SUNNI LEADER ADNAN DULAYMI'S SECURITY DETAIL UNDER

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003955 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/05/2027 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PHUM IZ SUBJECT: SUNNI LEADER ADNAN DULAYMI'S SECURITY DETAIL UNDER INVESTIGATION FOR TERRORISM; FURTHER FRACTURES SUNNI PARTICIPATION IN GOVERNMENT Classified By: Political Counselor Matt Tueller for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (S) Sunni Tawafuq bloc leader Adnan Dulaymi continues to protest his innocence following discovery of evidence linking his security staff to terrorist activities during a November 29 joint Iraqi-MNF/I raid on his Baghdad offices. As a result of that raid, approximately 35 members of his security detail, along with his son Makki al-Dulaymi, were detained and are expected to face trial. Dulaymi was later cleared of suspicion by the GOI, but his movements are constrained, his reputation damaged, and his political future in question. During a December 5 meeting with Emboff, Dulaymi requested USG assistance to have his son transfered from GOI to CF custody, GOI permission to return to his Baghdad residence, and stationing of Kurdish troops in his neighborhood. He believed a meeting with PM Maliki would help conclude talks to bring Tawafuq back to government. Dulaymi professed support for an agreement to secure a long-term relationship with the U.S. and passage of a draft De-Baath law. Meanwhile, senior Sunni contacts reflect their community's agitation over this incident and believe an already fractured Sunni political community has been further weakened in terms of leverage with the Maliki government. Unsubstantiated rumors that Dulaymi's son has been tortured by Iraqi security forces may further fan the flames of sectarianism. End summary. -------------- Dulaymi Asks For USG Help -------------- ¶2. (S) During a December 5 meeting with poloff and MNF/I representative, senior Tawafuq bloc leader Adnan Dulaymi provided his version of events regarding a November 29 raid on his offices in the Mansour District of Baghdad. The joint ISF/MNF raid followed the shooting murder by one of Dulaymi's personal security detail (PSD) of the leader of a Concerned Local Citizen group in the Hay al Adel neighborhood of Mansour, in northwest Baghdad. During the raid, two car bombs were found (and later detonated) in a side-street alongside Dulaymi's office, along with evidence linking the bombs to his PSD. Dulayami first told poloff that he (Dulaymi) was the likely target of the car bombs, since he �0A;had been targeted many times over the past years. He next said that his son Makki recently warned MNF/I that his PSD has been infiltrated by "criminals." These people "should be punished," he said; "but what does my son have to do with it," he asked. "I have no relations with terrorists," he asserted. ¶3. (S) Dulaymi requested U.S. help to transfer his son and his PSD members from Iraqi Army to MNF/I custody to ensure their protection and fair treatment ("we trust you, but not the sectarian Iraqi Army"). His son Makki, he said, frequently helped MNF/I troops on security issues in the Hay al Adel neighborhood and was an ally of the U.S. Asked why he and his son had not fired "criminals" from among his PSD, Dulaymi stated that he had indeed fired "many of them," but could not be held responsible for the actions of "three of four" criminals. Dulaymi also requested U.S. assistance to ensure his freedom of movement to return to his home on November 6 in Hay al Adel. Asked his predictions on the incident's potential impact on the political process, Dulaymi believed efforts toward national reconciliation would be damaged ("if not treated with wisdom and logic"). Already, he said, there were demonstrations in Yathrib, Tikrit, and Fallujah to protest the investigation and detentions. He said that he requested National Security Adviser Mowafaq Rubaie and Planning Minister Ali Baban to arrange a meeting for him with PM Maliki. "Maybe if we get together," he said, "we can reach a solution to the political crisis." ¶4. (S) During a short discussion on benchmark legislation and the upcoming USG-GOI negotiations on a bilateral strategic partnership, Dulaymi said he was a strong supporter of a long-term U.S. presence in Iraq, as it "benefited the Sunnis." He accepted poloff's point that his efforts in Parliament and among his Tawafuq colleagues would be closely watched to measure that support. He said he was also supportive of a draft "De-Baathification" bill and was working to ensure its passage. -------------- Sunni Melt-down? -------------- BAGHDAD 00003955 002 OF 002 ¶5. (S) Although the Tawafuq bloc has been talking for several weeks with members of the Prime Minister's office over its potential return to government, local contacts and analysts believe the latest incident with Dulaymi will increase the likelihood that talks will fail. Senior Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) members also fear that the self-destruction of the Dulaymi camp (with eight of Tawafuq's 44 Parliament seats) will further fray the Sunni bloc and weaken its relative negotiating strength on key legislation. They also fear a collapse of the Sunni coalition, and the further alienation of its more hard-line Sunni allies in Dulaymi's Iraq People's Conference, and Khalaf Allyan's National Dialogue Council - both politically linked with elements of the Sunni insurgency. -------------- Allegations of Torture -------------- ¶6. (S) A senior adviser to Vice President Hashimi told poloff on December 5 that he heard Dulaymi's son was tortured while in GOI detention following the November 29 incident. Asked for the source of the information, he cited "inside sources" at the Ministry of Interior. Poloff cautioned that absent credible evidence of such torture, allegations like these were irresponsible and were likely to only fan the flames of sectarian violence and distrust. He responded that he would seek more specific evidence of torture, and stressed the importance of allowing legal counsel access to represent the accused. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶7. (S) The available physical evidence from the November 29 raid, along with Dulaymi's own admissions, are enough to warrant a serious investigation into the activities of his staff. Nonetheless, the political ramifications of the government's handling of the case are significant. So far, senior GOI figures have responded with relative sensitivity to the concerns raised by the Tawafuq bloc, allowing Dulaymi freedom of movement to move to the IZ and participate in sessions of Parliament. Doubtless, PM Maliki is pleased with events, as the spotlight has been placed directly on his Sunni counterparts, allowing him (without so much as uttering a word) to portray them as terrorists and, by extension, as the party guilty of political obstructionism. BUTENIS