Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BAGHDAD3911
2007-12-02 12:23:00
SECRET
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:
CG AND CDA DISCUSS FOREIGN FIGHTERS AND SYRIA,
VZCZCXRO1754 OO RUEHDE DE RUEHGB #3911/01 3361223 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 021223Z DEC 07 FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4607 INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY RUEHBC/REO BASRAH PRIORITY 2288 RUEHKUK/REO KIRKUK PRIORITY 2228 RUEHIHL/REO HILLAH PRIORITY 2231 RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 003911
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/30/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS MARR IZ
SUBJECT: CG AND CDA DISCUSS FOREIGN FIGHTERS AND SYRIA,
TURKEY AND THE PKK, AND UNSCR WITH PM
REF: BAGHDAD 03874
BAGHDAD 00003911 001.3 OF 003
Classified By: CDA Patricia Butenis for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 003911
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/30/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS MARR IZ
SUBJECT: CG AND CDA DISCUSS FOREIGN FIGHTERS AND SYRIA,
TURKEY AND THE PKK, AND UNSCR WITH PM
REF: BAGHDAD 03874
BAGHDAD 00003911 001.3 OF 003
Classified By: CDA Patricia Butenis for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (S) Summary: In a wide-ranging hour-long
meeting Thursday, November 29, MNF-I Commanding General
David Petraeus and Charge Patricia Butenis reviewed efforts
with Prime Minister Maliki to stem the flow of Foreign
Terrorists (FTs) from Syria and
elsewhere, possible limited Turkish military action against
the PKK inside northern Iraq, and progress on renewing the
UNSCR that authorizes Multi-National Force (MNF) operations
in Iraq. They also touched briefly on improvements in the
security situation in Baghdad and the public perception of
the improved situation, further funding of Concerned Local
Citizen (CLC) groups, releasing detainees and amnesty,
disposition of yellow cake from the Tuwaitha nuclear
facility, and Provincial Iraqi Control for Basrah on
December 16. End Summary.
Foreign Terrorists
--------------
2. (S) The CG and PM Maliki reviewed the success in driving
Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) from Baghdad and its near suburbs.
They agreed that Coalition efforts supported by AQI had
denied any safe haven to AQI in Baghdad. Though AQI could
still cause trouble and commit acts of violence, the CG
noted that without safe havens it could not mount serious
attacks. The battle against AQI was not over, but AQI was
certainly reeling from the Coalition and ISF attacks on
it. Maliki revealed that he had intelligence indicating
that Omar al Baghdadi was depressed - his network had been
taken apart and his attempts at action are usually thwarted
at the outset. CG noted that this success was due in part
to Syrian cooperation in stopping FTs using Syria to
reach Iraq. Maliki said that he had received assurances
from Basher al-Assad that Syria would stop FTs and that
Maliki should let Assad know if the flow was not stopped.
CG and Maliki agreed that Assad was sincere but that some
of his subordinates might still be facilitating movements
of FTs. CG noted that he would like to go to Damascus with
LTG McCrystal to meet with select Syrian leaders, perhaps
including Assad, to discus actions after FT transit of Syria.
He added that he would be sharing with Maliki details of the
FTs situation in a briefing on Monday, December 3.
Turkey/PKK
--------------
3. (S) CG told Maliki that additional Turkish action
against the PKK inside Iraq remained likely, but that it
would be carefully targeted against the PKK and not a
massive Cross Border Operation (CBO). Maliki asked if the
U.S. was assisting or might undertake separate military
action. CG replied that the U.S. was assisting the Turks
only with support by various intelligence assets
to ensure that they targeted PKK and not Iraqis. CG
stated clearly that MNF would not being taking action -
"we are helping them be more precise" - and that action
taken would be by the Turks. CG reminded Maliki of the
importance the Turks and the U.S. attach to continued
efforts by the GOI and the KRG to interdict the PKK.
In response, Maliki noted that Erdogan had initially
doubted the sincerity of the GOI and the KRG, but now
appeared to accept that Maliki's government as well as
most in the KRG leadership were serious about tackling
the PKK. CG agreed, noting the valuable role played by
KRG PM Nerchivan Barzani. Both agreed that it would be
helpful for senior KRG leaders to travel to Ankara,
including President Talabani.
UNSCR
--------------
4. (S) Charge stressed the importance of following
up the success on the Declaration of Principles on
Cooperation and Friendship, signed November 26 by POTUS and
the PM via SVTC, with progress on the Iraqi letter to the
UN Security Council requesting a new resolution. Noting
all the hard work by the PM's team and USG personnel on the
declaration, she underlined the need to have a good letter
reach New York no later than Monday, December 3 to have
sufficient time at the UNSC to craft this final
resolution. Maliki took the point and indicated that he
BAGHDAD 00003911 002.3 OF 003
saw no reason why the letter should not be ready in the
time needed.
Detainees
--------------
5. (S) CG and Maliki shared ideas on how to release large
numbers of detainees held by MNF-I or the GOI to offer
amnesty to many of its prisoners. They agreed that while a
hard core of MNF-I detainees, about six to eight thousand,
as well as Iraqi prisoners guilty of serious crimes such as
murder or acts of terrorism could not be released, many
thousands could and should be set free after review. CG
noted he had just visited Camp Bucca and was pleased with
the changes to prepare detainees for return to society.
He subsequently instructed his commanders to increase review
board staffing and to accelerate the review process. Maliki
noted similar actions in the Iraqi courts and repeated his
commitment to an amnesty that would release many prisoners,
excepting those guilty of serious crimes or those with
pending concomitant civil lawsuits. In response to
National Security Advisor (NSA) Muwaffaq Rubaie's question
if Iraqi Islamic Party imams are in charge of religious
education, CG noted that the Imans in Camp Bucca teach
patience and moderation; none are extremist. In fact, the
general population had gathered up the Takfiri prisoners
(extremists) and locked them in the bathrooms - MNF-I
released them directly into high security cells. Maliki
smiled and took the point. The CG then presented Maliki
with artwork produced by one of the detainees in Bucca.
Basrah PIC
--------------
6. (S) CG indicated that he agreed with the PM's suggested
changes to the MOU on PIC for Basrah. He foresaw the
ceremony taking place December 16 at the Basrah airfield.
In reply to NSA Rubaie's question, CG said that either the
Governor or Deputy Governor could sign the MOU on behalf of
the GOI, it was up to the PM, though it
would be better if the Governor signed. Maliki stated that
he had no personal problems with Governor Wa'eli of Basrah
- the courts had confirmed his legal status and that was
enough for him to settle Wa'eli's status. Advised
that Wa'eli might come to Baghdad on December 1, Maliki
reaffirmed his willingness to meet with Wa'eli, even
stating that he would like to meet with him.
Redeveloping Basrah
--------------
7. (S) CG and Maliki discussed proposals by Iraqi
businessman and entrepreneur Hanna Sheikh to re-develop
the port of Basrah. Maliki noted he had spoken with him
several times but remained skeptical. CG pressed him to
keep an open mind and to think of the long-term job
creation and economic development Hanna Sheikh's projects
would create. Maliki promised to work with him.
Tuwaitha Yellowcake
--------------
8. (S) Charge raised the issue of disposal of uranium
yellowcake currently located at the Tuwaitha Nuclear
Research Facility. She told Maliki it would be best for
Iraq to move it out for reprocessing and sell it. In
response to his question, Charge replied that the U.S.
was not going to buy it but would like to see it disposed
of in a manner to yield Iraq the greatest profit. CG
offered US assistance in helping GOI officials determine
best disposition and sales method, but reiterated that the
yellowcake needed to be moved out of Iraq while a large
Coalition force is present. Attempting humor, Rubaie
asked if Iraq could sell it to Iran - Charge made it clear
that would not be acceptable.
Polling Results
--------------
9. (S) CG gave Maliki polling data MNF-I's local polling
contractor had gathered (from 2,400 Baghdadis) that
indicated Baghdadis felt more secure and more confident
in the GOI's ability to handle security in the capital.
CG noted that Maliki's approval rating had risen thirteen
points since October,s poll - an increase in approval
rating any leader would envy. Maliki took the point and
BAGHDAD 00003911 003.3 OF 003
smiled.
CLCs
--------------
10. (S) CG noted that USD 150 million had been identified
to support CLC members and provide employment for them and
that he hoped the Government of Iraq would match the funds
Further discussion of CLCs will take place on Sunday,
December 2 at the weekly Ministerial Council on National
Security (reftel).
BUTENIS
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/30/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS MARR IZ
SUBJECT: CG AND CDA DISCUSS FOREIGN FIGHTERS AND SYRIA,
TURKEY AND THE PKK, AND UNSCR WITH PM
REF: BAGHDAD 03874
BAGHDAD 00003911 001.3 OF 003
Classified By: CDA Patricia Butenis for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (S) Summary: In a wide-ranging hour-long
meeting Thursday, November 29, MNF-I Commanding General
David Petraeus and Charge Patricia Butenis reviewed efforts
with Prime Minister Maliki to stem the flow of Foreign
Terrorists (FTs) from Syria and
elsewhere, possible limited Turkish military action against
the PKK inside northern Iraq, and progress on renewing the
UNSCR that authorizes Multi-National Force (MNF) operations
in Iraq. They also touched briefly on improvements in the
security situation in Baghdad and the public perception of
the improved situation, further funding of Concerned Local
Citizen (CLC) groups, releasing detainees and amnesty,
disposition of yellow cake from the Tuwaitha nuclear
facility, and Provincial Iraqi Control for Basrah on
December 16. End Summary.
Foreign Terrorists
--------------
2. (S) The CG and PM Maliki reviewed the success in driving
Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) from Baghdad and its near suburbs.
They agreed that Coalition efforts supported by AQI had
denied any safe haven to AQI in Baghdad. Though AQI could
still cause trouble and commit acts of violence, the CG
noted that without safe havens it could not mount serious
attacks. The battle against AQI was not over, but AQI was
certainly reeling from the Coalition and ISF attacks on
it. Maliki revealed that he had intelligence indicating
that Omar al Baghdadi was depressed - his network had been
taken apart and his attempts at action are usually thwarted
at the outset. CG noted that this success was due in part
to Syrian cooperation in stopping FTs using Syria to
reach Iraq. Maliki said that he had received assurances
from Basher al-Assad that Syria would stop FTs and that
Maliki should let Assad know if the flow was not stopped.
CG and Maliki agreed that Assad was sincere but that some
of his subordinates might still be facilitating movements
of FTs. CG noted that he would like to go to Damascus with
LTG McCrystal to meet with select Syrian leaders, perhaps
including Assad, to discus actions after FT transit of Syria.
He added that he would be sharing with Maliki details of the
FTs situation in a briefing on Monday, December 3.
Turkey/PKK
--------------
3. (S) CG told Maliki that additional Turkish action
against the PKK inside Iraq remained likely, but that it
would be carefully targeted against the PKK and not a
massive Cross Border Operation (CBO). Maliki asked if the
U.S. was assisting or might undertake separate military
action. CG replied that the U.S. was assisting the Turks
only with support by various intelligence assets
to ensure that they targeted PKK and not Iraqis. CG
stated clearly that MNF would not being taking action -
"we are helping them be more precise" - and that action
taken would be by the Turks. CG reminded Maliki of the
importance the Turks and the U.S. attach to continued
efforts by the GOI and the KRG to interdict the PKK.
In response, Maliki noted that Erdogan had initially
doubted the sincerity of the GOI and the KRG, but now
appeared to accept that Maliki's government as well as
most in the KRG leadership were serious about tackling
the PKK. CG agreed, noting the valuable role played by
KRG PM Nerchivan Barzani. Both agreed that it would be
helpful for senior KRG leaders to travel to Ankara,
including President Talabani.
UNSCR
--------------
4. (S) Charge stressed the importance of following
up the success on the Declaration of Principles on
Cooperation and Friendship, signed November 26 by POTUS and
the PM via SVTC, with progress on the Iraqi letter to the
UN Security Council requesting a new resolution. Noting
all the hard work by the PM's team and USG personnel on the
declaration, she underlined the need to have a good letter
reach New York no later than Monday, December 3 to have
sufficient time at the UNSC to craft this final
resolution. Maliki took the point and indicated that he
BAGHDAD 00003911 002.3 OF 003
saw no reason why the letter should not be ready in the
time needed.
Detainees
--------------
5. (S) CG and Maliki shared ideas on how to release large
numbers of detainees held by MNF-I or the GOI to offer
amnesty to many of its prisoners. They agreed that while a
hard core of MNF-I detainees, about six to eight thousand,
as well as Iraqi prisoners guilty of serious crimes such as
murder or acts of terrorism could not be released, many
thousands could and should be set free after review. CG
noted he had just visited Camp Bucca and was pleased with
the changes to prepare detainees for return to society.
He subsequently instructed his commanders to increase review
board staffing and to accelerate the review process. Maliki
noted similar actions in the Iraqi courts and repeated his
commitment to an amnesty that would release many prisoners,
excepting those guilty of serious crimes or those with
pending concomitant civil lawsuits. In response to
National Security Advisor (NSA) Muwaffaq Rubaie's question
if Iraqi Islamic Party imams are in charge of religious
education, CG noted that the Imans in Camp Bucca teach
patience and moderation; none are extremist. In fact, the
general population had gathered up the Takfiri prisoners
(extremists) and locked them in the bathrooms - MNF-I
released them directly into high security cells. Maliki
smiled and took the point. The CG then presented Maliki
with artwork produced by one of the detainees in Bucca.
Basrah PIC
--------------
6. (S) CG indicated that he agreed with the PM's suggested
changes to the MOU on PIC for Basrah. He foresaw the
ceremony taking place December 16 at the Basrah airfield.
In reply to NSA Rubaie's question, CG said that either the
Governor or Deputy Governor could sign the MOU on behalf of
the GOI, it was up to the PM, though it
would be better if the Governor signed. Maliki stated that
he had no personal problems with Governor Wa'eli of Basrah
- the courts had confirmed his legal status and that was
enough for him to settle Wa'eli's status. Advised
that Wa'eli might come to Baghdad on December 1, Maliki
reaffirmed his willingness to meet with Wa'eli, even
stating that he would like to meet with him.
Redeveloping Basrah
--------------
7. (S) CG and Maliki discussed proposals by Iraqi
businessman and entrepreneur Hanna Sheikh to re-develop
the port of Basrah. Maliki noted he had spoken with him
several times but remained skeptical. CG pressed him to
keep an open mind and to think of the long-term job
creation and economic development Hanna Sheikh's projects
would create. Maliki promised to work with him.
Tuwaitha Yellowcake
--------------
8. (S) Charge raised the issue of disposal of uranium
yellowcake currently located at the Tuwaitha Nuclear
Research Facility. She told Maliki it would be best for
Iraq to move it out for reprocessing and sell it. In
response to his question, Charge replied that the U.S.
was not going to buy it but would like to see it disposed
of in a manner to yield Iraq the greatest profit. CG
offered US assistance in helping GOI officials determine
best disposition and sales method, but reiterated that the
yellowcake needed to be moved out of Iraq while a large
Coalition force is present. Attempting humor, Rubaie
asked if Iraq could sell it to Iran - Charge made it clear
that would not be acceptable.
Polling Results
--------------
9. (S) CG gave Maliki polling data MNF-I's local polling
contractor had gathered (from 2,400 Baghdadis) that
indicated Baghdadis felt more secure and more confident
in the GOI's ability to handle security in the capital.
CG noted that Maliki's approval rating had risen thirteen
points since October,s poll - an increase in approval
rating any leader would envy. Maliki took the point and
BAGHDAD 00003911 003.3 OF 003
smiled.
CLCs
--------------
10. (S) CG noted that USD 150 million had been identified
to support CLC members and provide employment for them and
that he hoped the Government of Iraq would match the funds
Further discussion of CLCs will take place on Sunday,
December 2 at the weekly Ministerial Council on National
Security (reftel).
BUTENIS