PM AND AMBASSADOR DISCUSS SPD, UNSCR, PKK, CLC,

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 003834

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/01/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS MARR IZ
SUBJECT: PM AND AMBASSADOR DISCUSS SPD, UNSCR, PKK, CLC,
AMNESTY; AMB ENCOURAGES IRAQI PARTICIPATION AT ANNAPOLIS
CONFERENCE

REF: BAGHDAD 03772

BAGHDAD 00003834 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: In a wide-ranging, hour-long meeting
November 22, Ambassador Crocker and PM Nouri
al-Maliki discussed progress on the Security
Partnership Declaration (SPD),foreseeing its signing
on Monday, November 26; moving quickly on a United
Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) for 2008;
possible Turkish action against the PKK; next steps
with Concerned Local Citizens (CLC) groups; and
provisions of an Amnesty (reftel). End Summary.

Members of Congress visiting
--------------


2. (C) Ambassador opened the meeting by explaining that
MNF-I CG David Petraeus was unable to attend due to his
need to meet with visiting U.S. Congressional delegations.
Maliki expressed his interest in also meeting with Senators
McCain, Lieberman, Graham, and with Representative Murtha.
The Ambassador assured him that their respective staffs
were working the schedules to make room for a meeting if
possible.

SPD Soon
--------------


3. (S) Ambassador told Maliki that the SPD was just about
concluded and he hoped to arrange the signing soon. Maliki
rejoined that they were still socializing the Declaration
to the Council of Representatives (COR),quickly adding
that the COR must be informed, but its approval is not
needed for signing - it is a cabinet decision. He foresaw
a signing on Monday, November 26. Ambassador agreed that
the greater the consensus supporting the SPD the better
it would be, but it must be finished soon to move onto the
next matter at hand - the UNSCR.

UNSCR
--------------


4. (S) Maliki noted that agreement on the SPD would ease
adoption of a new UNSCR. Ambassador agreed, but reiterated
the importance of quick action - with the Hajj and
Christmas holidays looming, there was not much time to get
the UNSCR text agreed and passed. Maliki took the point.

Annapolis conference
--------------


5. (C) Ambassador encouraged Maliki to send a
representative to the Annapolis Arab-Israeli Conference,
noting that it would be most useful for Iraq to show itself
playing a role in the wider region. Maliki demurred,
responding that Iraq had so many internal problems to face,
it would be difficult to get involved in larger issues in a
profitable way. Ambassador pressed Maliki not to leave
empty their seat at the table, noting that resolution of
the Arab-Israeli conflict would certainly have benefits
beyond Israel and Palestine. He suggested that the Iraqi
Ambassador in Washington could certainly travel to
Annapolis so Iraq's place was not empty. Maliki promised
to consider it and asked if Syria would be present.
Ambassador assured him that Syria had been invited, as had
all members of the Arab League (AL) and the AL itself.
Maliki took note of this but did not make a commitment.

PKK/Turkey
--------------


6. (S) Ambassador informed Maliki that the Government of
Turkey was likely still considering military action against
PKK elements in Iraq. Although the GOT has toned down the
rhetoric, a clear indication that it has taken note of and
appreciated GOI and Kurdish Regional Government (KRG)
actions against the PKK, there remained a good chance that
the GOT would conduct military operations against the PKK.
Maliki asked for a clarification of what Ambassador
expected to happen. Ambassador outlined the U.S. messages
to the GOT that any military action should be directed
against armed PKK targets. Ambassador added that the KRG
delegation to Ankara (led by Kurdish Islamic Union
Secretary General Salahdin Bayadin) had been

SIPDIS

BAGHDAD 00003834 002.2 OF 003


well received and they had good talks. Responding to
Maliki's concern the group had only staff-level talks,
Ambassador noted that the delegation had met with PM
Erdogan's Foreign Policy Advisor, Ahmed Davutoglu. He
reminded Maliki that this issue was not resolved and the GOI
must continue to work the issue - PM leadership, as at
Istanbul, would be crucial, he stressed.


7. (S) In response, Maliki expressed concern that Iraq was
being sidelined by the GOT rejection of trilateral talks
in favor of bilateral talks with the United States.
Ambassador assured him that we support trilateral
dissuasions, noting that the GOT was likely hesitant,
given its bad experience with past trilateral efforts.
Maliki agreed it was important to continue efforts for
trilateral discussions and that, for the time being,
bilateral U.S.-Iraq and U.S.-Turkey talks would have
to suffice. He raised the importance of having the GOT
accept the role of the KRG in future talks. Ambassador
concluded by agreeing with Maliki and advising him that
as the GOT sees positive efforts from the KRG, as the US
has, it will resist less the KRG's inclusion in talks.
Maliki took the point, but noted that the GOT did not
trust Masoud Barzani - but the Iraqi Kurds must do their
best.

Security Improving, but...
--------------


8. (C) On security issues, Ambassador advised Maliki that
much progress had been made, but the fight is not over - we
will continue pressure on those who oppose you and us. We
must be careful, for we have not reached the point of final
victory, he added. One concern is that elements of
Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) are ready to reject Mogtadah al-
Sadr's directives to not attack Coalition Forces. Recent
gains give the U.S. an opportunity, he noted, and it was
important to keep the focus on the common enemy. In this
vein, it was important that FMS program funds be
transferred for use by the MOI. Maliki agreed with all the
Ambassador said but indicated the FMS funds transfer to MOI
would not take place. He added that there was internal
dissension in the JAM, with some of its personnel,
"moderates" according to Maliki, interested in pushing out
the Special Groups forces. Maliki expressed strong
confidence in the ability of Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)
to go after the JAM Special Forces elements. He then
expressed continuing concern about Al Qaeda. Maliki
concluded that Baghdad must be secured - "a country is
judged on its capital," he said.

MOSUL/CLCs
--------------

9. (C) Maliki raised the issue of Mosul, linking his
concerns with some of the members of CLCs to the need for
stability and security in Mosul. He questioned the need
for CLCs in Mosul, opining that it would upset the KRG and
that some, though not all, of CLC members were just in it
for money or other negative reasons. He made it clear that
he considers Mosul a predominantly Arab town that needs an
Arab security operations commander assisted by Kurdish and
Turkomen officers. He declared that success in Mosul
against the gangs, foreign terrorist, and armed groups
there would be "our declaration of victory." He knew that
the KRG would not be happy with an ethnic-Arab commander
there, but he would remind the commander to be
non-sectarian and include Kurdish and Turkomen officers.
He stressed the importance of using lessons learned
elsewhere to pursue security in Mosul. Ambassador reminded
Maliki of MNF-I offer to brief him on situation there,
which would allow for strategic discussion on the way
forward in Mosul.

Amnesty
--------------


10. (C) Maliki explained that the Amnesty committee was
looking at an amnesty for those in detention as well as
some who are not but for whom a warrant had been issued.
He said that he wanted to include as many as possible,
but not murderers. There were also some constitutional
issues to be sorted out. That said, the judiciary might
decide on its own to release many detainees for lack of
evidence. He asked that Ambassador discuss with MNF-I
CG an amnesty for many of its detainees. Ambassador

BAGHDAD 00003834 003.2 OF 003


replied that someone from MNF-I should be included in
the work of Maliki's Amnesty committee. National
Security Advisor Muwaffaq Rubaie interjected that an
MNF-I officer was already engaged with the committee.
Maliki agreed with this arrangement. Ambassador wrapped up
the meeting by reminding Maliki that he had congratulated
him November 12 on his amnesty plans as a "bold initiative"
(reftel) and that an amnesty that was as broad as possible
would be a key to reconciliation.
CROCKER