SHIA POLITICIANS NOT ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT MOVING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003904

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/30/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ
SUBJECT: SHIA POLITICIANS NOT ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT MOVING
ARTICLE 140 AHEAD

REF: BAGHDAD 3878

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Classified By: Classified By Senior Advisor David Pearce for reasons 1.
4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: The first step toward resolving complicated
Article 140 territorial issues, including Kirkuk, is for
Iraq's political leadership to come to agreement on the way
forward, according to Council of Representatives (CoR)
Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Humam Hamoudi (ISCI bloc
leader, Shia). He told Senior Advisor that the Article 140
mechanism was vague and there are many complicated issues
underlying it. It will be difficult for the Iraqi political
parties to come to an agreement on their own, so facilitation
by a third party may be necessary. He saw two avenues of
approach -- step-by-step implementation of the constitution
or brokering an overall political agreement. Meanwhile, the
Prime Minister's Advisor on Tribal Affairs, Dr. Fa'al Niamah
Al-Alayawi, urged a delay in considering the issue until
Constitutional reform was complete. Senior Advisor observed
to both that rising Kurdish-Arab tensions in the north made
it destabilizing to prolong the uncertainty over how the
issue would be handled, so we should focus on finding a fair,
transparent process that could be agreed all parties. End
Summary

Hamoudi Encourages U.S. Engagement
--------------


2. (C) Hamoudi told Senior Advisor 11/25 that Article 140 is
part of the Iraqi Constitution. ISCI had agreed to support
it as part of the Constitution because the party had needed
the Kurds to form a government. He originally thought the
article must be applied in all of its details, but it has
become clear over time that the article's vague language has
caused problems. Hamoudi said the process of "normalization"
(adjudicating the claims and needs of those forcibly moved in
and out of various areas during the Saddam era) is under way.
But with regard to territorial issues, there are questions.
For example, with regard to Kirkuk, it is unclear from the
language of the article whether it refers to the province or
the city. The Presidency Council is supposed to reach
collective agreement on proposed boundary changes. But the
conduct of a referendum on the matter is a problem because no
one has as yet determined the question to be posed in the
referendum. Nor has it been settled how and where the
referendum will be conducted -- countrywide, or only in
Kirkuk province, or Kirkuk city, and/or in disputed
territories in Diyala, Salah ad-Din, Ninewa and elsewhere.
Furthermore, there is an issue with the article's provision
for a census -- should voter registration really be via the
1957 census or via some other mechanism?


3. (C) He speculated that the people of Kirkuk province could
decide to form their own region, although the Kurdish parties
would probably not accept that solution. Another possibility
was that political leaders could agree to changes such as
moving the Sunni Arab-dominated district of Hawija to Salah
ad-Din province. He noted that there are other political
issues, e.g. the Turkmen are a significant component of the
Kirkuk city population, but weak politically. Hamoudi
concluded that the complications were such that it was hard
to see how boundary changes could be worked out at a purely
Iraqi level; recourse to a third party may be needed.


4. (C) In response to the Senior Advisor's question about the
practical steps required from the Iraqi government to achieve
consensus on the way forward, Hamoudi urged Senior Advisor to
talk to Vice President Hashimi and get the buy-in of the 3 1.
But, he cautioned, any decision should be in writing and
signed by all parties or else there would be a risk one of
them (read: Vice President Hashimi) could claim later he did
not agree.


5. (C) On ultimate resolution of the issue, Hamoudi said
perhaps the entire Article 140 did not need to be
implemented, instead a settlement could be worked out that is
acceptable to all parties. He felt there were two possible
approaches: to call for the strict interpretation of the
Constitution (i.e., step-by-step implementation) or to broker
an overall equitable solution.

PM Advisor Prefers Constitutional Reform First
-------------- -


6. (C) According to the Prime Minister's Advisor on Tribal
Affairs, Dr. Fa'al Niamah Al-Alayawi (Shia),a political
solution in the north required true reform and stopping what
he termed the division of Iraq. It was necessary to bridge
the mistrust that has built up between the GOI and Iraqis and
get the terrorists out of Mosul and Kirkuk. In a November 23
meeting, also attended by Shaykh Mohsin Nayif al Jabar, a

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Sunni tribal advisor to the Prime Minister from Ninewa
province, Fa'al asserted to Senior Advisor that the Kurds
sought to control certain territories in Mosul, Kirkuk and
Diyala in order to achieve their future dreams. "I am not
against the Kurdish region," Fa'al asserted; "I am against
what they are trying to do within Iraq that is damaging to
Iraqi unity."


7. (C) Solving Kirkuk now is a political problem, not a
technical one, Fa'al said. The Kurds have expanded into
Kirkuk and the KRG influence there is greater than that of
the provincial council. Fa'al urged that the U.S. listen to
ground truth from the locals and pressure the Kurds to delay
implementation until after Constitutional reform is
completed. We don't mind moving ahead with normalization and
compensation, he said, but resolution of Kirkuk's status
vis--vis the KRG should be delayed. It is okay to return
Kirkuk province to its original boundaries, Fa'al said,
echoing Hamoudi's suggestion that Kirkuk province might then
vote to become its own region, instead of joining the KRG.
But he maintained that Transitional Administrative Law 58,
from which Article 140 was derived, is flawed.
Constitutional reform should be completed first; the Arabs
and Turkmen want Article 140 delayed.


8. (C) Senior Advisor noted that Kurdish public opinion was
anxious for resolution, yet Arab and Turkmen public opinion
felt at a political disadvantage and reluctant to proceed.
So while it was difficult to move ahead it was also
destabilizing for uncertainty to persist. The issue was
reaching agreement on a fair and transparent process.


9. (C) Comment: Hamoudi seemed to favor a stepped-up effort
to address the issues in moving forward on Article 140, but
ticked off a list of complications to make the point that
there were many aspects to resolve and the process should not
be rushed. When he referred to recourse to a third party, it
was clear he meant not only the possibility of UN
facilitation but also active US engagement. Left unsaid in
the Foreign Relations Committee chairman's comment about the
Turkmen being weak politically was the implication that
Turkey retains an active interest in the issue.
BUTENIS