MOD GENERAL ABBADI'S RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BASRAH ISF

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 003869 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/27/2017 TAGS: IZ MCAP MOPS PGOV PINS PREL SUBJECT: MOD GENERAL ABBADI'S RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BASRAH ISF REF: A. REF A: BASRAH 99 ¶B. REF B: BASRAH 98 Classified By: Political Military Minister Counselor Marcie B. Ries. R easons: 1.4 (b) & (d). The upcoming transfer of security responsibility to provincial Iraqi control (PIC) in Basrah, currently scheduled for December, has hightened the Iraqi Government's scrutiny of Basrah, and Prime Minister Maliki sent Joint Forces Deputy Commander General Nassir Abbadi to Basrah in early November to assess local security and current Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) effectiveness. On October 23, Basrah ISF faced their first significant challenge against JAM since Operations Center Commander Mohan and Police Chief Major General Jalil began implementing their Basrah security plan (reftel B) when a checkpoint guard scuffled with JAM-affiliated men driving a Land Rover with illegally tinted windows. JAM elements retaliated by attacking the city's check points and ISF buildings and taking dozens of Iraqi Police (IPs) hostage when Operations Center Commander MG Mohan refused JAM demands to release the driver and vehicle. The Basrah Operations Center was able to end the assault with Coalition air assistance; however, the sudden, coordinated JAM attack and the ISF's halted response has prompted concerns that the province would be increasingly vulnerable to such unexpected outbursts following the upcoming PIC ceremony. ¶2. (U) General Abbadi investigated the day's events during his November 2 visit to consider options for the GOI to improve ISF effectiveness in countering similar raids. He met with both Iraqi and MND-SE officials, according to his advisor, after which he made the following recommendations in the after-action report to PM Maliki: -PM Maliki should form a ministerial committee to propose solutions to the unique political, security, and economic situations in Basrah. -The Basrah Operations Center (BOC) should be reinforced with additional ISF units. -MOD/MOI needs to fill Basrah shortages in Basrah ISF manning, equipping, arming, and vehicles. -Unify efforts to drive militias from the province and confiscate all illegal weapons. Conduct raids on residential districts to confiscate illegal weapons. -Militia infiltration of MOI Border Forces requires immediate action. -Take measures to limit the control political parties have over the strategic infrastructure, including oil infrastructure, ports, etc. -Establish a joint operations center with the British forces to exchange intelligence information and have in place suitable air support from the Coalition to support the BOC as needed. -Iraq should continue diplomatic talks with Iran to limit infiltration and smuggling across their shared borders. ¶3. (U) While Abbadi noted the ISF in Basrah still require a great deal of work, he did not recommend delaying the PIC ceremony for Basrah beyond December. ¶4. (C) Comment: This is the second time PM Maliki has sent General Abbadi to investigate an event where the ISF response has been questioned. Gen. Abbadi traveled to Karbala at the PM's behest following the August 29 flare-up in which local JAM elements attempted to overrun ISCI/Badr-affliated IP forces guarding shrines just days before the province was initially scheduled to PIC. (Note: The Coalition and GOI jointly agreed to delay the Karbala PIC until October 29 because of the potential instability caused by the incident. End Note.) The PM's personal involvement in these cases through General Abbadi reflects his careful stance on transferring to PIC those provinces that appear unstable or unprepared. While Abbadi did not recommend delaying PIC for Basrah, his detailed list of necessary security improvements reveals cracks in the foundation for building effective Iraqi control of this province. End Comment. BUTENIS