MALIKI: SHOW MORE FLEXIBILITY ON SPD LANGUAGE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003818 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/20/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ SUBJECT: MALIKI: SHOW MORE FLEXIBILITY ON SPD LANGUAGE REF: BAGHDAD 3782 Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: In a November 18 meeting, the Ambassador and Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki reviewed ongoing discussions over the text of a proposed Strategic Partnership Declaration (SPD). In reply to the Ambassador's observation that proposed GOI changes to our latest working draft affects the integrity of the document, Maliki stated repeatedly that the two sides share common principles and that "natural" disagreements over language surrounding those principles can be overcome if each side demonstrates flexibility in a spirit of trust. Maliki brushed off the Ambassador's statement that our draft enjoys the broad support of the Iraqi political leadership by claiming that Iraqi political figures say one thing to the USG and another to the GOI and other Iraqis, citing the example of CoR Speaker Mashadani who has allegedly dubbed the GOI as "America's agent government." Maliki also asked for greater USG understanding of the "complexity of the Iraqi situation" and predicted the SPD would face significant opposition and could spark demonstrations. Maliki stated he would huddle with top advisors over text language, and National Security Advisor al-Rubaie agreed to meet with us November 19 to resume text review. After Maliki departed to a separate meeting, Rubaie and PM Advisor Sadeq al-Rikabi insisted that all aspects of a renewed UNSCR, including operative language, must be changed to reflect changes that have occurred in Iraq over the past year. Ambassador and NSC Senior Director for Iraq and Afghanistan McGurk pushed back hard, asserting that nothing good will come from such an approach. End Summary. "Natural" to Disagree Over Words -------------- ¶2. (C) The Ambassador opened the meeting by stating that the latest USG SPD draft captures the letter and intent of the August 26 leaders declaration, and that we have received affirmations of support for the draft from the Kurds (both GOI President Talabani and Masood Barzani),the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI),the Chairman of the Shia United Iraqi Alliance (UIA) Abdel Aziz al-Hakim, Vice President Adel Abdel Mehdi and Vice President Tareq al-Hashemi. All the leaders who stood with Maliki on the August 26 declaration now support our draft. He stated the USG has problems with the latest GOI SPD draft which proposed major textual changes, did not reflect the spirit of months of negotiations, and affected the integrity of our underlying agreement. Noting that Maliki would in a few minutes be chairing a meeting of the Political Committee for National Security (PCNS) to discuss SPD matters, he urged the PM to present the latest USG draft for PCNS review since our draft has the broad support of Iraq's political leadership. ¶3. (C) Maliki, who was joined by GOI National Security Advisor Muwafaq al-Rubaie and Advisor Sadeq al-Rikabi, replied that the GOI draft was not much different than the USG draft and that the two drafts share common principles and a common vision. Therefore, Maliki asserted, it was only natural that the two sides would quibble over a few words here and there. He said the GOI had sought from the beginning to preserve the August 26 leaders declaration language and issue the SPD as a general, non-binding statement of intent to enter into a long-term bilateral relationship, with relationship details to be negotiated at a later date. Since the USG has now introduced a more detailed draft SPD, he continued, it is natural that the GOI would seek to negotiate over the details. He surmised that the two sides could come to agreement if they focused on shared principles and each demonstrated flexibility and trust and did not try to impose terms on the other. The Ambassador replied that the USG had shown considerable flexibility as evidenced by the many changes we had already agreed to since the process began. In particular, he took issue with Maliki's characterization of the negotiations, noting that it was the USG that had agreed to back down from a more detailed text. The GOI was now presenting an entirely new draft that did not reflect months of intensive negotiations. ¶4. (C) Maliki downplayed the issue of broad Iraqi political support for the latest USG draft by claiming that Iraqi political figures ("our so-called partners") say one thing to the USG and another to the GOI and other Iraqis behind closed doors. For example, he questioned whether CoR Speaker Mashadani told us that he is telling other Iraqis that the GOI is "America's agent government." He said the UIA had approved the latest Iraqi SPD draft without proposing any changes. He also asked for greater USG sensitivity to the "complexity of the Iraqi situation," adding that he expects significant opposition to the SPD and even demonstrations against it by people "with different allegiances to different countries." He stated repeatedly that the two sides share BAGHDAD 00003818 002 OF 002 common principles and that "natural" disagreements over language surrounding those principles can be overcome if each side demonstrates flexibility. He left the meeting to chair the PCNS gathering by noting that he hoped the PCNS would produce comments and suggestions to be incorporated into a "unified" Iraqi position in anticipation of further bilateral discussions over the SPD text. He mentioned that the GOI might discuss the "unified position" with the CoR as early as November 19 if the PCNS agreed. The Ambassador asked that the latest GOI draft not be presented to the PCNS as a text on which the USG and GOI had agreed. Tedious UNSCR Discussion with PM Aides -------------- ¶5. (C) After Maliki's abrupt departure, Rubaie and Rikabi spoke at some length about their views on the SPD and the related UNSCR extension. While it appeared initially that the two were employing the time-honored "good cop/bad cop" discursive approach, it soon became impossible to determine "good cop" identity. Over the Ambassador's repeated objections, Rikabi (and, to a somewhat lesser extent, Rubaie) insisted that all aspects of a renewed UNSCR, including operative language, must be changed to reflect the change that has occurred in Iraq over the past year. NSC Senior Director McGurk stated that the SPD will commit the USG to removal of UN Chapter 7 authority over Iraq after one final UNSCR renewal, which should be drafted with minimal change in order to ensure a smooth UNSC approval process. He explained that this was the agreed-upon procedure, which the Iraqis were now attempting to change at the last minute. Rikabi stated that the GOI must come to agreement with the CoR over any future resolution, claiming that the CoR had passed a law which gives it the power to review in advance all terms of future UNSCR mandates. ¶6. (C) The Ambassador urged the GOI to insert preamble language regarding the many positive changes the GOI and MNF-I have achieved in partnership over the past year, but no changes should be made to the operative paragraphs, which would only result in game-playing by other UNSC members such as Russia and leave Iraq without a follow-on resolution on December 31. Issues covered in the operative paragraphs should not be debated by numerous countries in a multilateral forum, he continued, but rather should be negotiated only between the U.S. and Iraq in the context of our long-term bilateral relationship. He stated that if the GOI truly intends for the UNSCR to signal a positive change in Iraq, an affirmation that the renewal would be the last Chapter 7 extension is the strongest signal possible. Rikabi blurted that changes in preamble language would be "meaningless," and neither he nor Rubaie appeared concerned about the possibility of expiration of the current UNSCR without a follow-on mandate. Rubaie dodged the Ambassador's contention that Iraq's political leaders would support a renewed UNSCR with minimal changes by claiming that a modified UNSCR would help remove "friction and irritants" between the GOI and MNF-I. The Ambassador replied that we should not overstate the degree of "irritation," and focus instead on the progress we continue to make in partnership. Rubaie closed the meeting by stating the two sides must be "creative" in bridging clear differences, and he agreed to meet early on November 19 to resume discussions over SPD text. Comment -------------- ¶7. (C) Our readout of the PCNS session that followed this meeting confirms that Iraqi political leaders unanimously pushed back on the Maliki/Rikabi/Rubaie plan to reopen the operative provisions of the UNSCR. We have made clear that this issue is a red line for the United States -- and unacceptable. CROCKER