Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BAGHDAD3869
2007-11-28 08:05:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:
MOD GENERAL ABBADI'S RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BASRAH ISF
how-toVZCZCXRO7563 PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK DE RUEHGB #3869 3320805 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 280805Z NOV 07 FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4545 INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 003869
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/27/2017
TAGS: IZ MCAP MOPS PGOV PINS PREL
SUBJECT: MOD GENERAL ABBADI'S RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BASRAH ISF
REF: A. REF A: BASRAH 99
B. REF B: BASRAH 98
Classified By: Political Military Minister Counselor Marcie B. Ries. R
easons: 1.4 (b) & (d).
The upcoming transfer of security responsibility to
provincial Iraqi control (PIC) in Basrah, currently scheduled
for December, has hightened the Iraqi Government's scrutiny
of Basrah, and Prime Minister Maliki sent Joint Forces Deputy
Commander General Nassir Abbadi to Basrah in early November
to assess local security and current Iraqi Security Forces
(ISF) effectiveness. On October 23, Basrah ISF faced their
first significant challenge against JAM since Operations
Center Commander Mohan and Police Chief Major General Jalil
began implementing their Basrah security plan (reftel B) when
a checkpoint guard scuffled with JAM-affiliated men driving a
Land Rover with illegally tinted windows. JAM elements
retaliated by attacking the city's check points and ISF
buildings and taking dozens of Iraqi Police (IPs) hostage
when Operations Center Commander MG Mohan refused JAM demands
to release the driver and vehicle. The Basrah Operations
Center was able to end the assault with Coalition air
assistance; however, the sudden, coordinated JAM attack and
the ISF's halted response has prompted concerns that the
province would be increasingly vulnerable to such unexpected
outbursts following the upcoming PIC ceremony.
2. (U) General Abbadi investigated the day's events during
his November 2 visit to consider options for the GOI to
improve ISF effectiveness in countering similar raids. He met
with both Iraqi and MND-SE officials, according to his
advisor, after which he made the following recommendations in
the after-action report to PM Maliki:
-PM Maliki should form a ministerial committee to propose
solutions to the unique political, security, and economic
situations in Basrah.
-The Basrah Operations Center (BOC) should be reinforced with
additional ISF units.
-MOD/MOI needs to fill Basrah shortages in Basrah ISF
manning, equipping, arming, and vehicles.
-Unify efforts to drive militias from the province and
confiscate all illegal weapons. Conduct raids on residential
districts to confiscate illegal weapons.
-Militia infiltration of MOI Border Forces requires immediate
action.
-Take measures to limit the control political parties have
over the strategic infrastructure, including oil
infrastructure, ports, etc.
-Establish a joint operations center with the British forces
to exchange intelligence information and have in place
suitable air support from the Coalition to support the
BOC as needed.
-Iraq should continue diplomatic talks with Iran to limit
infiltration and smuggling across their shared borders.
3. (U) While Abbadi noted the ISF in Basrah still require a
great deal of work, he did not recommend delaying the PIC
ceremony for Basrah beyond December.
4. (C) Comment: This is the second time PM Maliki has sent
General Abbadi to investigate an event where the ISF response
has been questioned. Gen. Abbadi traveled to Karbala at the
PM's behest following the August 29 flare-up in which local
JAM elements attempted to overrun ISCI/Badr-affliated IP
forces guarding shrines just days before the province was
initially scheduled to PIC. (Note: The Coalition and GOI
jointly agreed to delay the Karbala PIC until October 29
because of the potential instability caused by the incident.
End Note.) The PM's personal involvement in these cases
through General Abbadi reflects his careful stance on
transferring to PIC those provinces that appear unstable or
unprepared. While Abbadi did not recommend delaying PIC for
Basrah, his detailed list of necessary security improvements
reveals cracks in the foundation for building effective Iraqi
control of this province. End Comment.
BUTENIS
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/27/2017
TAGS: IZ MCAP MOPS PGOV PINS PREL
SUBJECT: MOD GENERAL ABBADI'S RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BASRAH ISF
REF: A. REF A: BASRAH 99
B. REF B: BASRAH 98
Classified By: Political Military Minister Counselor Marcie B. Ries. R
easons: 1.4 (b) & (d).
The upcoming transfer of security responsibility to
provincial Iraqi control (PIC) in Basrah, currently scheduled
for December, has hightened the Iraqi Government's scrutiny
of Basrah, and Prime Minister Maliki sent Joint Forces Deputy
Commander General Nassir Abbadi to Basrah in early November
to assess local security and current Iraqi Security Forces
(ISF) effectiveness. On October 23, Basrah ISF faced their
first significant challenge against JAM since Operations
Center Commander Mohan and Police Chief Major General Jalil
began implementing their Basrah security plan (reftel B) when
a checkpoint guard scuffled with JAM-affiliated men driving a
Land Rover with illegally tinted windows. JAM elements
retaliated by attacking the city's check points and ISF
buildings and taking dozens of Iraqi Police (IPs) hostage
when Operations Center Commander MG Mohan refused JAM demands
to release the driver and vehicle. The Basrah Operations
Center was able to end the assault with Coalition air
assistance; however, the sudden, coordinated JAM attack and
the ISF's halted response has prompted concerns that the
province would be increasingly vulnerable to such unexpected
outbursts following the upcoming PIC ceremony.
2. (U) General Abbadi investigated the day's events during
his November 2 visit to consider options for the GOI to
improve ISF effectiveness in countering similar raids. He met
with both Iraqi and MND-SE officials, according to his
advisor, after which he made the following recommendations in
the after-action report to PM Maliki:
-PM Maliki should form a ministerial committee to propose
solutions to the unique political, security, and economic
situations in Basrah.
-The Basrah Operations Center (BOC) should be reinforced with
additional ISF units.
-MOD/MOI needs to fill Basrah shortages in Basrah ISF
manning, equipping, arming, and vehicles.
-Unify efforts to drive militias from the province and
confiscate all illegal weapons. Conduct raids on residential
districts to confiscate illegal weapons.
-Militia infiltration of MOI Border Forces requires immediate
action.
-Take measures to limit the control political parties have
over the strategic infrastructure, including oil
infrastructure, ports, etc.
-Establish a joint operations center with the British forces
to exchange intelligence information and have in place
suitable air support from the Coalition to support the
BOC as needed.
-Iraq should continue diplomatic talks with Iran to limit
infiltration and smuggling across their shared borders.
3. (U) While Abbadi noted the ISF in Basrah still require a
great deal of work, he did not recommend delaying the PIC
ceremony for Basrah beyond December.
4. (C) Comment: This is the second time PM Maliki has sent
General Abbadi to investigate an event where the ISF response
has been questioned. Gen. Abbadi traveled to Karbala at the
PM's behest following the August 29 flare-up in which local
JAM elements attempted to overrun ISCI/Badr-affliated IP
forces guarding shrines just days before the province was
initially scheduled to PIC. (Note: The Coalition and GOI
jointly agreed to delay the Karbala PIC until October 29
because of the potential instability caused by the incident.
End Note.) The PM's personal involvement in these cases
through General Abbadi reflects his careful stance on
transferring to PIC those provinces that appear unstable or
unprepared. While Abbadi did not recommend delaying PIC for
Basrah, his detailed list of necessary security improvements
reveals cracks in the foundation for building effective Iraqi
control of this province. End Comment.
BUTENIS