KIRKUK/ARTICLE 140: SENIOR SUNNI POLITICIAN'S

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003828

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/23/2027
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS IZ TU IR
SUBJECT: KIRKUK/ARTICLE 140: SENIOR SUNNI POLITICIAN'S
VIEWS ON DISPOSITION OF KIRKUK

REF: A. ANKARA 2790 (NOTAL)

B. BAGHDAD 36XX (NOTAL/BARZANI MEMCON)

C. BAGHDAD 3595 (EXDIS)

Classified by Senior Political Adviser David D. Pearce for
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

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Summary
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1. (S) During a November 20 introductory meeting, senior
Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) official and Council of
Representatives (CoR) member Ayad al-Samaraie provided Senior
Adviser Pearce his views on Kirkuk and Article 140
implementation. Samaraie, expressing his personal thoughts,
believed it best if Kurdish borders remain unchanged for the
short/medium term, due to the likelihood of violent
interference by Iran and Turkey. He agreed there needs to be
agreement by political leaders on a process to address the
issue, to address elevated Kurdish expectations and Arab
resentments which feed into the insurgency and fuel false
impressions of tacit USG acceptance of Kurdish encroachments.
Both agreed that a solution on Article 140 will likely
require Presidency Council involvement (and United Nations
assistance) to reach an acceptable outcome. Samaraie
predicted Kurdish resistance to a strong UN role to resolve
the issue. He believed it useful for Pearce to travel to the
north, and offered names and groups to meet with in Ninewa
and the northern provinces to assess local views. End
summary.

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KRG Expands, Neighbors Interfere
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2. (S) In an introductory meeting on November 20 with senior
IIP parliamentarian Ayad al-Samaraie, Senior Political
Adviser Pearce conveyed the USG's strong interest in a fair,
transparent, and agreed process to address the issues of
Kirkuk and Article 140. Samaraie, expressing his personal
views, thought it best if the borders of the Kurdish Regional
Government (KRG) remained unchanged for the short/medium term
("until some other time") while Iraq's state institutions
strengthen sufficiently to address border alterations. "Once
Iraq is strong enough," he said, "even if Kirkuk decides to
join the KRG, no one can object." Based on his recent
consultations in Ankara and Tehran, Samaraie understands the
Turks and Iranians to be extremely anxious over any moves by
the KRG to increase its territory and resources, which they
would interpret as laying the groundwork for future
separation and independence by the region, with implications
for their own populations. Should events move in this
direction, he predicted, the neighbors would not sit back and
watch; "they will interfere if this is not handled
correctly." This was a danger that the Kurds and the GOI had
to be mindful of, he added. One possible solution, he
opined, is to let Kirkuk be "its own region." It would be an
Iraqi province separated from the KRG, and governed jointly
by the various ethnic groups there, but the Kurds would quite
possibly have a majority population and thus gain de facto
control of the province's affairs.

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Status Quo Problematic; Need Process
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3. (S) Pearce pointed out the risks of leaving the issue to
fester: elevated Kurdish expectations on the one hand, and
Arab apprehensions about Kurdish inroads on the other. On
the latter issue, Arab fears were feeding into the
insurgency, particularly in Ninewa Province where there was
strong Arab resentment at perceived disproportionate Kurdish
influence in provincial government (Comment: Due, of course,
to the Arab boycott of provincial elections. End comment).
There was an erroneous impression among Iraq's Arabs, Pearce
said, that Coalition Forces and the GOI were complicit in
Kurdish expansionism. Samaraie agreed, but noted his opinion
was one thing; what position his party would take on the
matter was something else. He acknowledged that if the Kurds
continued to press, the issue could not be resolved in the
Article 140 Committee and would need to go to the Presidency
Council for added traction. If the issue moved to the
Presidency Council, he added, it is likely the GOI would ask
the United Nations to help sort out the issue. But, he
added, the Kurds "don't want to give responsibility (for the
issue) to the UN; they'll want to solve it among Iraqis."

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U.S. Policy, Next Steps
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4. (S) Pearce said that the U.S. interest lay in a fair,
transparent, and agreed process. Establishment of such a
process was something that the Leaders and their Deputies
could actually achieve. Just putting a process for resolving
the complex Article 140 issues in place, he added, could help
with progress on other issues. The issue had to be addressed
soon. Samaraie, discussing a possible visit by Pearce to the
northern provinces to assess local views, offered suggestions
for people and groups with whom he should meet.
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Comment
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5. (S) Samaraie appeared to be unaware of recent stirrings
among the Kurdish leadership and in Turkey in favor of a UN
role on the Article 140 issue. However, it was noteworthy
that he too appeared to recognize that referral to the UN was
the most likely way forward.
CROCKER