SCENESETTER FOR SECRETARY GATES' VISIT TO IRAQ

S E C R E T BAGHDAD 003922

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

OSD FOR SECRETARY GATES FROM CDA BUTENIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/02/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR PTER ASEC OVIP IZ
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR SECRETARY GATES' VISIT TO IRAQ

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i. Patricia A. Butenis for reasons
1.4(b) and (d).


1. (S) Dear Mr. Secretary: Your visit to Iraq comes at a
critical time. Since the September testimony by the
Ambassador and Gen. Petraeus, we have seen further progress
on security: Anbar Province remains remarkably calm; the Sadr
ceasefire continues -- in general -- to hold; the threat from
Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) has been diminished; the CLC program
continues to flourish, though with some GOI reservations; and
the Turkey-PKK crisis appears to be contained for the moment,
though we will need to continue to press for political
dialogue which includes the KRG. With GOI assistance,
refugees are beginning to return to Iraq in increasing
numbers, although their return may be due as much to economic
necessity and dissatisfaction with their lot in neighboring
Arab states as to improved security here in Iraq. On the
political front, PM Maliki successfully weathered
late-September attempts by the opposition to organize a
no-confidence vote (although he may not be entirely out of
those woods yet),and he has recently taken steps to fill the
vacancies in his cabinet. Notwithstanding these positive
developments, there has been relatively little movement on
key legislation, and the 3 1 power sharing mechanism
enshrined in the August 26th leaders' communique is
essentially defunct -- primarily because relations between
Maliki and Vice President Hashimi are at a nadir. Maliki
remains a challenge for us as well: he did the right thing on
the Strategic Partnership Declaration, the wrong thing on
Annapolis, and is saying he will do the right thing -- not
ask to open the resolution -- on UNSCR renewal while
slow-rolling on the GOI letter. Your trip follows recent
visits by Deputy Secretary Negroponte, S/I Ambassador

Satterfield and U/S Jeffrey, who, in tandem with Ambassador
Crocker, have pressed the GOI leadership to take more
meaningful steps on reconciliation. While anything you can
do to reinforce those efforts will be appreciated, you will
probably want to focus your efforts on persuading Maliki to
stick with what he told Deputy Secretary Negroponte on
December 1 -- when he agreed to not insist on addressing
bilateral issues in the operative paragraphs of the UNSCR.

SECURITY
--------------


2. (S) A major factor in recent security gains has been the
emergence of the "Concerned Local Citizens" (CLC) movement,
now comprising roughly 65,000 personnel. We are working to
obtain complete GOI buy-in to the program, and to ensure that
CLCs remain committed to a secure and united Iraq. Since we
forecast that only about 20 percent of CLC personnel will
transition to permanent security-related careers in the Iraqi
Security Forces (ISF),the Embassy and MNF-I are working to
knit together various employment and training programs so
that the other 80 percent can develop employment skills and
have access to advanced technical training. These programs
currently include USAID's Community Stabilization Program
(CSP),a pilot Community Service Corps (CSC) program (funded
with CERP) and the DoD/GOI Joint Technical Education
Reintegration Program, just getting off the ground. Our goal
is to help beneficiaries, including CLC's, move from
dependence on our programs to longer term GOI-directed
opportunities, and in many cases to private sector
employment. The GOI will be a major partner in this process,
with the ultimate goal of GOI ownership and funding of these
programs. New funding sources for the interim stage are
urgently needed, however. The USAID CSP is currently funded
only through September 2008; present burn rate projections
indicate funds will be exhausted by mid-summer 2008. Unless
additional funds are received, programs will begin to ramp
down by no later than June 2008. At a ministerial level
briefing on CLCs on December 1, MNF-I agreed to the Prime
Minister's request not to develop CLCs in the southern
provinces. At the conclusion of the brief the Prime Minister
appeared to accept that the program was making an important
contribution to security and that effective supervision was
in place to identify the "bad apples."


3. (S) The Coalition is working closely with the GOI to
establish and operate nation-wide programs to allow militia
members to join the ISF or return to civilian life, but
successful implementation remains localized and limited. The
Coalition and other interested international organizations
(UNAMI and IOM) are helping Iraqi parties to draw on
programmatic advice and implementation resources to help
design and implement re-integration. PM Maliki's recent
announcement of re-hiring some former Ba'ath party cadres in
recognition of their efforts to battle AQI and his reported
pursuit of a general amnesty framework are both positive
developments.

4. (S) While there has been significant success in isolating
AQI and other Sunni irreconcilable elements in Anbar and
other areas, some in the Sunni community still lack
confidence that the Shia-majority government will protect
their interests; others fear attacks by Badr/JAM militias and
government-affiliated death squads; and, in the north, many
reject Kurdish expansionism. As a result, some Sunnis
continue to look to AQI and the insurgency for protection.
Among the Shia, the combination of JAM's attacks on Karbala's
Shia shrines, a reduced level of reciprocal sectarian
killing, and the mafia-style tactics of some Sadrist elements
have combined to diminish Jam's public prestige. Moqtada
al-Sadr's six-month "freeze" order has slowed but not stopped
JAM violence. Just as some Sunnis continue to look to AQI
and other extremists for protection, some in the Shia
community either seek or are obliged to seek the same from
JAM, Badr, and local gangs rather than GOI security personnel
who should be seen as the guarantors of public law and order,
the bedrock of good governance.

SPD/UNSCR/SOFA
--------------


5. (S) With the signing of the Strategic Partnership
Declaration (SPD) on November 26, we must now concentrate on
the renewal of the UNSCR to continue Coalition Forces
operating authorities. We expect negotiations with the GOI
to be intense, though we do not expect them to go down the
wire to the December 31 deadline. The GOI has been adamant
that there not be another Chapter VII resolution after 2008.
We have underscored to our interlocutors that the next UNSCR
must grant essentially the same authorities as the present
resolution to permit Coalition Forces to continue operations
crucial to security in Iraq. Underlying the negotiating
process will be the need to allay deep GOI anxieties about
the UNSCR undermining Iraqi sovereignty. PM Maliki,s closest
security advisors, particularly National Security Advisor
Muwafaq Rubaie, see themselves as the standard bearers for
sovereignty, and they have been empowered by the PM to
negotiate in this vein. Of deep concern to us now is
Maliki,s desire to reopen the operative paragraphs for
negotiation. By the time of your arrival, we hope to have
persuaded the PM that what is needed is a simple rollover;
bilateral issues should be negotiated bilaterally. You
should urge PM Maliki to conclude negotiations on UNSCR
renewal as quickly as possible, to enable both sides to
concentrate on the real work to be done, the negotiation of a
SOFA in the first half of 2008. A negotiating team is
tentatively scheduled to arrive in Baghdad in January to
begin this long process.

IRAN TRILATERAL
--------------


6. (S) Iran trilateral talks which we agreed to take part in
o/a November 24 did not take place, and the GOI continues to
seek alternative dates from Tehran. We hope that these talks
will take place sometime in the next few weeks, allowing us
to raise directly with the Iranians our concerns about
Iranian-provided lethal aid to illegal armed groups in Iraq.
Recent interrogations of detained JAM Special Groups members
have clearly established that the IRGC Qods Force has
continued to provide weapons training in Iran for Iraqi
militants since the purported promise by the Iranian
leadership to PM Maliki to cut lethal aid flowing into Iraq.
MNF-I released nine Iranians from detention in mid-November
(including two members of the IRGC-QF from the Irbil Five) in
an effort to create a more positive atmosphere in which the
talks could occur.

FOREIGN TERRORISTS & FACILITATORS
--------------


7. (S) The flow of foreign terrorists into Iraq continues to
be of great concern, underscored by the treasure trove of
Objective Massey documents obtained from the principal AQI
facilitator of foreign terrorist flow from Syria, Abu
Muthana, killed by Coalition Forces in mid-September. This
information details the identities of some 800 foreign
terrorists who entered Iraq in a 13-month period. Of note
was the number of individuals from Libya and North Africa,
particularly Tunisia, who had entered Iraq, which comprised
approximately 40% of all foreign terrorists rather than 20%
as previously estimated. PM Maliki is scheduled to be
briefed December 3 on intelligence derived from Objective
Massey, which has already been shared with services within
Iraq and throughout the region. Iraq has been engaging Syria
on this and other issues bilaterally and we are seeking to
facilitate regional cooperation through the Border Security
Working Group, part of the Neighbors Process. You may wish
to query Interior Minister Bulani on his views of Syrian and
source country efforts to stem the flow of foreign
terrorists; he traveled to Damascus and to a regional

interior ministers meeting in Kuwait in October.

TURKEY/PKK/KGK
--------------


8. (S) Your Iraqi counterpart,s recent trip to Ankara and
the subsequent trilateral meeting in Istanbul succeeded in
demonstrating to the Turks that both the GOI and USG are
serious in tackling the problem of the PKK/KGK presence in
Iraq. Continued PKK violence is fueling Turkish frustration
and generating pressure for kinetic action. Our ability to
convince them to continue to exercise restraint is
diminishing, although it does appear that any Turkish cross
border operation would be limited in scope and would not
destabilize the KRG.


9. (S) Your trip is a prime opportunity to express USG
appreciation for measures and actions by the authorities in
the north and in Baghdad to curtail PKK/KGK activities.
These measures are a good start, but our interlocutors need
to hear that these actions must be sustained and augmented.
While Turkey has said it is not interested in a PKK/KGK
ceasefire, every attack by the terrorists increases the
likelihood of the Turks taking action on their own. The
PKK/KGK needs to lay down their arms. PKK/KGK leaders should
be arrested, but to detain and release these individuals
would only make matters worse. Those detained should either
stand trial in Iraq or be sent back to Turkey. We are
working on ideas to prevent financial flows to the PKK/KGK in
Iraq, and considering requests to train airport personnel to
prevent the transit of PKK/KGK personnel through Irbil
airport.

RETURN OF REFUGEES
--------------


10. (S) A mixed batch of approximately 450 Sunni and Shia
refugees returned to Baghdad from Syria on November 28.
Iraqi ministers were on hand to greet the refugees upon
arrival, and the GOI provided each family with one million
dinars (approximately USD $800). USAID will follow up with
the Iraqi Ministry of Displacement and Migration to assess
and monitor the needs of the returnees. Meanwhile, the
Iraqis are assimilating lessons learned from the return of
this first tranche of refugees, in preparation for future
refugee returns.

DYSFUNCTIONAL GOVERNMENT
--------------


11. (S) Of the 36 cabinet seats within the Maliki government,
a healthy chunk remain empty due to walk-outs by the Sunni
Tawafuq bloc, the Sadrist bloc, the Iraqiya bloc, and
Fadilah. Their complaints vary but all remain deeply
suspicious of Maliki and his backers, complaining that their
ability to affect change or deliver services to their
constituencies was severely hampered by the Prime Minister.
Talks have just started with Tawafuq to return to government,
and a group of technocratic nominees may be sent to the
Parliament soon to replace the other parties. With the Shia
and Kurdish alliance keeping the government afloat, Maliki
has had little incentive to be flexible or conciliatory. In
the wake of the security surge, however, political conditions
have altered just enough to perhaps allow for a new coalition
of parties and ministers led by Maliki, pursuing a less
sectarian agenda. The litmus test, of course, will be this
coalition's ability to achieve passage of benchmark
legislation and meaningful reconciliation. Meanwhile, local
developments in the provinces continue to outpace the central
government's ability to define the national political agenda.


LEGISLATIVE UPDATE
--------------


12. (S) De-Baathification: A second reading of the
De-Baathification Law took place December 1. Our next task
will be to get the law to a third and final reading/vote
before the Council of Representatives is unable to muster a
quorum due to the hajj, which begins at the end of the first
full week of December.


13. (S) Elections Law: The PM's office (PMO) has prepared a
partial working draft, but feels little urgency to complete
its work -- in large part because neither Da'wa nor its
principal allies (ISCI and the Kurds) stand to gain by
holding early provincial elections.


14. (S) Provincial Powers Law: At least two drafts of the law
are reportedly with the Shura Council for legal review. The
drafts have apparently stalled there due largely to
opposition from PM Maliki, who believes the current drafts
concede too much power to the provinces.


15. (S) CPA 17: The Council of Ministers approved a draft
law rescinding CPA 17 but it has not yet been submitted to
the CoR. Given widespread public support for asserting Iraqi
sovereignty over private security firms, once the law is
submitted it could move quickly through the normally
hidebound CoR procedures. We recommend that you reinforce
with GOI officials USG concerns about the law and press them
against sending it to the CoR. We also must continue to
stress our concerns with Maliki and ask that the law be held
in the PM,s Office pending further bilateral discussion with
the USG.


16. (S) Hydrocarbons: Hydrocarbons framework legislation
remains stalled. PM Maliki, who repeatedly assured us that
he had the votes for passage, now asserts the GOI should
build a stronger consensus on the hydrocarbons package before
proceeding. Left unchecked, Maliki's position will lead to
further delays. Key decision-makers need to hear that it is
time to stop quibbling about details, since every day that
passes delays much-needed investment opportunities that would
raise revenue in absolute terms for all of Iraq.


17. (S) The situation has not been helped by the KRG's
passage of its own hydrocarbons law, nor by a raft of
non-transparent, unilateral deals. The KRG obtained a
favorable arrangement in the February draft 2007 hydrocarbon
law, and KRG PM Barzani is in need of a firm message to stop
the stalling and finalize the deal agreed to in February,
both to maximize potential economic returns to Iraq and to
reinforce national unity. Finally, the national government
and Oil Minister Shahristani, in particular, need to stop
sniping at the KRG and Barzani, and to stop trying to walk
back the February compromise (by putting into question the
ability of regions to conclude PSAs).


BEYOND THE GREEEN ZONE
--------------


18. (S) Coalition capacity building efforts in the central
and local government continues, focusing on supporting
government activities that contribute to improved delivery of
essential services and political reconciliation. A
particular priority is ensuring that Sunni and
mixed-population provinces no longer feel discriminated
against by the central government. Governance issues
contributing to poor service delivery include a weak and
highly-centralized bureaucracy with poor coordination between
Baghdad ministries and their provincial representatives. The
Coalition, particularly through our PRTs, has facilitated
better coordination, particularly in helping provincial
officials better register their concerns and lobby the
central government for release of funds and services.


19. (U) I look forward to welcoming you to Baghdad. Warm
regards.
BUTENIS