MAYSAN'S GOVERNOR: JAM ASSOCIATE AND RISING SHI'A

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003882

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/27/2017
TAGS: PGOV IR IZ
SUBJECT: MAYSAN'S GOVERNOR: JAM ASSOCIATE AND RISING SHI'A
STAR

Classified By: Deputy Political Counselor Robert Waller for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).

1 . (S/NF) Summary and Comment: Maysan Governor Adil Mohoder
Radhi al-Maliki is an astute, ambitious, and pragmatic young
politician, closely aligned to Moqtada al-Sadr (MAS).
Allegedly a former JAM commander, Maliki reportedly has links
to the al-Gharawi terrorist cell and had a bitter
relationship with Maysan's (Badrist) former Chief of Police.
He may be connected to MAS through a former acquaintance of
MAS, father now undergoing cancer treatment in Iran. His
relationship with the Coalition has fluctuated over time, and
he is said to fear other powerful provincial JAM/OMS figures
and will likely accede to their demands. Well-connected in
Baghdad, Maliki has repeatedly refused ministerial positions.
PRT Maysan assesses that Maliki's immediate priority is the
completion of key development projects in Maysan. End
Summary and Comment.

Personal Background
--------------


2. (S/NF) Governor Adil Mohoder Radhi al-Maliki was born to
Badriyah Kadhim on July 17, 1970 and grew up in al-Majar
al-Kabir. He has at least two children, Zahra (circa five
years old) and Moqtada (an infant named after Moqtada al-Sadr
(MAS)). Although Maliki speaks and understands English well,
he sometimes conceals this from his interlocutors. The
departing former Multinational Division/Southeast (MND(SE))
General Officer Commanding (GOC) described Maliki as the most
effective and astute politician that he had met in Iraq.
Maliki has assiduously cultivated an image of loyalty,
competence, and combat effectiveness. He studied electrical
engineering at the prestigious Baghdad Institute of
Technology, reportedly worked as a telecommunications
engineer, and still takes an interest in engineering issues.
One former engineering schoolmate (now living abroad)
expressed astonishment that Maliki became a provincial
governor, implying he was not a particularly distinguished
student.

A JAM partisan influenced by outside powers
--------------


3. (S/NF) Maliki reportedly rose rapidly through the ranks to
become a JAM Company Commander, leading combat operations
against the British at Camp Abu Naji and later acting as a
signatory to the August 2004 ceasefire agreement. As of July
2006, British officials suspected that Maliki was associated
with the Ahmad Abu Sajad al-Gharawi terrorist cell, while
qualifying that he may have not supported them personally.
According to British authorities, in early June 2006 the
Governor demanded not only the release of a JAM sniper
arrested by the Iraqi Police Service (IPS),but also the
return of his rifle. He reportedly intervened similarly on
other occasions. Maliki is known to have had a bitter
relationship with the previous (Badrist) Chief of Police and
regularly sought to check Badr,s power.


4. (S/NF) Maliki was elected by the PC in March 2005 as a
member of the Hussein Ideology Front (HIF). Most Maysani PC
members likewise belong to HIF. He and his staff have
repeatedly made their Sadrist affiliation clear to Coalition
Forces (CF) and the PRT. Despite his official status as the
province,s chief executive, Maliki is strongly influenced by
several powerful constituencies: 1) Sadr and his OMS
surrogates seeking to consolidate political gains, 2) armed
JAM leaders seeking to dominate the South,s militia
landscape, and 3) Iranian security forces intent on
establishing a permissive operational environment in support
of their political-military goals in the South. These
constituencies are not necessarily harmonized and may present
him with difficult trade-offs.

Friends in high places?
--------------


5. (S/NF) MAS travels to Maysan periodically and has met with
the Maliki there. Maliki reportedly relies on a close
adviser and de facto deputy Governor by the name of Mohan
Abdullah Sultan, aka Abu Mariam for political advice. PRT
Maysan has yet to meet Abu Mariam but understands he is a
respected elder who apparently had a relationship with Grand
Ayatollah Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr. Abu Mariam is now
reportedly undergoing chemotherapy in Iran. Maliki enjoys
positive working relationships with Iraqi officials in other
parties due to his assistance to Iran and UK-based exiles
under Saddam's regime. He has easy access to the Prime
Minister and Vice President Abdul-Mehdi, as well as selected
cabinet officials. He also has strong connections in the
Amanat in Baghdad and travels to the capital frequently.


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Uneven relationship with the Coalition
--------------


6. (S/NF) In line with his origins as a JAM fighter, Maliki
has had an uneven relationship with the Coalition. British
commanders of the Maysan Battle Group and MND(SE) regularly
transitioned after six months, and Maliki and his staff have
noted that they have had so many Coalition interlocutors that
we seem almost a blur. At times, he and his associates have
complained about unfulfilled promises made (or implied) by
Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) officials. Maliki is
careful to keep his distance from CF and limit CF's ability
to intervene and conduct operations in Maysan. As reported
septel, a trusted aide confided that Maliki would support
technical and project-related engagement with the PRT but
occasionally feel the need to make populist and
anti-Coalition statements to retain his political
credibility. According to an NGO official who knows him, the
Governor is unable to &fully express himself8 because of
outside OMS/JAM pressure.

Official relationship with Iran
--------------


7. (S/NF) Maliki travels to Iran from time to time for
official duties. He accompanied Prime Minister al-Jaafari to
Tehran in September 2005, after which he announced that the
border crossing point at al-Sheeb would be opened. In
January 2006 he accepted an invitation from the Governor in
Ahwaz, Khuzestan and crossed at al-Sheeb. In April 2007, the
Governor traveled to Khuzestan again, this time visiting
Shush/Susa. After this trip, al-Maliki publicly announced an
agreement with the Government of Iran to build a 1,000 unit
housing complex in Maysan.


8. (S/NF) COMMENT: The Governor is a highly-ambitious and
calculating pragmatist who threw in his lot early with MAS.
We assess that he anticipated MAS, early wide appeal and
used his ample charm, political charisma, and 2004 combat
reputation to ingratiate himself with the leadership of OMS
in MAK. He is a survivor whose decisions (on allowing lethal
aid smuggling or anything else) will be driven on whatever
will preserve or strengthen his political career. Maliki
will use his political force to move forward on large scale
development projects. We assess that the Governor needs to
balance the needs of several groups in order to preserve
power.


9. (S/NF) Multiple sources report that MAS has offered Maliki
a position as a Sadrist cabinet minister on multiple
occasions. Maliki reportedly has refused the appointment
because of the unstable political situation in the Cabinet,
the dangerous security situation in Baghdad, and the belief
that he could have a more positive impact at the local level.
We assess that the Governor,s intermediate-range goal is to
establish a reputation as a politician who delivers at the
local and provincial level, with Maysan a stepping stone to a
larger national role. His immediate priority is to develop
the hydrocarbons infrastructure in Maysan in order to
facilitate a transition from its agrarian roots. His vision
for a planned city attempts to respond to the al-Amarah's
unemployment, security and housing challenges. Despite his
background as a JAM fighter, we would not be surprised if he
were actually a moderating influence within OMS and advocated
political instead of violent means to expand Sadrist (and
indirectly his own) power. END COMMENT.
BUTENIS