KRG OFFICIALS DISCUSS WITH DEPUTY SECRETARY LACK

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 003915 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/01/2017 TAGS: PGOV PTER EPET ENRG TU IZ SUBJECT: KRG OFFICIALS DISCUSS WITH DEPUTY SECRETARY LACK OF POLITICAL PROGRESS, HYDROCARBONS, TURKEY/PKK AND MOSUL Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Patricia A. Butenis for reasons 1.4 (b ) and (d). This is an Erbil Regional Reconstruction Team message. Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) In November 28-29 meetings with Deputy Secretary Negroponte, S/I Satterfield, Ambassador Charles Ries, and Senior Advisor David Pearce, KRG PM Barzani and VP Rasoul praised Iraq,s improved security while criticizing PM Maliki,s failing performance and cautioning that security gains could be undone by flagging political progress. Barzani stated that the KRG would soon more actively wield its parliamentary influence to drive political change in Baghdad. Barzani claimed the KRG was waiting however until the Security Council adopted a new Chapter 7 United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) to authorize Multi-National Forces-Iraq (MNF-I) for another year as well as the conclusion of the Declaration of Principles for a Long-Term Relationship of Cooperation and Friendship (aka the strategic agreement) with the United States. PM Barzani agreed in principle to a process to move past the technical difficulties in concluding the KRG,s hydrocarbon legislation. That process would include harmonizing the July and February texts of the hydrocarbon law, determining a precise list of oil fields, and agreeing to the revenue sharing law. Barzani and Rasoul agreed that continued coordination on combating the PKK was necessary and welcomed the opportunity for engagement and intelligence sharing; and agreed to cooperate on fighting a growing Al-Qaida threat moving north as insurgents are denied sanctuary in southern and central provinces. Barzani noted the recent visit of United Nations Special Representative De Mistura as &excellent,8 and agreed a new way forward on Article 140 is needed with U.S. and UN help. End summary. PM Barzani: Security Gains Can Be Undone by Lack of Political Progress; Maliki,s Performance: &A Failure; Time to See Some Changes8 -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani and Vice President Kosrat Rasoul praised the overall improved security situation in Iraq but cautioned that the improvements would be undermined without parallel political progress in Baghdad. They criticized Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki for his lack of flexibility in dealing with issues, unwillingness to change, and lack of political progress. PM Barzani complained that Maliki,s reluctance to share authority for key portfolios had created a system that failed to function. Barzani said the KRG was &tired of dealing with Maliki;8 that he was unable to establish good working relations with other political groups; and that despite the KRG,s past support for the prime minister, it was &time to see some changes.8 ¶3. (C) Deputy Secretary Negroponte and S/I Satterfield noted our concern over the lack of political progress and encouraged Barzani to use the Kurdish party bloc,s parliamentary leverage to impact policy and send a message to PM Maliki that more needed to be done to move forward on critical issues. Barzani took the point but claimed that the KRG was waiting first for the adoption of the next UNSCR authorizing the MNF as well as for the conclusion of the strategic agreement with the United States. The KRG, Barzani claimed, did not want to complicate progress on those vital issues. He indicated that he would take up the issue with President Masoud Barzani, who would be returning in early December from medical treatment in Germany. KRG Agrees to Process to Push Past Hydrocarbon Impasse -------------- -- ¶4. (C) The Deputy Secretary raised the lack of progress on resolving the hydrocarbon legislation issues and stressed that the legislative agenda needed to move forward in step with security improvements in order to show tangible results. Left unresolved, the hydrocarbon issue risked undermining U.S. political and public support for Iraq and could scare off large oil and gas investors over time. PM Barzani expressed willingness to resolve the issue but indicated the KRG,s misgivings over Baghdad,s moves to exert more centralized control over the industry. Trust was the issue. He indicated that the KRG was ready to sign the revenue sharing law -- with nothing to add to it, but took issue with the article in the February text of the hydrocarbon law that allowed for KRG contracts/production sharing agreements (PSAs) to be reviewed by &Baghdad,8 arguing this was BAGHDAD 00003915 002 OF 003 tantamount to a veto. ¶5. (C) Ambassador Ries clarified that the February text, in accordance with the constitution, provided for a 60-day review of contracts by the independent Federal Oil and Gas Council; that the hydrocarbon law, together with the revenue sharing law, guaranteed a regional role in the oil and gas sector; and that as oil prices rose, the KRG,s influence in the sector would rise )- provided the legislative package was concluded as soon as possible. Responding to Barzani,s concerns, Ambassador Ries proposed (1) convening a non-political technical committee to correct the July draft of the law (which Barzani complained the Shura Council had substantively altered) so that it was consistent with the February text; and (2) and to open negotiations on a precise and accurate list of oil and gas fields according to the following four categories: (a) discovered and developed; (b) discovered and near-developed )- categories that the Iraqi government would control; (c) discovered and far-from-developed; (d) not discovered )- categories in which regional PSAs could apply. Ries stressed that the package would need to include a corrected and agreed February text, a precise list of fields, and an agreed revenue sharing law; and that it all must be legally sound and possible to implement. The KRG,s trust issues could be resolved by a close eye to oversee the process, and that this process offered the advantages of a definitive time frame, clear parameters, and an absence of political influence. PM Barzani indicated the KRG would want to review the make-up of the technical committee but agreed to the process as a way forward. Ambassador Ries said that the Secretary has asked Under Secretary Reuben Jeffery to travel to Iraq in the coming weeks to discuss next steps. Situation with Turkey Calming: Ongoing Need for Coordination on PKK -------------- --- ¶6. (C) The Deputy Secretary noted that the situation with Turkey over the PKK had calmed but stressed the need for continued consultation and cooperation, including in the area of intelligence, between Iraq and the U.S. The situation still required great care and coordination of effort between the U.S., Iraq, the KRG, and Turkey, and we needed to do the maximum to avoid any destabilizing action by Turkey. Ambassador Negroponte expressed appreciation for measures the KRG has taken to date to counter the PKK and pointed to the potential for developing a stronger Iraqi-Turkish strategic relationship once the PKK threat was resolved. Vice President Rasoul offered that the KRG stood ready to coordinate with the other governments on the PKK issue, but turned to the familiar argument that support for the PKK would dissolve if the rights of Kurds in Turkey were respected. A general amnesty (by Turkey for the PKK) would change the overall dynamic of the problem. The Deputy Secretary responded that one could support democratic rights SIPDIS for the Kurdish people in Turkey while rejecting and confronting terrorism; the two were not mutually exclusive )- the question was how to apply both principles effectively. Ambassador Satterfield noted that the Kurds, situation in Turkey was moving forward; that any military action would jeopardize this progress; and that the PKK,s strategy had less to do with agitating for Kurdish rights than with polarizing Turkish politics by destabilizing southeastern Turkey. PM Barzani said there was broad agreement that the PKK was a problem, and Vice President Rasoul welcomed the opportunity for continued engagement on the issue. Support for New Mosul Operations Command -------------- ¶7. (C) Senior Advisor David Pearce noted that Ambassador Crocker had asked that we raise the GOI's intent to establish a Mosul Operations Command. This has our full support. The GOI also will appoint MG Riyad as commander of the MOC. He has our full support, and we expect our friends to cooperate with him as we try to calm the atmosphere and face a common AQI enemy in Ninewa. Ambassador Satterfield stressed our critical operational concern (as we increased pressure on Al-Qaida elements) to continue to deny them opportunities to regroup and gain strength in KRG border areas. Barzani readily agreed to cooperate seriously in confronting Al-Qaida as it looked for new havens in the north. Barzani Open to UN Involvement on Article 140 -------------- ¶8. (C) On Article 140, Barzani said that time is heading to the end point; a solution is needed. United Nations Special BAGHDAD 00003915 003.2 OF 003 Representative De Mistura visited Erbil and it was &excellent8 to have him here, Barzani noted. We want the U.S. to engage on Article 140 and have the United Nations help us technically. We need to find a way out by end of the year and avoid problems with public reaction to further delays. Ambassador Satterfield replied we fully support and encourage implementation of Article 140, but agree there will not be resolution by year,s end. We hold the same position as yours on UN involvement. ¶9. (U) The Deputy Secretary's party has cleared this cable. BUTENIS