FM SHARPLY CRITICAL OF PM OFFICE UNSCR ROLE;

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003966

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/05/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: FM SHARPLY CRITICAL OF PM OFFICE UNSCR ROLE;
THINKS NIE WILL EMBOLDEN TEHRAN

REF: STATE 162558

Classified By: Classified by S/I David Satterfield for Reasons 1.4(d/b)
.


1. (S) SUMMARY. In a December 4 meeting with S/I
Satterfield, Foreign Minister Zebari described the "heated"
debate UNSCR renewal triggered in both the Iraqi Council of
Representatives and the Council of Ministers. Both on the
record and in private, Zebari blamed the small cadre of "Dawa
Party Ideologues" in the Prime Minister's office for most of
the difficulties in the SPD and UNSCR processes. Zebari
warned that the December 3 NIE would "embolden" Iran and
worried that Tehran's continued
equivocation over a date for tri-lateral talks was another
indication of increased assertiveness. Zebari provided some
indication the Neighbors "support mechanism" is moving
forward but did not have a time-table for upcoming Neighbors
events. END SUMMARY.

UNSCR--HEATED COR, PCNS MEETINGS



2. (S) Foreign Minister Zebari opened by describing for S/I
Satterfield the "heated" sessions UNSCR renewal had triggered
in both the Council of Representatives and the Political
Council on National Security (PCNS.) Zebari said some
representatives were skeptical this would be the final
Chapter VII resolution, prompting him to counter that POTUS
and the PM had already signed a Declaration of Principles to
that effect. Referring to UNSCR renewal as an "executive
decision," Zebari said the CoR would not debate the matter
before the GOI submitted it to the Security Council. S/I
Satterfield stressed the USG hoped to conclude UNSCR-related
talks with the GOI within 24 hours (COB, December 5) and
present the matter to the Security Council before December 10.


3. (S) Zebari volunteered that the "entire cabinet"
approved the GOI's first version of the UNSCR renewal letter,
but that at a subsequent PCNS meeting, the Prime Minister's
office tabled an amended letter that sparked intense debate.
Zebari said he and UIA/ISCI Vice President Adel Abdel Mehdi
"fought hard" against the proposed changes, arguing the UNSCR
renewal was taking Iraq in "a
new direction"; that the cabinet would not accept the
amendments; and that in the end, as with the August
Leadership Declaration, the Prime Minister's office would
"return to the original version." Zebari noted that
President Talabani appeared receptive to the PMO's arguments
that in 2007 the Coalition had gone beyond the terms of the
resolution and that subsequent version should
contain changes to the operative language.


4. (S) S/I Satterfield mentioned that following the PCNS
he had had a "difficult" meeting with senior PM advisors Sami
al Askeri and Saddiq Rikabi (Satterfield made a point of
noting that Mowaffuq Rubaie had been absent) about the PMO's
version of the letter. He remarked that while some parts of
the letter were unobjectionable, much was poorly drafted and
would embarrass the GOI if presented in an international
forum. Other clauses were incompatible with the authorities
contained in the UNSCR itself and could not be accepted by
the US. Zebari suggested that because the USG so often dealt
directly with the PMO on foreign affairs issues, we were
partly to blame for the problem. S/I Satterfield commented
that the USG "had taken a cautionary lesson" from the SPD and
the UNSCR proceedings.

IRAN--NIE DEMARCHE--ESTIMATE WILL EMBOLDEN IRAN



5. (S) S/I Satterfield delivered reftel demarche and
talking points and underscored that the new assessment did
not change the fact that Iran was, is and will remain a
dangerous country. S/I Satterfield stressed that POTUS was
particularly concerned about the NIE's impact in Iraq and
pressed Zebari for likely fallout. Without hesitating,
Zebari responded the report would "embolden" Iran (and
Syria.) He cited increased militia activity (after a period
of relative calm,) obstructionist behavior by some CoR
members, and an up-tick in the amount of shelling British
forces receive in Basrah as signs of increased Iranian
meddling in Iraq. Zebari worried that Tehran's fear of a
long-term strategic partnership between Iraq and the US, its
perception of Annapolis as a failure, and the Gulf
Cooperation Council's invitation to President Ahmedinejad to
address its December 3 Doha meeting were other factors that
would encourage Iranian "misbehavior."

IRAN--TRI-LATERAL MEETINGS--STILL NO DATE



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6. (S) Zebari said Iranian Ambassador Qummi told him during
a discussion the previous day that while Iran agreed to the
agenda and level for the next round of tri-lats, they had not
yet set a date for the meeting. Zebari hoped to have more
information within 24/48 hours, but argued that Tehran's
equivocation on the issue was another (unwelcome) sign of
increased assertiveness.

NEIGHBORS ISSUES--SUPPORT MECHANISM HAS PRIORITY, NO DATES
FOR WORKING GROUPS



7. (S) Zebari confirmed that the MFA had met with UNAMI
twice about the support mechanism, but did not mention any
forward movement on office space, staffing or other
logistics. Without being specific, Zebari said Deputy
Foreign Minister Libeed Abbawi, the GOI POC for the
initiative, was "following up" the UNAMI meetings. Zebari
added that the GOI would focus on the next round of working
group meetings after establishing the support mechanism,
which Zebari described as the GOI's "top priority."
(NOTE: We have told Zebari several times that we want a full
round of Neighbors events before the end of the first week in
March. END NOTE)

ONE-ON-ONE SESSION--FM-S/I



8. (S) In a private one-on-one side-bar, Zebari sharply
criticized the Prime Minister's office and the clique of
"Dawa Party ideologues" whom he blames for the difficulties
encountered during the SPD and UNSCR processes.
BUTENIS