SOUTH'S INDEPENDENT POLICE CHIEFS NEED U.S. SUPPORT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003951 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/05/2017 TAGS: PGOV IR IZ SUBJECT: SOUTH'S INDEPENDENT POLICE CHIEFS NEED U.S. SUPPORT Classified By: Deputy Political Counselor Greg D'Elia for reasons 1.4 ( b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is a joint Baghdad POL, PRT Babil, PRT Karbala, and PRT Muthanna cable. ¶2. (C) Summary: Recent events in Babil, Karbala and Muthanna demonstrate the precarious position of police officials willing to prosecute militias in southern Iraq. The political independence that makes these police officials effective also makes them vulnerable to attempts to remove them from office Coalition officials ) PRT, Embassy and MNF-I -- have intervened on behalf of police officials whose positions were in jeopardy. Continued engagement will be necessary to provide these independent officials with the political cover they need to remain in office. End Summary. ¶3. (C) Police officers in several southern governorates have proven willing and able to prosecute Shi'a militias, including armed groups belonging to Da'wa, Badr, and JAM. The political independence that makes these police officials effective makes them vulnerable to attempts to remove them, particularly if these attempts come from the national leadership. Sadrists and ISCI are both able to use their influence within the central government to remove local officials willing to prosecute their militias. PM Maliki's government at best condones and at worst actively supports these attempts. Babil: Chief's removal would lead to more violence -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C) IP Chief General Qais Hamza Abood al-Mamury, working with SWAT Commander BG Abbas al-Jaburi, has targeted armed elements linked to ISCI, Da'wa, and JAM. A political independent, Qais has protected both Sunni and Shi'a citizens and is one of the few local officials unmarred by accusations of graft, corruption, or sectarian bias. Qais has been targeted for assassination three times since June. Previous attempts to remove him from office by the governor and the MOI were stopped after intervention from the PRT. In December 2007, Qais received a letter from Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki removing him from duty in Babil province. PRT expects that Qais' replacement would be sympathetic to Shi'a militias, leading to increased sectarian violence and security risks for the REO and Coalition Forces (CF) in the province. Local residents told the PRT that Qais' removal would be an invitation for Shi'a militias to impose their own brand of law and persecute local Sunnis. Karbala: Da'wa unresponsive to threats against chief -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) In June 2007 Police Chief BG Ra'ad survived an assassination attempt and a vote of removal from the Provincial Council (PC). The vote came in response to Ra'ad's efforts to limit PC influence on police hiring and reduce the size of PC security details. Ra'ad has consistently complained about the lack of MOI support and expressed his belief that the MOI is furthering JAM's agenda. In November 2007, Ra'ad requested U.S. help due to threats against him and his family. In a discussion with the PRT, Karbala Governor Aqeel (Da'wa) said that Da'wa leadership knew of the threats but had not offered any assistance. Muthanna: Anti-JAM commander targeted by MOI -------------- ¶6. (C) Colonel Ali al-Khawam, leader of Muthanna's elite Criminal Intelligence Unit (CIU),is an effective anti-JAM commander who has succeeded in bringing JAM's influence in the province to an all-time low. He has survived multiple assassination attempts, including an EFP attack, as well as efforts from national JAM and Sadrist leaders to pressure the MOI to remove him from office. The assassination of governor Hassani robbed Khawam of his political cover and the latest effort to remove Khawam through the MOI failed only after MNF-I intervened on his behalf. Comment: Continued U.S. Engagement is Critical -------------- - ¶7. (C) Comment: Despite the relative calm, Shia parties and their militias are continuing to jockey for power and advance their own agendas in the south. If they succeed, the immediate losers of the ISCI-Sadr truce could be the police officials willing to enforce the law in southern Iraq. The removal of these officials would have serious consequences for U.S. interests, including regional security, reconciliation, and the establishment of rule of law and good governance. Continued PRT, Embassy, and MNF-I engagement will be necessary to provide these officials with the BAGHDAD 00003951 002 OF 002 political cover and protection they otherwise lack. High-level U.S. engagement should also be considered to emphasize our concern to PM Maliki's government over recent attempts to remove these police officials. End Comment. BUTENIS