Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BAGHDAD3886
2007-11-29 14:23:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:
PROVINCIAL OPERATIONS CENTERS CHANGING THE PREMISE
VZCZCXRO8927 PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK DE RUEHGB #3886/01 3331423 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 291423Z NOV 07 FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4568 INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 003886
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/29/2017
TAGS: IZ MCAP MOPS PGOV PINS PREL
SUBJECT: PROVINCIAL OPERATIONS CENTERS CHANGING THE PREMISE
OF PIC
REF: REF BAGHDAD 003318
Classified By: Pol-Mil Counselor Marcie Ries for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d
)
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 003886
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/29/2017
TAGS: IZ MCAP MOPS PGOV PINS PREL
SUBJECT: PROVINCIAL OPERATIONS CENTERS CHANGING THE PREMISE
OF PIC
REF: REF BAGHDAD 003318
Classified By: Pol-Mil Counselor Marcie Ries for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d
)
1. (C) On October 29, Karbala became the eighth province to
transfer from Coalition to Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC) in
a two-hour ceremony that was intended to symbolize Iraq's
growing stability and progress. The transfer ceremony was
slightly different this time, however; when MND-C Commander
MG Rick Lynch signed the document handing over provincial
security responsibility, he did not transfer security
responsibility to co-signer and Karbala Governor Aqeel al
Khazali. Instead, as outlined in the document, security
authority went to the Karbala Operations Center (KOC)
Commander BG Qasim Nazal, from the 9th Armored Division. The
presence of this federally-mandated provincial operations
center opens the door for a new interpretation of "Provincial
Iraqi Control" (PIC) and is the latest move by the central
government to assert more authority over the provinces.
-------------- --------------
Operations Centers Establishing Federal Control of Provinces
-------------- --------------
2. (C) Operations centers serve as the commanding body for
all security operations within the province where the local
police force cannot independently maintain security; they
also bypass provincial authorities. Iraqi Army and National
Police assistance to fledgling local police forces (IP) is
not new in Iraq; many IPs still lack equipment, training, and
personal distance from local disturbances to adequately
maintain local security. Normally, the Provincial Director of
Police (PDOP) maintains operational control over his IPs
while answering to the governor and coordinating operations
through the Provincial Joint Coordination Center (PJCC). The
existence of federally-mandated operations centers, however,
sidelines the PDOP, the provincial governor, and the JPCC.
The ops centers are commanded by an Army Commander who
reports up the Ministry of Defense chain of command to the
Office of the Prime Minister, placing provincial security in
the hands of the central government rather than the
provincial government. In more accurate terms, Karbala
transfers to 'federal Iraqi Control' with the Karbala
Operations Center, rather than 'Provincial Iraqi Control'
with the governor and PDOP.
--------------
Karbala Operations Center
--------------
3. (C) Prime Minister Maliki established the Karbala
Operations Center (KOC) by Prime Ministerial Directive (#34)
on June 6, 2007 to respond to local instability from
intra-Shia fighting and a lack of enough reliable police to
protect Karbala's fluctuating population. (Note: Karbala's
local police are taxed by an upwards of a million pilgrims
visiting the Holy Shrines on religious holidays and criminal
elements infiltrating across Karbala's shared borders with
the volatile Al Anbar and Babil provinces. End Note.) In late
August, the Karbala police, largely made up of Badr members
and affiliates, violently clashed with Jaish al Mahdi (JAM)
when the militia group attempted to overrun a shrine. Over
the ensuing hours, the KOC played a role in mobilizing Iraqi
Army reinforcements that helped to effectively alleviate the
conflict and eventually coordinated arrest operations against
many of the culprits. While this outburst delayed PIC for two
months, it also proved that the operations centers could help
temper crisis situations.
4. (C) Similar to operations centers in other provinces, the
KOC has operational control over the Iraqi Police (IPS),the
Facilities Protection Service (FPS),the Iraqi Army (IA)
units and Department of Border Enforcement (DBE) deployed to
the province, and the provincial intelligence and security
centers. The KOC also has taken over many of the functions of
the PJCC which, under normal circumstances, assists the
governor in coordinating security operations and sends
regular reports to the National Operations Center (NOC).
-------------- --------------
Operations Centers: The Standard Rather Than the Exception
-------------- --------------
5. (C) These operations centers currently function in
Baghdad, Diyala, Karbala, and Basrah provinces, and Samarra
city in Salah Ad Din province, and there are indications that
they will become the norm rather than the exception. At the
BAGHDAD 00003886 002.2 OF 003
/ / / / ZFR / / / / / / / / ZFR / / / / / / / / / ZFR / / / /
PLS CANCEL BAGHDAD 3886 AND BLANK ALL ASSOCIATD MCN/MRN
AND RECALL PER RUSSELL
/ / / / / ZFR / / / / / / / /ZFR / / / / / / / / / ZFR / / / /
BAGHDAD 00003886 003.2 OF 003
/ / / / / ZFR / / / / / / ZFR / / / / / / / / /ZFR
PLS CANCEL BAGHDAD 3886 AND BLANK ALL ASSOCIATED MCN/MRN
AND RECALL PER RUSSELL
/ / / / / ZFR / / / / / / ZFR / / / / / / / / ZFR
BUTENIS
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/29/2017
TAGS: IZ MCAP MOPS PGOV PINS PREL
SUBJECT: PROVINCIAL OPERATIONS CENTERS CHANGING THE PREMISE
OF PIC
REF: REF BAGHDAD 003318
Classified By: Pol-Mil Counselor Marcie Ries for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d
)
1. (C) On October 29, Karbala became the eighth province to
transfer from Coalition to Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC) in
a two-hour ceremony that was intended to symbolize Iraq's
growing stability and progress. The transfer ceremony was
slightly different this time, however; when MND-C Commander
MG Rick Lynch signed the document handing over provincial
security responsibility, he did not transfer security
responsibility to co-signer and Karbala Governor Aqeel al
Khazali. Instead, as outlined in the document, security
authority went to the Karbala Operations Center (KOC)
Commander BG Qasim Nazal, from the 9th Armored Division. The
presence of this federally-mandated provincial operations
center opens the door for a new interpretation of "Provincial
Iraqi Control" (PIC) and is the latest move by the central
government to assert more authority over the provinces.
-------------- --------------
Operations Centers Establishing Federal Control of Provinces
-------------- --------------
2. (C) Operations centers serve as the commanding body for
all security operations within the province where the local
police force cannot independently maintain security; they
also bypass provincial authorities. Iraqi Army and National
Police assistance to fledgling local police forces (IP) is
not new in Iraq; many IPs still lack equipment, training, and
personal distance from local disturbances to adequately
maintain local security. Normally, the Provincial Director of
Police (PDOP) maintains operational control over his IPs
while answering to the governor and coordinating operations
through the Provincial Joint Coordination Center (PJCC). The
existence of federally-mandated operations centers, however,
sidelines the PDOP, the provincial governor, and the JPCC.
The ops centers are commanded by an Army Commander who
reports up the Ministry of Defense chain of command to the
Office of the Prime Minister, placing provincial security in
the hands of the central government rather than the
provincial government. In more accurate terms, Karbala
transfers to 'federal Iraqi Control' with the Karbala
Operations Center, rather than 'Provincial Iraqi Control'
with the governor and PDOP.
--------------
Karbala Operations Center
--------------
3. (C) Prime Minister Maliki established the Karbala
Operations Center (KOC) by Prime Ministerial Directive (#34)
on June 6, 2007 to respond to local instability from
intra-Shia fighting and a lack of enough reliable police to
protect Karbala's fluctuating population. (Note: Karbala's
local police are taxed by an upwards of a million pilgrims
visiting the Holy Shrines on religious holidays and criminal
elements infiltrating across Karbala's shared borders with
the volatile Al Anbar and Babil provinces. End Note.) In late
August, the Karbala police, largely made up of Badr members
and affiliates, violently clashed with Jaish al Mahdi (JAM)
when the militia group attempted to overrun a shrine. Over
the ensuing hours, the KOC played a role in mobilizing Iraqi
Army reinforcements that helped to effectively alleviate the
conflict and eventually coordinated arrest operations against
many of the culprits. While this outburst delayed PIC for two
months, it also proved that the operations centers could help
temper crisis situations.
4. (C) Similar to operations centers in other provinces, the
KOC has operational control over the Iraqi Police (IPS),the
Facilities Protection Service (FPS),the Iraqi Army (IA)
units and Department of Border Enforcement (DBE) deployed to
the province, and the provincial intelligence and security
centers. The KOC also has taken over many of the functions of
the PJCC which, under normal circumstances, assists the
governor in coordinating security operations and sends
regular reports to the National Operations Center (NOC).
-------------- --------------
Operations Centers: The Standard Rather Than the Exception
-------------- --------------
5. (C) These operations centers currently function in
Baghdad, Diyala, Karbala, and Basrah provinces, and Samarra
city in Salah Ad Din province, and there are indications that
they will become the norm rather than the exception. At the
BAGHDAD 00003886 002.2 OF 003
/ / / / ZFR / / / / / / / / ZFR / / / / / / / / / ZFR / / / /
PLS CANCEL BAGHDAD 3886 AND BLANK ALL ASSOCIATD MCN/MRN
AND RECALL PER RUSSELL
/ / / / / ZFR / / / / / / / /ZFR / / / / / / / / / ZFR / / / /
BAGHDAD 00003886 003.2 OF 003
/ / / / / ZFR / / / / / / ZFR / / / / / / / / /ZFR
PLS CANCEL BAGHDAD 3886 AND BLANK ALL ASSOCIATED MCN/MRN
AND RECALL PER RUSSELL
/ / / / / ZFR / / / / / / ZFR / / / / / / / / ZFR
BUTENIS