismissal letters. (COMMENT:
The National Commission remains annoyed that their repeated
calls for the dismissal of Salah ad Din Deputy Governor
Abdulla have been ignored by the Provincial Government. END
COMMENT).


7. (C) The second piece of the reconciliation puzzle is the
integration of tribal security units into Iraqi Security
Forces (ISF). When the tribal security initiative was
initiated in July after Coalition Forces (CF) saw stirrings
of an "awakening" among Salah ad Din Sheikhs, various GoI
officials, including Prime Minister Maliki, made commitments
to fund six police battalions comprised of several thousand
officers, which would be filled by security personnel
currently employed by Salah ad Din tribes. The leader of the
Tribal Support Council, Sheikh Kamees of the dominant
Al-Juboori tribe, told PRTOff that he has men to fill these
positions, but GoI support has not materialized.


8. (C) According to Coalition Forces working with the GoI,

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the new GoI plan is to either take over payments of the
current security contracts for the tribal security personnel
or to encourage these individuals to take positions in the
police, army, or in civilian community service jobs, which
the GoI plans to create in the future. The GoI has yet to
commit the funding necessary to create the additional police
officer positions, claiming that Salah ad Din already has
enough allocated positions. Salah ad Din provincial
government officials feel this is an indication of low level
GOI support for the province.

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COMMENT
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9. (C) One CF Battalion commander told PRTOff that he is
trying "to keep hope alive among the Iraqis" while they await
improvements in their day-to-day lives. With no tangible
benefits or action flowing from the central government, it is
increasingly difficult to keep that hope alive. The sudden
increase in GOI budget allocation to Salah ad Din, despite
the attendant difficulties in the expenditure and monitoring
of the funds, contrasts sharply with the phlegmatic efforts
by the Central Government to address other core
reconciliation needs. END COMMENT.
BUTENIS