Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BAGHDAD4027
2007-12-12 01:34:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
how-toVZCZCXRO9382 PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK DE RUEHGB #4027 3460134 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 120134Z DEC 07 FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4788 INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 004027
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/10/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: FM RECEIVES OBJECTIVE MASSEY BRIEF
Classified By: Classified by PolMil Minister Counselor Marcie Ries for
Reasons 1.4 (d/b)
C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 004027
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/10/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: FM RECEIVES OBJECTIVE MASSEY BRIEF
Classified By: Classified by PolMil Minister Counselor Marcie Ries for
Reasons 1.4 (d/b)
1. (C) On December 10, and in advance of what will be
Foreign Minister Zebari's first official trip to Syria,
PolMil Minister Counselor Ambassador Marcie Ries and MNF-I
intel personnel provided him a foreign terrorist and
facilitators (FTF) briefing based on Objective Massey data.
Zebari listened attentively, took notes, and thanked the
briefers several times at the end of the presentation.
2. (C) Zebari asked for clarification about monthly
crossing trends, and noted that internal Iraqi reporting
suggesting a drop in the number of FTF entering Iraq from
Syria agreed with Massey findings. He believes the SARG has
"internal grounds" to stem the FTF flow; that it had learned
lessons from other countries in the region, particularly
Lebanon, and concluded that FTF could easily become an "out
of control" domestic problem. Despite the more positive
recent trends, Zebari remains concerned the SARG could
"reactivate" terrorist and facilitator networks whenever it
suits them.
3. (C) Syria, Zebari went on, was only a part (albeit an
important one) of a web of networks running though several
countries in the region. Zebari thinks the SARG recognizes a
stable Iraq is in its interest, but complained that on FTF
issues, the GOI had provided mixed messages and not "dealt
professionally" with Syria. Zebari said he intended to be
"direct" and condition better bilateral relations on
continued SARG FTF cooperation. He asserted that the GOI has
other incentives, principally economic, to encourage greater
SARG engagement across the range of bilateral issues. Zebari
took care to point out that "our people in the North"
(Kurdish leadership) also approved of the trip.
4. (C) Zebari admitted the GOI "have people" within Syrian
intelligence and that he had approved an increase in the
Damascus embassy's budget to cover rising asset recruitment
and retention costs. But he worried that the GOI still does
not have adequate clarity on SARG thinking. He hopes his
trip will help remedy this and added that one of his main
goals was "get a feel" for senior SARG leadership. He plans
to meet President Assad, Vice President Attar, Foreign
Minister Moallem and other "security doers." Zebari
described Prime Minister Utri as "ineffective" and was not
sure they would meet.
BUTENIS
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/10/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: FM RECEIVES OBJECTIVE MASSEY BRIEF
Classified By: Classified by PolMil Minister Counselor Marcie Ries for
Reasons 1.4 (d/b)
1. (C) On December 10, and in advance of what will be
Foreign Minister Zebari's first official trip to Syria,
PolMil Minister Counselor Ambassador Marcie Ries and MNF-I
intel personnel provided him a foreign terrorist and
facilitators (FTF) briefing based on Objective Massey data.
Zebari listened attentively, took notes, and thanked the
briefers several times at the end of the presentation.
2. (C) Zebari asked for clarification about monthly
crossing trends, and noted that internal Iraqi reporting
suggesting a drop in the number of FTF entering Iraq from
Syria agreed with Massey findings. He believes the SARG has
"internal grounds" to stem the FTF flow; that it had learned
lessons from other countries in the region, particularly
Lebanon, and concluded that FTF could easily become an "out
of control" domestic problem. Despite the more positive
recent trends, Zebari remains concerned the SARG could
"reactivate" terrorist and facilitator networks whenever it
suits them.
3. (C) Syria, Zebari went on, was only a part (albeit an
important one) of a web of networks running though several
countries in the region. Zebari thinks the SARG recognizes a
stable Iraq is in its interest, but complained that on FTF
issues, the GOI had provided mixed messages and not "dealt
professionally" with Syria. Zebari said he intended to be
"direct" and condition better bilateral relations on
continued SARG FTF cooperation. He asserted that the GOI has
other incentives, principally economic, to encourage greater
SARG engagement across the range of bilateral issues. Zebari
took care to point out that "our people in the North"
(Kurdish leadership) also approved of the trip.
4. (C) Zebari admitted the GOI "have people" within Syrian
intelligence and that he had approved an increase in the
Damascus embassy's budget to cover rising asset recruitment
and retention costs. But he worried that the GOI still does
not have adequate clarity on SARG thinking. He hopes his
trip will help remedy this and added that one of his main
goals was "get a feel" for senior SARG leadership. He plans
to meet President Assad, Vice President Attar, Foreign
Minister Moallem and other "security doers." Zebari
described Prime Minister Utri as "ineffective" and was not
sure they would meet.
BUTENIS