PRT KIRKUK: ARABS END PROVINCIAL COUNCIL BOYCOTT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 004008

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/07/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ
SUBJECT: PRT KIRKUK: ARABS END PROVINCIAL COUNCIL BOYCOTT

Classified By: Kirkuk PRT leader Howard Keegan for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).


1. (U) This is a Kirkuk Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT)
message.


2. (C) Summary: The return of the Arab bloc members on
December 4 to the Kirkuk Provincial Council peacefully
resolved a year-long Sunni Arab boycott. Negotiations for
the Arab bloc's return saw concessions by the ruling Kirkuk
Brotherhood List (KBL) that included agreement on
power-sharing and allotment of government positions in the
province by community. The Turkmen Bloc meanwhile remains on
the sidelines, pursuing an ineffective and increasingly
isolated boycott of its own. End Summary.

A Boycott More in Name Than Political Impact


3. (C) Arab Bloc members of the Kirkuk Provincial Council
(PC) ended a year-long PC boycott on December 4, 2007. Arab
and Turkmen blocs, which had formed a strategic alliance,
initiated the boycott in November 2006. The Kirkuk PC is
made up of party blocs, including Arabs under the mantle of
the Arab Gathering List party, Turkmen represented by the
Turkmen Eli party (ITF),and the majority Kurdish-dominated
Kirkuk Brotherhood List, which also comprises numerous
smaller parties and factions.


4. (C) The boycott by Arab Bloc and ITF members did not have
a substantial negative impact on the provincial government,
as the KBL was able to muster and maintain a quorum at the PC
in their absence and to ensure the effective functioning of
the government. The boycotting members themselves maintained
offices within the Kirkuk Government Building (KGB) and
generally continued to participate in select committees and
daily office functions. The boycotters greatly overestimated
the impact of their action. Both groups in fact lost support
from constituents as the months dragged on. The agreement
between the Turkmen and Arabs was a loose association that
never formalized itself with a true agreement of issues to
settle the boycott.

Accelerating the Negotiations, Splitting the Blocs


5. (C) Starting in July, PRT Kirkuk was able to accelerate
efforts to get all parties back to the table and resolve the
boycott, capitalizing on anticipation of the September
Congressional testimony by Ambassador Crocker and General
Petraeus. The Provincial Chairman and the KBL embraced the
PRT initiative and started serious negotiations with both
blocs. The initial meetings underlined the difference in
demands between the strategic partners and eventually
revealed increasing Arab and Turkmen faultlines, with each
bloc pursuing a separate agenda. Individual Arab bloc
members publicly denounced the call to continue joint
negotiations and began applying internal pressure to other
Arab bloc members to pursue an independent negotiation track.
Starting in October, the Arab bloc undertook solo
negotiations in earnest.


6. (C) After months of efforts and countless negotiation
meetings, the Arab bloc appeared ready to reconcile and
return to the council in late November. A last minute set of
excuses based on the former Turkmen agreement prohibited a
solution from being achieved on November 28 during a formal
negotiation session with the KBL. To help resolve the
impasse, the PRT met with key Arab bloc members and
successfully convinced them of the need for their
participation in the province's democratic process. Based on
this meeting, bloc members drafted and signed a memo for
media release stating that they agreed to the last of ten
negotiation points and would rejoin the government.

Power-sharing Agreement as Efforts continue to bring Turkmen
on Board


7. (C) On December 2, Arab bloc and KBL representatives
signed a formal agreement outlining ten main points. Under
the agreement, the Arab bloc secured the positions of Deputy
Governor of Kirkuk province and Deputy Chairman of the
yet-to-be-formed Kirkuk City Council. In addition,
thirty-two percent of positions in the Kirkuk Provincial
Government will NOW be allocated to each of the three ethnic
groups -- Arab, Turkmen, and Kurd -- with the remaining four
percent set aside for Christian minority groups. While key
positions will be filled candidates from the Arab bloc
nominations, formally rebalancing the ethnic levels of the
provincial government (including Director General positions)
will require approval from Baghdad authorities. The
agreement outlined the formation of an executive committee to
address matters arising during implementation, notably the
formation of the city council, and to attempt to devise a
compromise to ensure the formal return of the Turkmen bloc.

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8. (C) Both the Arab Bloc and KBL participated in a formal
press conference following the signing, sealing the
arrangement in front of most of Kirkuk,s media. The
participating parties highlighted the need for the Turkmen to
rejoin government and pledged to work toward formation of a
full unity government.

Arab Members Attend Provincial Council Meeting


9. (C) The defining moment of this new arrangement was
reached on December 4, when Arab bloc members dutifully took
their hither-to vacant seats at the regular provincial
council meeting and actively participated in both discussion
and voting phases. Their long absence from the political
process was acknowledged by several returning Arab Bloc
members, who furthermore addressed the PC in Kurdish (vice
Arabic),which is the true universal language in Kirkuk. Both
sides voiced optimism and pledged to work together to ensure
that the perceived marginalization that had prompted the
original boycott would not reoccur.

Comment: Turkmen Bloc Still a Problem


10. (C) Comment: PRT Kirkuk approached the Turkmen party on
November 29 to check on their interest in rejoining
negotiations to end the boycott. In what has become their
trademark, the Turkmen not only refused the offer, but tacked
on an additional condition for their return to the
negotiating table. The evident objective of this
ITF-dominated group is not to settle and seek resolution but
to disrupt the democratic process. Their media declarations
however indicate that their abandonment by the Arab bloc has
placed additional pressure on the Turkmen bloc to demonstrate
tangible benefits and results to their community from their
continuing boycott. The Turkmen ITF leader is well known for
his incendiary political remarks in the media, but NOW finds
himself speaking with less authority as many in the Turkmen
community are publicly questioning his tactics.


11. (C) Comment c'td: The head of the Arab delegation
approached the Turkmen bloc on the day of the formal signing
with a last minute request for them to rejoin the
negotiations. Although the Turkmen bloc had indicated a
willingness to participate, they did not show for the
meeting. This was the final straw for the Arab delegation
which realized it needed first and foremost to secure support
within its own community. While there is much public
attention to the need for the Turkmen bloc to rejoin the
government, that prospect appears unlikely in the immediate
future and is probably beyond reach. Their excessive
promises to their community and self-isolation have produced
a formidable cultural barrier to dialogue. The loss of
respect will require a specially crafted solution by the KBL
to facilitate the return of the Turkmen bloc, albeit with a
bit less dignity then they would have been possible through a
settlement several months ago.


12. (C) Comment c'td: The public commitment evinced at the
press conference to reach out to the Turkmen bloc may help
spur a return by this group to its rightful, elected place in
the Kirkuk government. While a small step, this
reconciliation with the Sunni Arabs is significant for
improving relations between Kirkuk,s communities and may
have significant implications for Article 140 implementation
and any future referendum on Kirkuk,s status.
BUTENIS