BRITISH AMBASSADOR TO IRAN: IRAN SEES U.S. AS ITS

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 003903 SIPDIS SIPDIS LONDON PLEASE PASS TO GAYLE E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/29/2027 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER IR IQ SUBJECT: BRITISH AMBASSADOR TO IRAN: IRAN SEES U.S. AS ITS BIGGEST STRATEGIC ISSUE BAGHDAD 00003903 001.3 OF 004 Classified By: by CDA Patricia Butenis for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 1.(S) Summary: In the course of several meetings with U.S. officials, UK Ambassador to Iran Geoffrey Adams laid out the following perspectives of the current state-of-play in Iran and Iran,s views of the situation in Iraq in advance of the next rounds of trilateral talks. He said Iran,s relationship with the U.S. is the biggest strategic issue facing the country, and he believes views are divided how to deal with the U.S. While reactions he heard to the previous trilateral discussions on Iraq were lukewarm, he believed they had triggered an internal debate over Iran,s strategic interests. That said, he thought there were pockets inside the Iranian government lobbying to shut down the talks. He maintained that Iran,s strategies on all issues ) Iraq, nuclear, the U.S., etc, -- were intertwined, and Iran sees Iraq, in part, as a tool in its broader strategy to counteract the U.S. threat. Iran,s top priority in relation to Iraq was that its territory not be used to launch an attack against Iran -- by the Iraqi government, the U.S., or any terrorist groups. He underscored the importance of the Iran-Iraq war in shaping the psyche of those currently in office, adding that mistrust and misunderstanding of the West are rampant. He added that Iran,s obsession with the West at times blinds it to its other interests, which is why the Iranians will align itself with otherwise anathema groups or promote instability in Iraq when it appears contrary to their national interests. Adams thought that if Iran had had a hand in bringing down violence in recent months in Iraq, it may have been because intra-Shia killing crossed a redline and prompted push-back from clerics in Qom. To change Iranian behavior, Adams said, &unanimity and uncertainty8 were the international community,s best tools. While Iranian officials will be on a very short leash in talks with the U.S. and will be required to stick to talking points, the questions and points the U.S. raises will likely spark useful internal debate over their interests. The Iranian side will return to the next meeting with at least some responses. While the system of consensus-seeking in Iran makes changing course slow and difficult, Iranian decision-makers will reassess policy if it feels it advances their interests. End summary 2.(S) British Ambassador to Iran Geoffrey Adams described his views of Iran,s mindset towards Iraq and the U.S. in a series of meetings with U.S. officials and military officers in Baghdad November 23-24. The following is an amalgamation of three meetings held in advance of the fourth round of Iran-Iraq-US trilateral discussions on Iraq. Adams, who has served in Tehran for almost two years, also described the general political situation inside the country. British Ambassador to Kuwait Stuart Laing also joined the discussions, as well as British First Secretary in Tehran Alex Pinfield. Among those present on the US side at various briefings were Ambassador Crocker, MNF-I Commanding General Petraeus, Pol-Mil Minister Counselor Ambassador Marcie Ries, MG Kevin Bergner, Special Advisor David Pearce, and IRPO Director Jillian Burns. The British ambassador's recommendations on negotiating strategy with the Iranians to be reported septel. His Take on Iranian Strategy -------------- 3.(S) Iran,s relationship with the U.S. is the biggest strategic issue facing it, according to Adams, and he believes that power circles in Iran remain divided on the issue of how to deal with the U.S. Adams suggested that the Supreme Leader may have approved talks regarding Iraq as a conciliatory gesture towards those who advocate opening a relationship with the U.S., and perhaps also to actually test the waters. However, he added, there is a &significant lobby8 within the policymaking apparatus that opposes these talks. The feedback in Tehran that Adams heard of the previous rounds of trilateral talks on Iraq was disappointment, with Iranians claiming the meetings contained no substance. Nonetheless, he thought the talks had triggered a useful internal debate on Iran,s interests. 4.(S) Adams claimed that from the U.S., Iran wants respect -- &at least on par with Turkey8 as one interlocutor put it to him. In light of this, Adams believed that the largest carrots the U.S. holds in its dealings with Iran remain security guarantees and acceptance of the legitimacy of the Islamic government. BAGHDAD 00003903 002 OF 004 5.(S) At the same time, Adams said, Iran sees Iraq as a tool in its broader strategy to counteract the U.S. threat, by seeking to exploit perceived U.S. vulnerability there. Adam noted that Iran calibrates its tactics to protect its interests without compromising its broader strategic goals. (Comment: Although it is often said that the U.S. did Iran a favor by ridding it of the Taliban and Saddam Hussein, Iran actually views the U.S. as a bigger threat than either of these. Iran is likely prioritizing its threats. It is therefore willing to deal with groups it considers enemies in order to counter its perceived most significant threat, the U.S., with the expectation that it can handle the lesser threats down the road. End Comment.) 6.(S) When asked if they do not see that if we fail in Iraq they also fail, Adams replied that Iran believes it is more important to avoid a situation where the U.S. withdraws from Iraq with a plausible claim of success, believing that would be perceived as an Iranian failure. He also said that despite Iran,s public statements demanding a withdrawal of foreign forces from Iraq, Iran fears a quick withdrawal could lead to chaos. He added that does not believe the Iranians took seriously their Istanbul proposal on Iraq. Adams said that Iran,s obsession with the West ) particularly the U.S. and the UK ) can blind Iran to its own interests. He recommended that in the trilateral talks, the U.S. try to stir internal debate by asking whether it truly serves Iran,s strategic goals to link itself with Al Qaida, Taliban, and Arab Shia extremists that have given it trouble in the past. 7.(S) Because of this linkage between Iraq and other strategic interests, Adams noted the possibility that the nuclear issue, as well as the upcoming parliamentary elections in Iran, could negatively impact the course of the Iraq trilateral talks. (Note: Adams did not think that the replacement of Ali Larijani by Saeed Jalili as nuclear negotiator was a good sign. He said in his conversations with Jalili, who served in the IRGC and was wounded during the Iran-Iraq war, Jalili would lecture on the theological and ideological basis of foreign policy in a very academic, but pointless, manner. End Note.) Distrust, Misreading of the West -------------- 8.(S) Adams underscored the ongoing impact on the Iranian psyche of the Iran-Iraq war. Those in power today in Iran think they are operating from lessons learned from the war. In Iran,s view, after the Iranian people succeeded in casting off their dictator, the world -- namely the West -- tried to strangle their revolution by supporting Saddam Hussein against them and imposing sanctions. Iran,s success came from relying on traditional Shia virtues, such as sacrifice. Because of this experience, Iranians concluded they could not trust the West and have to rely on themselves. 9.(S) Adams added Iranians are prone to miscalculate and misread the U.S., largely because of their lack of understanding and exposure to the country. Asked how they are currently misreading the U.S., he said that the Iranians are overestimating the political difficulties facing the Bush Administration. Some are convinced, he said, that a military attack is not possible because President Bush is too weak. Others within power circles are arguing internally that this may not be the case, and Iran must be careful to avoid missteps. A third group believes that attack is inevitable, no matter what the U.S. says about seeking a diplomatic solution, because they believe that regime change remains the primary U.S. objective. Dealing with Iran -------------- 10.(S) To change Iranian behavior, Adams said that the international community,s best tools were &unanimity and uncertainty.8 He thought that the unanimity of the first two UNSCRs regarding Iranian nuclear activity had a tremendous impact. On the other hand, the U.S. Executive Order designations of the IRGC and the IRGC Qods Force made less of an impact because they were unilateral and had been previewed in the press for some time. He underscored that Iranians want predictability in their strategic environment. To keep them off-balance and reassessing their interests, it is sometimes useful to leave them unclear on consequences. For instance, when queried about the possibility of US BAGHDAD 00003903 003 OF 004 military action due to Iran,s nuclear program, his standard response is that Iran,s refusal to comply with UNSCRs are putting it in &the danger zone,8 and he doesn't know what will happen. Adams recommended that in talks with Iran, the U.S. be firm and steady, determined, with hand extended. He said that based on his experience, the negotiating team would be on a very short leash and would not have authorization to go beyond talking points, but that they would take our questions and points back to Tehran, where they would stimulate new discussion of Iran,s interests. 11.(S) Adams said that the Iranian system of consensus-seeking makes a bold policy change difficult to achieve. That said, when the Iranians decide that something is in their interest, they will change course. He added that Iranians can justify any means to the desired end, and they have a &high threshold on embarrassment.8 (Comment: This means they can both justify a negative action, as well as find a way to do a complete about-face on an issue. End Comment) 12.(S) He also said Iranians try to convey messages in various subtexts and assume we are doing the same. At the same time, because much of their rhetoric is only for propaganda purposes, they assume this is true for other countries as well, meaning they discount much of what other countries say. For instance, Adams said he believed that Iran no longer has as its goal exporting the revolution, saying that this line of rhetoric now only serves propaganda goals. Additionally, he said, Iran probably intended its proposal on Iraq put forward at the Istanbul Conference merely as a means to &muddy the waters.8 Strategic Goals in Iraq -------------- 13.(S) Adams described in the course of several meetings that in his view, Iran,s first priority in Iraq is to prevent any future threats from Iraqi soil -- from the Iraqi government, the U.S., or terrorist groups. While Iran sees it in its strategic interest to maintain a degree of instability in Iraq, it does not want a precipitous withdrawal of foreign forces, fearing a complete meltdown and perhaps the return to power of Baathists. It also uses the U.S. presence next door as a lever, as well as a scapegoat on which to blame Iraqi violence in its propaganda. Iran also wants a politically subservient Basra and access to religious sites. Adams said. Among its tactics to advance these strategic interests were providing support for certain groups, keeping up pressure for the dismantling of the MEK, and inflicting damage to Coalition Forces. 14.(S) The MEK holds a mythic image in Iran, Adams said, not necessarily in line with its current capacities. The Iranian government and the people remember the spectacular attacks the group launched after it was ousted from the ranks of the new revolutionary government. Among those injured by MEK was Supreme Leader Khamenei. Adams noted that he had not heard of any negative repercussions to former MEK members who have returned to Iran. He stressed that the act of &recanting8 is very important in Iran. He added that the Iranians made a big show of introducing some former MEK members to the recent delegation of British MPs, in an attempt to counter-balance pro-MEK sentiment in the British Parliament. 15.(S) As opposed to MEK, Adams said, he hears very little about Iranian concerns regarding PJAK. Although he said PJAK is a very sensitive issue, he sees no real danger of Kurdish independence in Iran. 16.(S) Adams believes that the IRGC -- probably IRGC-Qods Force leader Soleimani -- leads Iraq policy, with instruction from the Supreme Leader. He is not sure of other influences on Iraq policy. President Ahmadinejad and others from his administration likely seek to influence the policy. The Supreme National Security Council serves in general as the policy clearinghouse, but he did not know if the SNSC had taken up the Iraq issue recently. MOIS likely also plays a role. 17.(S) Adams did not think that Iran would expect thanks for the recent decline in violence in Iraq as it has not sought credit. In public comments, Iran has credited the Iraqi government, while continuing to blame the presence of foreign troops as the cause of violence. In Adams,s view, Iran likely calibrated its support of Shia groups in recent months BAGHDAD 00003903 004 OF 004 because its strategic interests were crossed, fearing an approaching meltdown in Karbala and Najaf. Intra-Shia killing likely crossed redlines and generated push-back from the clerics in Qom. Public Sphere -------------- 18.(S) Adams said there was very little detailed information in the Iranian press on the ongoing situation in Iraq. Furthermore, while the IRGC as a whole plays a very prominent role in Iran, there is very little knowledge by the general public of the Qods Force or its activities outside the country. The government has not sought to create national consensus behind its involvement in Iraq and publicly denies any interference, taking a very different tack to its position on the nuclear issue in which it seeks public support. Adams agreed that the result of this secrecy could be greater room for maneuverability on the Iranian part, should it decide to change course. 19.(S) Asked about public perceptions regarding Iraqis, Adams said he had expected to find enmity toward the former enemy but felt that actually, Iranians distinguish between Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi people. He said the permeability between the two countries, in terms of kinship, trans-border tribes, as well as travels of pilgrims, helped forge ties between the two peoples. On the other hand, he said, businessmen with whom he talks never mention much interest in trade with Iraq. Their focus is usually on other countries such as Turkey, Kazakhstan, etc. That said, it was clear there was a substantial black and gray market with Iraq, much of it controlled by the IRGC. Other issues -------------- 20.(S) Adams said the Majles elections will be an important barometer of Ahmadinejad,s popularity and could mark the beginning of his decline. Economic problems are hurting the president,s popularity. In addition, urban Iranians with access to internet and satellite TV are very aware of the global reaction to Iran,s nuclear policy and are worried about the threat of war. Those Iranians without outside access tend to believe the government statements that the U.S. will not attack, he said. 21.(S) Adams said there is some evidence (not described) that Ahmadinejad was gunning for Foreign Minister Mottaki, who Adams described as a loose cannon. Adams confirmed the press report that Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi has been named ambassador to Japan, which Adams saw it as an attempt to sideline elements in the Foreign Ministry who were not clearly aligned with the president. He said when he asked Araghchi about the assignment, Araghchi look none too pleased. 22.(S) Adams also noted that Iran sees Saudi Arabia as a long-term threat to manage, because of its economic power, its religious credentials, and its closer relationship with the West. His Working Environment in Tehran -------------- 23.(S) Adams noted that working as a Western diplomat in Tehran is somewhat similar to serving behind the Iron Curtain during the Cold War: cold, hostile relations with the government, with restrictions on operations, contrasted with friendly relations with the people. Diplomats can travel outside Tehran, but sometimes the Iranian government will prevent trips, such as a recent one in which they intended to visit reform-minded clerics in Qom. 24.(S) Adams said that the British have no choice but to deal with the stereotype they have in Iran as all-knowing and manipulative. The upside is that it puts the UK in a position of strength because Iranians believe that the British are important. They also assume that the British and the U.S. coordinate on all positions. (Comment: this feeds the conspiracy theory in Iran that the British work &behind the curtain8 to keep the U.S. out of Iran, out of concern they would lose relevance. End comment) BUTENIS