CHALABI OUTLINES HIS POPULAR COMMITTEE

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 000386 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/05/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM PINR IZ SUBJECT: CHALABI OUTLINES HIS POPULAR COMMITTEE MOBILIZATION PLANS Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Daniel Speckhard for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Ahmed Chalabi is moving forward on the political mobilization component of the new Baghdad Security Plan, although he suggested he is having some difficulty achieving full Sunni participation and has asked for Embassy assistance. His plan consists of creating tiered committees at the neighborhood and district levels which will provide assistance to security forces, help deliver essential services, and provide a channel for security-related information. He also indicated that the political parties will have a significant role in the creation of the committees but that they will ultimately be non-political entities. End Summary. -------------- -------------- Bringing People Together for Popular Mobilization -------------- -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Ahmed Chalabi, as the co-chair of the popular mobilization component of the new Baghdad security initiative, told DCM on February 1 that he has been meeting over the past week with former senior Ba'ath part military intelligence officers, Sunni IIP representatives Naseer al-Ani and Ayad Sammraie, and Sadrist and JAM representatives to form a plan to implement what he has dubbed 'popular committees' in Baghdad. He also met with Baghdad Deputy Mayor Naeem Aboub (Sadrist) and the 'mayor' of Sadr City, Raheem Al-Darraji, to secure their participation in the process. He said he will continue with an aggressive meeting schedule over the coming weeks to designate formal staff and to finalize details of the plan. -------------- Three Objectives for Popular Committees -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Chalabi has identified three main objectives for the popular committees. First, committees should facilitate the work of security forces in each of the nine security areas. To do so, these committees will coordinate with local commanders and provide assistance in 'easing the burden' of searches, as well as providing a mechanism for delivering assistance or compensation to individuals impacted by security activities in their neighborhoods. ¶4. (SBU) Second, the local committees will assess and report on local community requirements for essential services and public needs, and will also seek to expedite delivery of those services. He also mentioned that the popular committees will provide assistance to displaced persons in each security area. Chalabi made particular mention of efforts to improve local electrical generation in target areas as an essential component of the committees. ¶5. (SBU) Third, the committees will provide a mechanism for locals to provide security information to security forces. Chalabi indicated that people feel it is too risky at present to provide sensitive information to forces perceived as having possible sectarian biases. -------------- Committee Structure is Still Unclear -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Chalabi's envisioned structure for these committees is still under development, but he described the following basic framework. Within each of Baghdad's nine security sectors, committees would be formed at the mahalla (neighborhood) level, headed up by the existing mukhtar (local mayor) with one additional member selected per thousand dwellings in the neighborhood. Chalabi did not explain how additional members would be selected. ¶7. (SBU) Each of these local committees would report to a committee at the sector or district level, which in turn would report to a single coordination committee with links to other GOI and coalition entities. Chalabi was uncertain which set of administrative boundaries the mobilization program should use - citing the conflicting governorate administrative lines, the security boundaries, and the essential services boundaries as evidence of the confusing local layout. He requested clarification as to which boundaries he should be using for planning purposes, stating the importance of synchronizing the security, reconstruction, and mobilization components of the new plan. ¶8. (SBU) Chalabi did not explain how the popular committees will interface, if at all, with existing government institutions. Chalabi suggested that there would be around 200 local committees; PRT staff noted that the city has more than 400 mahallas, suggesting potentially many more committees than Chalabi envisioned. -------------- Parties Will Play a 'Strong Role' -------------- ¶9. (SBU) When asked about the role of the political parties in the creation of popular committees, Chalabi said that in areas where a given party has a 'strong role,' they would play a significant part in the creation of committees, but that the committees themselves would remain politically neutral. He mentioned that he had held productive conversations on the subject with SCIRI and IIP senior leadership, both of whom he said support the plan. (Note: SCIRI has been advocating for local neighborhood security groups for more than a year and has taken some steps to introduce them in the past. End Note.) At a February 2 BSP Executive Steering Committee (ESC) meeting (septel),Chalabi also clarified that the popular committees would not be armed. ¶10. (SBU) Chalabi also mentioned several initiatives he would like to see linked to the mobilization effort. He explained that providing diesel generators to support selected local electrical grids in target areas would have a powerful effect for a sub-$100M price tag. He requested Embassy assistance in securing broader Sunni participation in the mobilization effort, saying that their current level of involvement was not sufficient. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶11. (C) Chalabi's proposed initiative is the only systematic thinking we have seen about how to reach out to the Baghdad public about BSP, and solicit their feedback. The inclusion of several essential services provisions in his plan suggests the need for additional coordination between the mobilization and services component of the larger plan covered in DPM Zowbaie's service support committee. Chalabi's apparent lack of experience in working with the existing local government institutions has meant that much of his plan appears to bypass existing Neighborhood Advisory Council/District Advisory Council (NAC/DAC) structures, structures that the USG has sought to build up and support. Success of his plan will require further efforts to include existing entities to avoid a backlash from provincial government institutions. The ambiguity surrounding the role that political parties will play in the committee formation process suggests that popular committees risk falling prey to sectarian agendas. ¶12. (C) Chalabi's appointment to this important role is also noteworthy. Apart from his position as head of the de-Ba'athification Commission, he is not a member of the GOI in any official capacity, nor does he seem to enjoy a broad base of popular support in Baghdad. In his tenure as head of the De-Ba'athification Commission, he has not demonstrated an ability to reach across sectarian lines. END COMMENT. KHALILZAD